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In this thesis, we study Bayesian games with two players and two actions (2 by 2
games) in realistic settings where private information is correlated or players have
scarcity of attention. The contribution of this thesis is to shed further light on strategic
interactions in realistic settings.
Chapter 1 gives an introduction of the research and contributions of this thesis. In
Chapter 2, we study how the correlation of private information affects rational agents’
choice in a symmetric game of strategic substitutes. The game we study is a static 2 by
2 entry game. Private information is assumed to be jointly normally distributed. The
game can, for some parameter values, be solved by a cutoff strategy: that is enter if the
private payoff shock is above some cutoff value and do not enter otherwise. Chapter
2 shows that there is a restriction on the value of correlation coefficient such that the
game can be solved by the use of cutoff strategies. In this strategic-substitutes game,
there are two possibilities. When the game can be solved by cutoff strategies, either,
the game exhibits a unique (symmetric) equilibrium for any value of correlation co-
efficient; or, there is a threshold value for the correlation coefficient such that there is
a unique (symmetric) equilibrium if the correlation coefficient is below the threshold,
while if the correlation coefficient is above the threshold value, there are three equi-
libria: a symmetric equilibrium and two asymmetric equilibria. To understand how
parameter changes affect players’ equilibrium behaviour, a comparative statics analy-
sis on symmetric equilibrium is conducted. It is found that increasing monopoly profit
or duopoly profit encourages players to enter the market, while increasing information
correlation or jointly increasing the variances of players’ prior distribution will make
players more likely to choose entry if the equilibrium cutoff strategies are below the
unconditional mean, and less likely to choose entry if the current equilibrium cutoff
strategies are above the unconditional mean.
In Chapter 3, we study a 2 by 2 entry game of strategic complements in which
players’ private information is correlated. As in Chapter 2, the game is symmetric and
private information is modelled by a joint normal distribution. We use a cutoff strategy
as defined in Chapter 2 to solve the game. Given other parameters, there exists a crit-
ical value of the correlation coefficient. For correlation coefficient below this critical
value, cutoff strategies cannot be used to solve the game. We explore the number of
equilibria and comparative static properties of the solution with respect to the correla-
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tion coefficient and the variance of the prior distribution. As the correlation coefficient
changes from the lowest feasible (such that cutoff strategies are applicable) value to
one, the sequence of the number of equilibrium will be 3 to 2 to 1, or 3 to 1. Alterna-
tively, under some parameter specifications, the game exhibits a unique equilibrium for
all feasible value of the correlation coefficient. The comparative statics of equilibrium
strategies depends on the sign of the equilibrium cutoff strategies and the equilibrium’s
stability.
We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a unique
equilibrium. This necessary and sufficient condition nests the sufficient condition
for uniqueness given by Morris and Shin (2005). Finally, if the correlation coeffi-
cient is negative for the strategic-complements games or positive for the strategic-
substitutes games, there exists a critical value of variance such that for a variance
below this threshold, the game cannot be solved in cutoff strategies. This implies that
Harsanyi’s (1973) purification rationale, supposing the perturbed games are solved by
cutoff strategies and the uncertainty of perturbed games vanishes as the variances of
the perturbation-error distribution converge to zero, cannot be applied for a strategic-
substitutes (strategic-complements) game with dependent perturbation errors that fol-
low a joint normal distribution if the correlation coefficient is positive (negative). How-
ever, if the correlation coefficient is positive for the strategic-complements games or
negative for the strategic-substitutes games, the purification rationale is still applica-
ble even with dependent perturbation errors. There are Bayesian games that converge
to the underlying complete information game as the perturbation errors degenerate to
zero, and every pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the perturbed games will
converge to the corresponding Nash equilibrium of the complete information game in
the limit.
In Chapter 4, we study how scarcity of attention affects strategic choice behaviour
in a 2 by 2 incomplete information strategic-substitutes entry game. Scarcity of at-
tention is a common psychological characteristic (Kahneman 1973) and it is modelled
by the rational inattention approach introduced by Sims (1998). In our game, players
acquire information about their own private payoff shocks (which here follows a high-
low binary distribution) at a cost.
We find that, given the opponent’s strategy, as the unit cost of information ac-
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quisition increases a player’s best response will switch from acquiring information to
simply comparing the ex-ante expected payoff of each action (using the player’s prior).
By studying symmetric Bayesian games, we find that scarcity of attention can generate
multiple equilibria in games that ordinarily have a unique equilibrium. These multi-
ple equilibria are generated by the information cost. In any Bayesian game where
there are multiple equilibria, there always exists one pair of asymmetric equilibria in
which at least one player plays the game without acquiring information. The num-
ber of equilibria differs with the value of the unit information cost. There can be 1,
5 or 3 equilibria. Increasing the unit information cost could encourage or discourage
a player from choosing entry. It depends on whether the prior probability of a high
payoff shock is greater or less than some threshold value. We compare the rational
inattention Bayesian game with a Bayesian quantal response equilibrium game where
the observation errors are additive and follow a Type I extreme value distribution. A
necessary and sufficient condition is established such that both the rational inattention
Bayesian game and quantal response game have a common equilibrium.
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Chapter 1
Strategic Choices in Realistic
Settings: Introduction
In this thesis, we study how Bayesian players strategically interact in real settings.
The real settings refer to correlated private information and scarcity of attention. We
introduce the two features into a conventional 2× 2 Bayesian game and study how
these features affect a player’s strategic choice behaviour. The contributions of this
thesis shed further lights on the essence of strategic interactions in the real world and
provide us with fresh insight into modelling strategic interactions in a realistic setting.
1.1 Introduction
A 2-player entry game is one of the standard Bayesian games that has been widely
studied in economics. Its basic form can be expressed as shown in Table 11:
Player i∗
















1In this thesis, we use ∗ to denote any variable of the opponent. Particularly, i = (i∗)∗.
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Table 1: The strategic form of a conventional incomplete information entry game
After observing their respective private payoff shocks ε and ε∗, the players make
their individual action decisions simultaneously. ε and ε∗ have a joint distribution
F(ε,ε∗). Player i’s payoff of choosing action 1 is additively composed by a determin-
istic payoff (M or D) and the private payoff shock ε, and player i’s payoff of choosing
action 0 is 0. Both players collect their payoffs at the end of the game.
The entry game that we have described here makes some strong simplifying as-
sumptions, which this thesis seeks to relax. Specifically, in almost all existing literature
related to such a game, either theoretical or empirical, ε and ε∗ are assumed indepen-
dent and players can always pay full attention to their observations. In this thesis,
we modify the standard Bayesian game by introducing two ‘grains of sands’—private
information correlation and scarcity of attention. Private information correlation mod-
ifies the information environment and scarcity of attention introduces humanity into
rational agents. In this thesis, our main objectives are as follows: (i) to examine ra-
tional agents’ strategic choice behaviour in a realistic information environment, which
is modelled by correlated private information (Chapters 2 and 3), and (ii) to study
how rational agents with scarcity of attention make strategic choices in the standard
independent-type private information environment (Chapter 4).
1.2 Correlated Private Information (Chapters 2 and 3)
1.2.1 Chapter 2
In Chapter 2, we develop and present a simple model of duopoly entry with correlated
private information based on the 2-player static version of the dynamic entry game
studied by Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008). In a 2-player static entry game,
two identical competing firms simultaneously decide whether to enter a market after
observing their respective private payoff shocks. However, unlike conventional entry
games, these shocks are not idiosyncratic in this game. This is because there are com-
mon and idiosyncratic components of each payoff shock, and each firm only observes
its own aggregate shock without knowing its components. An example of this situa-
tion is two firms that produce the same good competing for the same market. Each firm
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expects the private payoff shocks of entry to be correlated with each other, especially
when these shocks depend on some common factors of the market.
In Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler’s (2008) dynamic entry game where payoff
shocks are independent, cutoff strategies are always assumed to be used.2 We show
that in the correlated-information static game, there is a restriction on the value of in-
formation correlation. If the value of the given correlation coefficient does not satisfy
this restriction, a cutoff strategy cannot be used to solve the static game. This is de-
termined by the normality of the joint prior distribution and the definition of the cutoff
strategy. The intuition is that if the correlation coefficient is greater than this critical
value, the expected payoff function is no longer monotonic with respect to a player’s
own private payoff shock, given any strategy of the opponent. For some strategies of
the opponent, there are multiple (three) best responses. One of the three best responses
will make a player choose entry if the payoff shock is below the best response cutoff
value, which contradicts the definition of the cutoff strategy.
Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler’s (2008) numerical analysis of a dynamic duopoly
entry game with idiosyncratic normally distributed payoff shocks have at least five
equilibria. The game assumes that players adopt a cutoff strategy. We analytically
prove that for a static correlated-information duopoly entry game, in which payoff
shocks are not only normally distributed but also linked by the correlation coefficient,
there are at most three equilibria, and hence, for the static version of Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler’s (2008) numerical example also (assuming a discount factor equal to
zero), in which payoff shocks are independent and normally distributed, there should
be at most three equilibria. Furthermore, we provide the comparative statics of the
number of equilibria with respect to the correlation coefficient.3 It is found that for
higher degree of information correlation, it is more likely that asymmetric equilibria,
i.e. one firm on average prefers entry more than the opponent does, arise. The intuition
is that the uncertainty between the players’ private payoff shocks is measured by the
2Cutoff strategies are defined as when a player’s private payoff shock is above a threshold value,
they choose entry, or vice versa.
3In an independent econometrics paper, Xu (2014) finds a sufficient condition to ensure a unique
equilibrium for a 2-player static entry game with flexible payoff specification and positively correlated
players’ types in order to identify such type of games. We find that his sufficient condition to ensure
a unique equilibrium by using a joint normal distribution as the prior distribution is equivalent to the
necessary and sufficient condition to ensure that the best response function is a contraction function;
this is provided by our Proposition 2. For details, please see Section 2.3. By far, Xu (2014) is the only
literature that is the most relevant to this chapter.
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correlation coefficient, and this uncertainty determines whether a player’s conditional
density function of the opponent’s payoff shock, given the player’s own private pay-
off shock, can approximately or imprecisely reflect the opponent’s private information
(private payoff shock).4 5 If the uncertainty between the players’ private payoff shocks
is low (high), then the conditional density function can approximately (imprecisely)
reflect the opponent’s private payoff shock given the player’s own shock . If the con-
ditional density function can approximately reflect the opponent’s private information,
multiple equilibria arise. If the conditional density function is imprecise to reflect the
opponent ’s private information, the game exhibits a unique equilibrium. In the strate-
gic substitutes game, high (low) value of the information correlation coefficient usually
represents low (high) uncertainty between the players’ private information. However,
it is also possible that given certain parameter specifications, the uncertainty between
players’ private information is high for high values of the correlation coefficient, and
so the conditional density function imprecisely reflects the opponent’s private infor-
mation. Accordingly, the game exhibits a unique equilibrium in this situation. These
intuitions are established when the best response functions are not contraction function.
If the best response functions are contraction function, each player is more focused on
the knowledge of himself and the opponent’s information becomes less important in
a player’s decision making. This situation is close to that of an individual decision
problem, and hence the game exhibits a unique equilibrium.
Introducing information correlation into an entry game is motivated by the follow-
ing considerations. First, it is consistent with the widely observed fact that private
information, in any form, is hard to be independent. Two entities’ private information
often depends on some fundamental factors such as the custom of a society or climate.
Therefore, each entity has some power of learning or inferring the other entity’s private
information through the fundamentals. Second, to understand how information corre-
lation affects rational agents’ behaviour itself is an interesting topic and few studies
about this topic are conducted from the perspective of game theory. Third, and perhaps
most importantly, solving the game analytically to understand the inherent structure of
4Suppose two random variables ε and ε∗. If ε and ε∗ are subject to the relation ε∗ = aε+b+η, where
a and b are real numbers and η is a random variable, then we say there exists uncertainty between ε and
ε∗ and this uncertainty is given by η. Suppose the correlation coefficient between ε and ε∗ is given by
ρ. Because the relation ε∗ = aε+b+η holds as long as the correlation coefficient ρ ∈ (−1,1), we can
consider using ρ to measure the uncertainty between players’ private information.
5To understand how the density function can reflect the opponent’s private information given a
player’s own private information, please refer to Section 2.4.
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the game, i.e. how many equilibria exist and what they are, is technically challenging
and is crucial for some further technical application, e.g. identification and estimation
of games. This study is also the first step to solve a 2-player correlated-information
dynamic entry game. Furthermore, it is a technical preparation to analytically under-
stand a dynamic entry game.
The simplicity of the proposed model makes it well suited for exploring how pa-
rameter changes, especially the information correlation coefficient, impact players’
equilibrium behaviour. To show this, we calculate the comparative statics of monopoly
profit, duopoly profit, variances of prior distribution and the information correlation co-
efficient, on firms’ equilibrium entry threshold in the symmetric equilibrium. We find
that increasing the monopoly profit or duopoly profit can always encourage players to
adopt lower cutoff strategies and so they are more likely to choose entry. If the present
cutoff strategies are positive, then increasing the information correlation or jointly in-
creasing the variances of type distribution will make both players adopt higher cutoff
strategies, i.e. they become less likely to choose entry. In contrast, if the present cutoff
strategies are negative, then increasing the information correlation or the variances of
prior distribution will encourage players to adopt lower cutoff strategies, i.e. they be-
come more likely to choose entry. If the present cutoff strategies equal zero, changing
the correlation coefficient or jointly varying the variances of prior distribution does not
affect the cutoff strategies.
The intuition is that, if we increase monopoly profit or duopoly profit, the payoff
of entry increases and it thereby encourages a player to choose entry. If we change
the correlation coefficient, the mean of the conditional distribution of the opponent’s
payoff shock given a player’s own payoff shock changes and the mean has a dominant
impact on the player’s belief towards the opponent’s strategy given their own strat-
egy. The change of mean depends on the sign of the symmetric equilibrium strategies.
If we jointly change the variances of the prior distribution, only the variance of the
conditional distribution of the opponent’s payoff shock given the player’s own shock
changes. Increasing the variances will assign higher likelihood on low and high pay-
off shocks in the conditional distribution of the opponent’s payoff shock, or vice versa,
and the sign of a symmetric equilibrium strategy determines whether this strategy is lo-
cated in the high payoff shock area or the low payoff shock area in the distribution. The
different location determines the different impacts of changing variances on a player’s
6 Chapter 1. Strategic Choices in Realistic Settings: Introduction
belief.
1.2.2 Chapter 3
In Chapter 3, we develop and exhibit a simple model of duopoly entry with correlated
private information in a 2-player static strategic complements game. In this game,
D > M and is represented as shown in Table 1. The game is symmetrically specified.
In the game, after observing their respective private payoff shocks, the two player firms
simultaneously decide whether to enter a market. The private payoff shocks are sta-
tistically correlated, and the correlation coefficient of players’ joint type distribution
measures the degree of information correlation. An example of this situation is two
firms that produce complementary inputs entering a local market. One firm expects its
private payoff shocks of entry to be correlated with the other firm’s because the shocks
depend on some common factors of the market. Each firm observes its own aggregated
shock without knowing its components, for example, the common factors and idiosyn-
cratic noises if they additively form the aggregated shock.
The game is solved by a cutoff strategy, which is defined as if a player’s private
payoff shock is above a threshold value, they choose entry, or vice versa. By solving
the game, we find a critical value of the correlation coefficient. For correlation coeffi-
cients below this critical value, a cutoff strategy cannot be used to solve the game. This
result is determined by the normality of the joint prior distribution and the definition
of the cutoff strategy. The intuition is that if the correlation coefficient is smaller than
this critical value, the expected payoff function is no longer monotonic with respect to
the player’s own strategies, given any strategy of the opponent. For some strategies of
the opponent, there are multiple (three) best responses. One of the three best responses
will make a player choose entry if the payoff shock is below the best response cutoff
value, which contradicts the definition of cutoff strategies.
Under some parameter specifications, the game exhibits a unique equilibrium. Un-
der other parameter specifications, there may exist two or three equilibria and the num-
ber of equilibria changes in the following order as the correlation coefficient increases
from the lowest feasible value to 1: 3→ 2→ 1 or 3→ 1. The intuition is that the
uncertainty between players’ private payoff shocks is measured by the correlation co-
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efficient, and the uncertainty between players’ private information determines whether
a player’s conditional density of the opponent’s payoff shocks given the player’s own
payoff shock can approximately or imprecisely reflect the opponent’s private infor-
mation.6 7 If the uncertainty between players’ private payoff shocks is low (high),
then the conditional density function can approximately (imprecisely) reflect the op-
ponent’s private information. If the density function can approximately reflect the
other players’ private information, then players can obtain enough information to help
them match their action strategies, hence leading to multiple equilibria. Otherwise,
players cannot obtain enough information to help them match their action strategies
and hence the game exhibits a unique equilibrium. In the strategic complements game,
high (low) value of correlation coefficient usually represents high (low) uncertainty
between players’ private information. However, it is also possible that for certain pa-
rameter specifications, the game has a unique equilibrium for all feasible values of the
correlation coefficient. This is because due to the concerned payoff specification, the
two players’ ex ante expectations of the opponent’s behaviour are unique, irrespective
of what payoff shocks will be drawn. Ex ante in this chapter means the expectation is
formed before the payoff shocks are drawn, and hence, the expectation is taken for all
possible values of payoff shocks. Therefore, we call it ex ante expectation. The ex-
pectations are that both players are more likely to choose being inactive, active or not
sure whether the opponent is more likely to choose being inactive or active, or more
likely to be indifferent to either action choice. Accordingly, the game exhibits a unique
equilibrium to echo the respective expectations.8
6As in Chapter 2, the uncertainty between players’ payoff shocks (random variables) indicate that for
two random variables ε and ε∗, the relation ε∗ = aε+b+η holds, where a and b are two real numbers
and η is a random variable that is used to reflect the uncertainty between players’ private information.
Still, we can consider to use the correlation coefficient between the two random variables to measure
the uncertainty between them.
7To understand how the density function can reflect the opponent’s private information given a
player’s own private information, please refer to Section 2.4 of Chapter 2
8Specifically, if the expectation is that both players are more likely to choose being inactive or that
both players are more likely to choose being active, the expectation is dominant in a player’s decision
making and the uncertainty between players’ private information takes a minor role in his decision
making. However, if the expectation is that players are not sure whether the opponent is more likely
to choose being inactive or active, or more likely to be indifferent to either action choice, only when
the uncertainty between players’ private information is high, the expectation is dominant in a player’s
decision making. These intuitions are established when the best response functions are not contraction
function. If the best response functions are contraction function, each player is more focused on the
knowledge of himself and the opponent’s information becomes less important in a player’s decision
making. This situation is close to that of an individual decision problem, and hence the game exhibits a
unique equilibrium.
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The equilibrium strategies are represented by the cutoff strategies, which take all
real numbers. The comparative statics of the correlation coefficient or variances of
prior distribution on players’ equilibrium strategies depend on the sign of the equilib-
rium strategy and the stability of the equilibrium.9 For a stable equilibrium, increasing
the payoff of entry will make a player more likely choose entry. If the given equilibrium
cutoff strategies are negative, increasing the information correlation or jointly increas-
ing the variances of the joint prior distribution will make players less likely choose
entry. If the given equilibrium cutoff strategies are positive, increasing information
correlation or jointly increasing the variances of the joint prior distribution will make
players more likely choose entry. If the given equilibrium cutoff strategies equal zero,
changing the information correlation or variances of the joint prior distribution does
not have any impact on the equilibrium strategies. For unstable equilibrium, increas-
ing the payoff of entry will make a player less likely choose entry, which contradicts
our common sense. Because we use a cutoff strategy to solve the game, if the payoff of
entry increases, then given the opponent’s strategy, a player will more likely choose en-
try. Because the game exhibits positive externalities in payoffs, the opponent will also
be more likely to choose entry as the best response to the player’s change of strategies
more favouring entry. Given this best response dynamics, no strategy will converge
to an equilibrium in which increasing the payoff of entry makes a player less likely to
choose entry. This situation satisfies the Lyapunovian instability of an equilibrium and
hence such an equilibrium is unstable.
In this symmetric game, the variances of players’ prior distribution are assumed to
be identical. There is an equivalence relationship between how the number of equilib-
ria varies with the variances and with the correlation coefficient. We find that under
certain parameter specifications, the game exhibits a unique equilibrium. Under other
parameter specifications, the number of equilibria changes in the following order as
variances increase from the lowest feasible value to +∞: 3→ 2→ 1 or 3→ 1. The
intuition is that the uncertainty of a player’s private payoff shock is determined by
the variance of the player’s prior distribution, and the uncertainty of both players’
private payoff shocks determines whether the conditional density of the opponent’s
payoff shocks given the player’s own payoff shock can approximately or imprecisely
reflect the opponent’s private information.10 If the uncertainty of both players’ private
9The stability concept adopted in this chapter is Lyapunov stability.
10In this chapter, no matter how the variances change, they are always assumed to be identical. There-
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payoff shocks is low (high), then the conditional density function can approximately
(imprecisely) reflect the opponent’s private information. Still, multiple equilibria arise
when the density function can approximately reflect the opponent’s private informa-
tion given the player’s own private information. Otherwise, the game exhibits a unique
equilibrium when the density function is imprecise to reflect the opponent’s private
information given the player’s own private information. The low (high) value of the
variance usually represents low (high) uncertainty of a player’s private information in
the strategic complements game. However, it is also possible that for certain parameter
specifications, the game has a unique equilibrium for all feasible values of variances.
Similar to the corresponding case for the uncertainty between players’ private infor-
mation, this is also because due to the concerned payoff specification, the two players’
ex ante expectations of the opponent’s behaviour are unique, irrespective of what pay-
off shocks will be drawn, and the expectations are that both players are more likely to
choose being inactive, active or not sure whether the opponent is more likely to choose
being inactive or active, or more likely to be indifferent to either action choice.11
The comparative statics of the number of equilibria with respect to variances is also
the necessary and sufficient condition to differentiate unique equilibrium and multiple
equilibria. Morris and Shin (2005) study an identically specified game and provide a
sufficient condition for unique equilibrium. They focus on how introducing strategic
uncertainty can reduce the number of equilibria of a complete information game. The
complete information game is symmetric and strategic complements. They also use
the cutoff strategy defined in this chapter to solve the game. They argue that when
the strategic uncertainty (belief) is sufficiently invariant with respect to all possible
strategies, there is a unique equilibrium. Based on this insight, they obtain a suffi-
cient condition to ensure the game exhibits a unique equilibrium. We find that their
sufficient condition is essentially the necessary and sufficient to ensure that the best
response functions are contraction functions. If both players’ best response functions
are contractions, then the game is dominance solvable and hence there exists a unique
equilibrium. Therefore, we nest Morris and Shin’s (2005) result.
fore, we consider the uncertainty of both players’ private information (payoff shocks).
11Specifically, if the expectation is that both players are more likely to choose being inactive or that
both players are more likely to choose being active, the expectation is dominant in a player’s decision
making and the uncertainty of the player’s private information takes a minor role in his decision making.
However, if the expectation is that players are not sure whether the opponent is more likely to choose
being inactive or active, or more likely to be indifferent to either action choice, only when the uncertainty
of each player’s private information is high, the expectation is dominant in a player’s decision making.
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The incomplete information entry game can be viewed as a perturbed game of a
complete information entry game. According to Harsanyi (1973)’s purification ratio-
nale, if the perturbation errors on each player’s payoff are independent, a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium exists that will converge to the mixed strategy equilibrium as pertur-
bation errors tend to zero. In our game, we specify that the variances of the perturbation-
error distribution converge to zero, as the process that uncertainty of perturbed games
vanishes. We find that, for the strategic complements complete information games if
the perturbation errors are negatively correlated, or for the strategic substitutes com-
plete information games if the perturbation errors are positively correlated, there does
not exist a Bayesian game that can be solved by the cutoff strategy as perturbation
errors tend to zero. Hence, Harsanyi’s purification rationale cannot be applied to this
situation. The intuition is that by assuming the variances of both players’ type distri-
butions are identical, for negative information correlation in the strategic complements
game or the positive correlation in the strategic substitutes game, there exists a critical
value of variances, below which the expected payoff function is not monotonic with
respect to a player’s own private payoff shock, and it is possible that given some of the
opponent’s strategies, the player can have multiple (three) best responses; around one
of the best responses, a payoff shock that is below the best response cutoff value can
make the player choose entry, which contradicts the definition of the cutoff strategy.
Therefore, for negative information correlation in the strategic complements game or
positive information correlation in the strategic substitutes game, only if the variances
are above the cutoff value, the game can be solved by cutoff strategies.
However, if the information correlation is positive for the strategic complements
games or negative for the strategic substitutes games, the purification rationale is still
applicable. We find that in these situations, the Bayesian games that are supposed to
converge to the complete information game as the perturbation errors that degener-
ate to zero exist, and during the process, the pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium
will converge to the corresponding Nash equilibrium of the underlying complete in-
formation game. Therefore, we extend Harsanyi’s purification rationale to dependent
perturbation-error situations.
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1.3 Scarcity of Attention (Chapter 4)
In Chapter 4, we study how scarcity of attention affects players’ strategic behaviour
in an incomplete information environment with strategic substitutes. The interac-
tion paradigm and sequence of actions still follow Table 1. In this game, we assume
M > D and payoff shocks ε (and ε∗) follows a bivariate distribution: ε ∈ {u,d}, where
Pr(u) = p ∈ (0,1) and u > d. Further, to ensure that the underlying game is domi-
nance solvable, we assume M +d < 0 and D+u > 0.12 The only difference between
this game and the conventional Bayesian games is that both players cannot pay full
attention to their observations of private payoff shocks. However, both players can
acquire information about their private payoff shocks at a cost, and the information
acquisition process in this game is modelled by the rational inattention approach. Psy-
chologists have found that scarcity of attention can account for randomized choice,
and in economics literature, Woodford (2008, 2009) and Matějka and Mckay (2015)
independently develop the randomized choice theory in the rational inattention frame-
work. The objective of Chapter 4 is to investigate how agents with scarcity of attention
strategically interact in an incomplete information environment.
The analysis in this chapter is in line with the literature of entry games. Entry
games have been widely studied in industrial organization literature, and it is the most
typical form for modelling strategic substitutes behaviour. However, no literature ex-
ists that study how psychological factors affect firms’ competition. There is a void
related to this topic in the industrial organization literature, which this chapter is ini-
tially motivated to fill.
Assuming both players’ information costs are identical, we first find that there ex-
ists a critical value of information cost.13 If the given information costs of both players
are below this value, the game is a Bayesian game. If the given information costs of
both players are above or equal to this value, the game becomes a complete information
game, in which the players make their best responses without acquiring information,
given any strategy of the opponent.
Next, by studying symmetric games, we find that scarcity of attention can generate
12The underlying games are the Bayesian games in which players have full attention to their observa-
tion.
13In this chapter, for simplicity, we refer to information cost to indicate the unit information cost.
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multiple equilibria, and different values of information costs lead to different num-
bers of equilibria.14 A general rule is that jointly increasing both players’ information
costs first increases and then decreases the number of equilibria. Specifically, in the
symmetric rational inattention Bayesian games, we find that given other primitives,
by jointly increasing the information costs from 0 to +∞, the number of equilibria
appears in the following sequence: 1→ 3→ 5→ 3 if multiple equilibria can arise. Al-
ternatively, there always exists a unique equilibrium for any value of information cost.
In addition, we find that in any multiplicity situation, there always exists one pair of
asymmetric equilibria in which at least one player plays without acquiring information
and relies on his prior knowledge. These results about the game’s equilibria are mainly
caused by the concavity–convexity property of the part of the second iteration of the
best response functions in which both players play the game by acquiring information.
Furthermore, the concavity–convexity property is ultimately induced by the structure
of entropy functions.15
For comparative statics of equilibrium strategies, we find that in the symmetric
equilibrium and outer asymmetric equilibrium, any improvement in players’ expected
payoff of entry can increase the probability of entry.16 If we jointly increase both play-
ers’ information costs, its impact depends on the relative magnitude between the prior
probability of high payoff shock and a threshold value. If the prior probability of high
payoff shock is higher (or lower) than the threshold value, increasing the information
cost will increase (or decrease) the probability of entry. If the prior probability of high
payoff shock equals the threshold value, increasing the information cost does not have
any impact on the probability of entry. There is no conclusive result about comparative
statics of inner asymmetric equilibrium without particular parameter specification. Fi-
nally, in any equilibrium, if we change only one player’s information cost, its impacts
on both players’ equilibrium strategies are not clear without particular parameter spec-
ification, but its impact on a player’s strategy is found to be always opposite to that on
the opponent’s strategy.
14A symmetric game is defined as a game in which the parameter specifications of both players are
identical, particularly the information costs of both players.
15The concavity–convexity property means that as the value of a player’s strategy increases, the part
of the second iteration of the best response functions in which both players acquire information first
exhibits concavity and then exhibits convexity. For details, please refer to Section 4.7 of Chapter 4.
16In this game, there are three types of equilibrium: symmetric equilibrium, outer asymmetric equilib-
rium and inner asymmetric equilibrium. They are named according to their location at the best response
functions.
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We also study how information cost affects a player’s expected payoff. A player’s
information cost does not have any impact on the player’s expected payoff, but the op-
ponent’s information cost can affect the player’s expected payoff through the player’s
belief towards the opponent’s behaviour. Except particular parameter specification,
there is no conclusive result about at what value of the opponent’s information cost,
the player’s expected payoff reaches its highest value.
Finally, we study a game in which the players observe their private payoff shocks
with an additive noise that follows Type I extreme value distribution. The solution con-
cept is therefore (Bayesian) Quantal Response Equilibria. The similar-looking strate-
gic choice models motivate us to further consider under what conditions the two games
can be identical. It is found that there exists a specific set of parameter specification
under which both games have a common equilibrium (12 ,
1
2). Except this situation, the
two games will not coincide.
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Chapter 2
Strategic Entry with Correlated Private
Information
This chapter studies how correlation of players’ private information affects their strate-
gic behaviour. We introduce information correlation into a static 2-player strategic
substitutes entry game. The degree of information correlation is measured by the cor-
relation coefficient of a symmetric joint normal distribution, which is used to model
players’ prior distribution. It is found that a cutoff strategy cannot be used for all
values of correlation coefficient to solve the game and there exists a threshold correla-
tion coefficient value to differentiate the unique-equilibrium and the multiple (three)-
equilibria situations given other parameters. Finally, by comparative statics analysis
of symmetric equilibrium strategies, we find that increasing the payoff of entry en-
courages players to adopt a lower entry threshold, while increasing the information
correlation or jointly increasing the variances of prior distribution increases the posi-
tive entry threshold and lowers the negative entry threshold.
2.1 Introduction
This chapter develops and presents a simple model of duopoly entry with correlated
private information based on a 2-player static version of the dynamic entry game stud-
ied by Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008). In a 2-player static entry game, two
identical competing firms simultaneously decide whether to enter a market after ob-
serving their respective private payoff shocks. However, unlike conventional entry
games, these shocks are not idiosyncratic in this game. This is because there are com-
15
16 Chapter 2. Strategic Entry with Correlated Private Information
mon and idiosyncratic components of each payoff shock, and each firm only observes
its own aggregate shock without knowing its components. An example of this situa-
tion is two firms that produce the same good competing for the same market. Each firm
expects the private payoff shocks of entry to be correlated with each other, especially
when these shocks depend on certain common factors of the market.
In Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler’s (2008) dynamic entry game where payoff
shocks are independent, cutoff strategies are always assumed to be used.1 We show
that in the correlated-information static game, there is a restriction on the value of in-
formation correlation. If the value of the given correlation coefficient does not satisfy
this restriction, a cutoff strategy cannot be used to solve the static game. This is de-
termined by the normality of the joint prior distribution and the definition of the cutoff
strategy. The intuition is that if the correlation coefficient is greater than this critical
value, the expected payoff function is no longer monotonic with respect to a player’s
own private payoff shock, given any strategy of the opponent. For some strategies of
the opponent, there are multiple (three) best responses. One of the three best responses
will make a player choose entry if the payoff shock is below the best response cutoff
value, which contradicts the definition of the cutoff strategy.
Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler’s (2008) numerical analysis of a dynamic duopoly
entry game with idiosyncratic normally distributed payoff shocks have at least five
equilibria. The game assumes that players adopt a cutoff strategy. We analytically
prove that for a static correlated-information duopoly entry game, in which payoff
shocks are not only normally distributed but also linked by the correlation coefficient,
there are at most three equilibria, and hence, for the static version of Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler’s (2008) numerical example also (assuming a discount factor equal to
zero), in which payoff shocks are independent and normally distributed, there should
be at most three equilibria. Furthermore, we provide the comparative statics of the
number of equilibria with respect to the correlation coefficient.2 It is found that for
1Cutoff strategies are defined as when a player’s private payoff shock is above a threshold value,
they choose entry, or vice versa.
2In an independent econometrics paper, Xu (2014) finds a sufficient condition to ensure a unique
equilibrium for a 2-player static entry game with flexible payoff specification and positively correlated
players’ types in order to identify such type of games. We find that his sufficient condition to ensure
a unique equilibrium by using a joint normal distribution as the prior distribution is equivalent to the
necessary and sufficient condition to ensure that the best response function is a contraction function;
this is provided by our Proposition 2. For details, please see Section 2.3. By far, Xu (2014) is the only
literature that is the most relevant to this chapter.
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higher degree of information correlation, it is more likely that asymmetric equilibria,
i.e. one firm on average prefers entry more than the opponent does, arise. The intuition
is that the uncertainty between the players’ private payoff shocks is measured by the
correlation coefficient, and this uncertainty determines whether a player’s conditional
density function of the opponent’s payoff shock, given the player’s own private pay-
off shock, can approximately or imprecisely reflect the opponent’s private information
(private payoff shock).3 4 If the uncertainty between the players’ private payoff shocks
is low (high), then the conditional density function can approximately (imprecisely)
reflect the opponent’s private payoff shock given the player’s own shock . If the con-
ditional density function can approximately reflect the opponent’s private information,
multiple equilibria arise. If the conditional density function is imprecise to reflect the
opponent ’s private information, the game exhibits a unique equilibrium. In the strate-
gic substitutes game, high (low) value of the information correlation coefficient usually
represents low (high) uncertainty between the players’ private information. However,
it is also possible that given certain parameter specifications, the uncertainty between
players’ private information is high for high values of the correlation coefficient, and
so the conditional density function imprecisely reflects the opponent’s private infor-
mation. Accordingly, the game exhibits a unique equilibrium in this situation. These
intuitions are established when the best response functions are not contraction function.
If the best response functions are contraction function, each player is more focused on
the knowledge of himself and the opponent’s information becomes less important in
a player’s decision making. This situation is close to that of an individual decision
problem, and hence the game exhibits a unique equilibrium.
Introducing information correlation into an entry game is motivated by the follow-
ing considerations. First, it is consistent with the widely observed fact that private
information, in any form, is hard to be independent. Two entities’ private information
often depends on some fundamental factors such as the custom of a society or climate.
Therefore, each entity has some power of learning or inferring the other entity’s private
information through the fundamentals. Second, to understand how information corre-
3Suppose two random variables ε and ε∗. If ε and ε∗ are subject to the relation ε∗ = aε+b+η, where
a and b are real numbers and η is a random variable, then we say there exists uncertainty between ε and
ε∗ and this uncertainty is given by η. Suppose the correlation coefficient between ε and ε∗ is given by
ρ. Because the relation ε∗ = aε+b+η holds as long as the correlation coefficient ρ ∈ (−1,1), we can
consider using ρ to measure the uncertainty between players’ private information.
4To understand how the density function can reflect the opponent’s private information given a
player’s own private information, please refer to Section 2.4.
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lation affects rational agents’ behaviour itself is an interesting topic and few studies
about this topic are conducted from the perspective of game theory. Third, and perhaps
most importantly, solving the game analytically to understand the inherent structure of
the game, i.e. how many equilibria exist and what they are, is technically challenging
and is crucial for some further technical application, e.g. identification and estimation
of games. This study is also the first step to solve a 2-player correlated-information
dynamic entry game. Furthermore, it is a technical preparation to analytically under-
stand a dynamic entry game.
The simplicity of the proposed model makes it well suited for exploring how pa-
rameter changes, especially the information correlation coefficient, impact players’
equilibrium behaviour. To show this, we calculate the comparative statics of monopoly
profit, duopoly profit, variances of prior distribution and the information correlation co-
efficient, on firms’ equilibrium entry threshold in the symmetric equilibrium. We find
that increasing the monopoly profit or duopoly profit can always encourage players to
adopt lower cutoff strategies and so they are more likely to choose entry. If the present
cutoff strategies are positive, then increasing the information correlation or jointly in-
creasing the variances of type distribution will make both players adopt higher cutoff
strategies, i.e. they become less likely to choose entry. In contrast, if the present cutoff
strategies are negative, then increasing the information correlation or the variances of
prior distribution will encourage players to adopt lower cutoff strategies, i.e. they be-
come more likely to choose entry. If the present cutoff strategies equal zero, changing
the correlation coefficient or jointly varying the variances of prior distribution does not
affect the cutoff strategies.
The intuition is that, if we increase monopoly profit or duopoly profit, the payoff
of entry increases and it thereby encourages a player to choose entry. If we change
the correlation coefficient, the mean of the conditional distribution of the opponent’s
payoff shock given a player’s own payoff shock changes and the mean has a dominant
impact on the player’s belief towards the opponent’s strategy given their own strat-
egy. The change of mean depends on the sign of the symmetric equilibrium strategies.
If we jointly change the variances of the prior distribution, only the variance of the
conditional distribution of the opponent’s payoff shock given the player’s own shock
changes. Increasing the variances will assign higher likelihood on low and high pay-
off shocks in the conditional distribution of the opponent’s payoff shock, or vice versa,
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and the sign of a symmetric equilibrium strategy determines whether this strategy is lo-
cated in the high payoff shock area or the low payoff shock area in the distribution. The
different location determines the different impacts of changing variances on a player’s
belief.
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 presents the model. Section 2.3 ex-
hibits the best response function. Section 2.4 describes how the conditional density
function of the opponent’s payoff shock given a player’s own payoff shock can be
used to reflect the opponent’s private information. Section 2.5 studies the comparative
statics of the number of equilibria with respect to the correlation coefficient and the
stability property of equilibrium. Section 2.6 studies the comparative statics of sym-
metric equilibrium strategies. Section 2.7 provides a summary of all main results and
intuitions of this game. Section 2.8 concludes this chapter.
2.2 The Game
Consider a 2-player entry game. Each player has two choices, activity (or equivalently
in), or inactivity (or equivalently out). They make their decisions after observing their
respective private payoff shocks. Then they implement their actions, simultaneously
which can be observed by each other. The active firm engages in production, and if
both firms are active, a Cournot competition will occur. At the end of the period, each
firm collects their own payoffs. The private payoff shocks are assumed to be subject
to a bivariate normal distribution (ε,ε∗) ∼ N(0,0,ς,ς∗,ρ). Therefore, the correlation
coefficient ρ is a natural measure of the dependence between the two players’ private
payoff shocks. We call it the information correlation coefficient. Hereafter, we use ‘*’
to denote variables of the opponent. Besides, we assume ς = ς∗ to ensure the game is
symmetric. Since a Cournot competition will happen if both firms are active, monopoly
profit (denoted by M) must exceed duopoly profit (denoted by D). The strategic form
of this game is depicted as follows:
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It is natural to think that the strategies of the firm may involve a cutoff value: that
is, it enters if the privately observed value of ε is above the cutoff value ε̄ and does not
enter otherwise. Suppose that a firm believes that the opponent plays such a strategy
with a cutoff x∗. Then, the firm forms a belief that the opponent plays out given its





where f (ε∗|ε) is the conditional density of ε∗ given ε. It is easy to show that
σx∗(x∗,ε)> 0, σε(x∗,ε)< 0 if ρ > 0, and σε(x∗,ε)> 0 if ρ < 0. σε(x∗,ε) = 0 at ρ = 0.
σx∗(x∗,ε) is the first-order partial derivative of σ(x∗,ε) with respect to x∗, and σε(x∗,ε)
is the first-order partial derivative of σ(x∗,ε) with respect to ε.
However, it is found that, given M, D, ς2 and ς∗2, the cutoff strategy concept cannot
be applied for all values of correlation coefficient ρ from -1 to 1. Let us first look at
the player’s expected payoff of entry, which is given by
EΠ(x∗,ε) = σ(x∗,ε)(M+ ε)+(1−σ(x∗,ε))(D+ ε)
= σ(x∗,ε)M+(1−σ(x∗,ε))D+ ε (2.1)
Equation (2.1) indicates that a player’s expected payoff is composed of two parts,
namely, the payoff induced by strategic uncertainty, σ(x∗,ε)M +(1−σ(x∗,ε))D, and
the realised payoff shock, ε. If ρ ≤ 0, given ρ, M, D, ς2 and ς∗2, both parts are non-
decreasing with respect to ε. Intuitively, if both firms’ private payoff shocks are neg-
atively correlated, a high payoff shock ε for one firm would on average imply a low
payoff shock ε∗ for the opponent, which provides an incentive that encourages the
player to be active. Therefore, the expected payoff should be non-decreasing with re-
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spect to ε for ρ ≤ 0. Thus, for negatively correlated private information situation, a
cutoff strategy can always be applied.
However, if ρ is positive, then given all parameter values, the payoff induced by
strategic uncertainty σ(x∗,ε)M+(1−σ(x∗,ε))D is decreasing with respect to ε. Thus,
whether the expected payoff EΠ(x∗,ε) is monotonically increasing with respect to ε
depends on the trade-off between the payoff induced by strategic uncertainty and by
the realized payoff shock. For positive ρs, if one firm draws a high payoff shock, it can
be expected that the opponent also draws a high payoff shock, and hence, it is highly
probable that both players will prefer being active, which provides strategic disincen-
tives for entry in a strategic substitutes context. It is also known that ε itself is a part of
the payoff and it incentivizes entering. Therefore, whether the firm will choose to be
active essentially depends on the trade-off between the two contrasting effects.
If the correlation between players’ private information is loose, i.e. ρ is slightly
positive, it can be deduced that the positive incentive generated by a high value of ε
dominates its negative impact, and hence, in total, its expected payoff should increase
with respect to ε. However, if the correlation coefficient between the players’ private
information is tight, i.e. ρ is close to 1, then it can be reasonably expected that the
strategic disincentive induced by the realization of a high value of ε will be strong,
and hence, a high payoff shock does not necessarily bring a high expected payoff
EΠ(x∗,ε). In fact, it is found that there exists a unique boundary ρ̃ > 0 in the strategic
substitutes discrete game such that if ρ≤ ρ̃, given the opponent’s expected cutoff strat-
egy x∗ ∈R, the expected payoff EΠ(x∗,ε) increases with respect to ε, and if ρ > ρ̃, the
expected payoff is no longer monotonic; it is also certain that for some x∗, equation
EΠ(x∗,ε) = 0 has multiple (three) solutions (best responses) of ε and there is one so-
lution below which a payoff shock can make a player choose entry, which contradicts
the definition of the cutoff strategy (see Appendix). Therefore, given M, D, ς2 and
ς∗2, a player can legitimately use the cutoff strategy to play the game if and only if




5 Thus, for each player, there exists a
boundary of ρ below which a cutoff strategy can be used to play the game. Due to the
assumption ς = ς∗, the boundary for both players are same, i.e. ρ̃ = ρ̃∗, and therefore,
this boundary defines the legitimate range of ρ in which a cutoff strategy can be used
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to solve the game. This result is formally given by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Restricions for Implementing Cutoff Strategy in Strategic Sub-
stitutes Game): Suppose M > D and ς∗ = ς. The game can be solved by a cutoff




Proof: See Appendix. 
π = 3.14... is the ratio of a circle’s circumference to its diameter. Given ρ ∈ (0, ρ̃]




for all x∗ ∈ R, and hence,
1≥−σε(x∗,ε)(M−D)
Because σε(x∗,ε) =−ρ f (x∗|ε) (see Appendix A), the above inequality can be writ-
ten as





As ς increases, the variance of the distribution f (.|ε), which equals ς2(1−ρ2), in-
creases and so the density function flattens.6 Particularly, the maximum value of f (.|ε),
which equals 1√
2π(1−ρ2)ς
and is taken at the mean x∗ = ρε, decreases. Hence, (2.2) is
easier to be satisfied and it is more certain that at the given value of ρ, EΠ(x∗,ε) in-
creases with respect to ε for all x∗ ∈ R. Therefore, the range of ρ that makes the
expected payoff increase with respect to ε should be broadened as ς increases, and ac-
cordingly, ρ̃ increases.
If M−D decreases, the right-hand side (RHS) of (2.2) increases. Hence, (2.2)
is easier to be satisfied and it is more certain that at the given value of ρ, EΠ(x∗,ε)
6The density function f (.|ε) refers to f (ε∗|ε). For the explicit expression, please refer to Appendix
A.
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increases with respect to ε for all x∗ ∈ R. Therefore, the range of ρ that makes the
expected payoff of entry increases with respect to ε should be broadened as M−D
decreases, and accordingly, ρ̃ increases.
2.3 The Best Response Function
Given the opponent’s cutoff strategy x∗ ∈R, a firm’s best response g(x∗) is determined
by EΠ(x∗,g(x∗)) = 0. That is,
σ(x∗,g(x∗))(M−D)+D+g(x∗) = 0
It is found that g(x∗) ∈ [−M,−D] because as long as M > D, the maximum of
σ(x∗,ε)(M−D)+D equals M when σ(x∗,ε) = 1 and the minimum of σ(x∗,ε)(M−
D)+D equals D when σ(x∗,ε) = 0. We define Φ(.) as the cummulative density func-
tion of the standard normal distribution and φ(.) as the probability density function of
the standard normal distribution. Given the joint normal distribution, we obtain the















In this game, the best response functions are divided into two types: contraction
and non-contraction.7 If the best response functions are contraction functions, accord-
ing to Zimper (2004), it indicates that the game is dominance solvable, and hence,
there exists a unique equilibrium. If the best response functions are non-contraction
functions, then the game may contain multiple equilibria. Figure 1 exhibits a numeri-
cal example of contraction and non-contraction best response functions . For the prop-
7For the description and properties of contraction and non-contraction best response functions,
please refer to Appendix H.
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erties of the best response functions, they are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Properties of Best Response Functions): Given that ς = ς∗ and
M > D, there exists a ρ̂ = 2πς
∗2−(M−D)2
2πς∗2+(M−D)2 , which differentiates contraction and non-
contraction best response function:
1) for ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̂), −1 < g′(x∗)< 0 globally;
2) for ρ ∈ [ρ̂, ρ̃],




2πς∗2 )−D), −1 < g
′(x∗)< 0;


























2πς∗2 )−D,−D], −1 < g
′(x∗)< 0;
Proof: see Appendix. 
Due to the negative externalities of payoff specification, the game exhibits strategic
substitutes; therefore it is not surprising that the best response function in this game
is decreasing. For the opponent, ρ̂∗ = 2πς
2−(M−D)2
2πς2+(M−D)2 . If both players’ best response
functions are contractions, the game is dominance solvable, and hence, a unique equi-
librium exists. We consider a symmetric game, ρ̂= ρ̂∗; therefore, a sufficient condition
for the game to have a unique equilibrium is that ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̂]. This sufficient condition
can be generalized to asymmetric payoff settings, where each player has different M
and D. Therefore, the generalized sufficient condition to ensure a unique equilibrium
is ρ ∈ (−1,min{ρ̂, ρ̂∗}]. If we further assume that ρ̂ and ρ̂∗ are positive, then the con-
dition ρ ∈ (0,min{ρ̂, ρ̂∗}] is identical to Xu’s (2014) sufficient condition to ensure a
unique equilibrium by using a normal distribution to model the prior.
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Figure 1: A numerical example of a contraction best response function and a
non-contraction best response function. M = 1, D = −1, ς (and ς∗)=1 and ρ = 0.1
(for the solid curve) and 0.3 (for the dashed curve). In this case, ρ̂ = 0.2220.The solid
curve represents a contraction best response function, and the dashed curve represents
a non-contraction best response function.
If the best response functions are contraction functions and therefore the game is
dominance solvable, then it follows from the implicit function theorem that for all

















Equation (2.5) can be explicitly written as
σε(x∗,g(x∗))(M−D)+1 > σx∗(x∗,g(x∗))(M−D)
Furthermore, the above inequality can be written as
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−ρ f (x∗|g(x∗))(M−D)+1 > f (x∗|g(x∗))(M−D)
and we obtain
1 > (1+ρ)(M−D) f (x∗|g(x∗))





From (2.6), it can be seen that as ρ→−1, the RHS of (2.6) increases to +∞ and
hence (2.6) is certainly satisfied. In this situation, it is certain that the best response
functions are contraction functions and hence the game is dominance solvable.
Given ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̂], as ς increases, the variance of f (.|g(x∗)), which is equal to
ς2(1−ρ2), increases, and hence, the density function flattens.8 Particularly, the max-
imum value of f (.|g(x∗)), which equals 1√
2π(1−ρ2)ς
and is taken at the mean ρg(x∗)
of the distribution f (.|g(x∗)), decreases. Hence, (2.6) is easier to be satisfied and it
is more certain that at the given value of ρ, g′(x∗) > −1 for all x∗ ∈ R. Therefore,
the range of ρ that ensures g(x∗) is a contraction function should be broadened as ς
increases, and accordingly ρ̂ increases.
If M−D decreases, the RHS of the inequality increases. Hence, (2.6) is easier to be
satisfied and it is more certain that at the given value of ρ, g′(x∗)>−1 for all x∗ ∈ R.
Therefore, if M−D decreases, the range of ρ that ensures g(x∗) is a contraction func-
tion should also be broadened, and accordingly ρ̂ increases.
2.4 f (ε∗|ε) as a Device to Reflect the Opponent’s Pri-
vate Information
In the case of jointly normal variables, if player i gets a draw ε, the mean of the distribu-
tion of i∗’s payoff shocks ε∗ changes to ρε and the variance is reduced to ς2(1−ρ2) (we
8The density function f (.|g(x∗)) still refers to the function f (ε∗|ε), where ε = g(x∗). For its explicit
expression, please refer to Appendix A.
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only consider symmetric cases where ς = ς∗). The density function f (ε∗|ε) remains
normal. Thus, f (ε∗|ε) shifts (left or right depending on the sign of ρ) and becomes
more precise to reflect i∗’s private information ε∗. An extreme situation is that if ρ = 1
or −1, ς2(1−ρ2) reduces to 0 and ε∗ = ε or −ε, respectively. Therefore, in the case
of ρ = 1 or −1, we say that a player can perfectly predict the opponent’s private infor-
mation according to the player’s own private information. Obviously, in this context,
the density function f (ε∗|ε) is a more useful device to predict the opponent’s private
information ε∗ than the belief σ(x∗,ε). The latter measures the probability that the op-
ponent chooses being inactive given ε and a possible entry threshold of the opponent x∗.
For ρ ∈ (−1,1), the variance ς2(1−ρ2) > 0. Therefore, given ε, player i cannot
predict ε∗ as precisely as in the case of ρ→±1. The variance ς2(1−ρ2) is composed
by ς, which by definition measures the uncertainty of a player’s private information,
and ρ, which measures the uncertainty between players’ private information. In Chap-
ter 3, for a strategic complements game, we obtain a specific result of how ς divides
high and low uncertainty of players’ private information, which is given by the intu-
ition underlying Corollary 1 in Chapter 3. For specific results of how ρ divides high
and low uncertainty between players’ private information, please refer the intuition
underlying Theorem 1 in Chapter 2 for strategic substitutes games and the intuition
underlying Theorem 1 in Chapter 3 for strategic complements games.
Therefore, as ς increases or ρ tends to 0, ς2(1− ρ2) will increase. If ς2(1− ρ2)
is low, i’s density function f (ε∗|ε) can approximately reflect i∗’s private information
ε∗ given ε. It might be because the uncertainty of players’ private information is low
or the uncertainty between players’ private information is low. This situation is close
to the case where ρ→ 1 in the strategic substitutes game or ρ→−1 in the strategic
complements game. Therefore, we obtain three equilibria when the uncertainty of or
between ε and ε∗ is low.
If ς2(1−ρ2) is high, f (ε∗|ε) is imprecise to reflect the other player’s private infor-
mation. It is either because the uncertainty of players’ private information is high, or
the uncertainty between players’ private information is high. In this situation, players
cannot have enough information to assist them to mismatch their action strategies in
strategic substitutes games or match their action strategies in strategic complements
games in which D > 0 > M; hence, they only have an unclear expectation of the oppo-
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nent’s propensity of action choice.9 Thus, only one equilibrium exists to capture this
situation, and it is symmetric.
2.5 Comparative Statics of the Number of Equilibria with
respect to the Correlation Coefficient
The equilibria of the game are intersection points of the best response functions. Be-
cause the game is symmetrically specified, the two players’ best response functions
are symmetrically located around the 45◦ line. Therefore, with the decreasing property
of g(x∗), it is reasonable to expect that in the strategic substitutes game, a symmetric
equilibrium always exists, which is the intersection point between 45◦ line and either
player’s best response function.
We are interested in the stability property of equilibrium. The stability concept
adopted in this chapter is Lyapunov stability. An equilibrium is stable (unstable) if and
only if it is a stable (unstable) fixed point of the game.
In this symmetric game, an cutoff strategy equilibrium (x, x∗) should simultane-
ously satisfy the following two equations:












where x = g(x∗) and x∗ = g∗(x). g(.) and g∗(.) are player i’s and player i∗’s best
response functions, respectively. Therefore, the corresponding Jacobian matrix is
9In the strategic complements games, if D > M > 0 or 0 > D > M, players are still able to match
their action strategies based on their ex ante expectations of the opponent’s behaviour. For details, please
refer to Chapter 3.








Hence, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are g∗
′
(x) and g′(x∗), respectively.
Thus, if we know the first-order derivative of best response functions at an equilibrium,
we can judge the stability of this equilibrium.
According to Zimper (2004), if each player’s best response function is a contrac-
tion function, i.e. ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̂] in our context, then the game is dominance solvable.
Hence, there exists an equilibrium that is unique, symmetric and stable.
If g(x∗) is no longer a contraction function, it may contain a unique equilibrium
for all ρ ∈ (ρ̂, ρ̃], or alternatively, for some value of ρ ∈ (ρ̂, ρ̃], there exists a unique
equilibrium, but for other values of ρ ∈ (ρ̂, ρ̃], there are three equilibria. In the follow-
ing, we derive the comparative statics of the number of equilibria with respect to ρ and
the stability of equilibrium. We will provide a complete description of these results in
Theorem 1.
Recall the best response function g(x∗) (equation (2.3)). We can express equation
(2.3) in polar coordinates. Define x∗ = r cosθ and g(x∗) = r sinθ, where θ ∈ [−π4 ,
7
4π)
and r ≥ 0. Recall that ς = ς∗. By substituting r cosθ and r sinθ in equation (2.3), we
















r). In this symmetric game, asymmetric
equilibria always appear in pairs because we can always find an equilibrium’s corre-
sponding equilibrium by switching players’ identities. Therefore, a pair of asymmetric
equilibria symmetrically locate around the 45◦ line. The radius of a pair of asymmetric
equilibria is denoted by r = ra. In polar coordinates, a pair of asymmetric equilibria
have the same radius r = ra > 0. A pair of asymmetric equilibria is denoted by (θ1,ra)







The symmetric equilibrium is denoted by (s,s). Figure 2 exhibits the two possible
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Case I θ ∈ [34π,
7





Figure 2: The two possible locations of best response functions. The set of radian
value is dichotomized according to the sign of the symmetric equilibrium (s,s). In
Case I, s < 0 and hence θ ∈ [34π,
7





locations of best response functions. They are classified according to the sign of the
symmetric equilibrium, whether s < 0 or s≥ 0.
The sign of the symmetric equilibrium dichotomizes the set of radian θ into two
subsets (cases). In Case I, θ∈ [34π,
7




4π). Hence, the radians of
a pair of asymmetric equilibria accordingly belong to one of the two subsets. Specifi-
cally, in Case I, θ1+θ22 =
5












r). Irrespective of whether







The radius of the symmetric equilibrium is denoted by r = rs. It should be empha-
sized that 1) given r, the shapes of p(θ,r) and q(θ,r) with respect to θ are determined
by M, D, ς and ρ; 2) p(θ,r) and q(θ,r) are symmetrically located around θ = 54π or
θ = π4 ; and 3) the symmetric equilibrium is always on the 45
◦ line, i.e. given r = rs,
θ = π4 or
5
4π.
2.5. Comparative Statics of the Number of Equilibria with respect to the Correlation Coefficient 31
For the relationship between rs and ra, it is found that
Lemma 1: In the symmetric strategic substitutes entry game where M > D and
ς = ς∗, rs < ra for all θ ∈ [−π4 ,
7
4π).
Proof: Consider a pair of asymmetric equilibria (θ1,ra) and (θ2,ra), where the
radians θ1 and θ2 ∈ [−π4 ,
3
4π) and θ1 < θ2. Geometrically, they are the intersection
points between x∗2 + g(x∗)2 = r2 and g(x∗) because g(x∗) decreases. Therefore, for
any function x∗2 +g(x∗)2 = r2, where r > ra, its left intersection point with g(x∗) will
be on the left side of (θ1,ra), and its right intersection point with g(x∗) will be on the
right side of (θ2,ra). Therefore, these new intersection points are located away from
the 45◦ line, and hence, rs ≥ ra is impossible. Recall that a symmetric equilibrium is
always located on the 45◦ line. The same analysis applies to the case where the radians
of a pair of asymmetric equilibrium belong to [34π,
7
4π) and we get the same result.
Therefore, in this game, rs < ra for all θ ∈ [−π4 ,
7
4π). Q.E.D.
In the following, we explain the comparative statics of the number of equilibria
with respect to the correlation coefficient by focusing on Case I, i.e. θ ∈ [34π,
7
4π).




4π), p(τ1,r)> p(τ2,r) for r > 0. There exists a
τ ∈ (π, 32π), p
′
θ
(θ,r)< 0 for all θ ∈ (34π,τ] and p
′
θ
(θ,r)> 0 for all θ ∈ (τ, 74π). It could
be that τ R 54π. According to the comparison relationship between τ and
5
4π, p(θ,r)
and q(θ,r) have either 1 or 3 intersection points. All possible situations are described
in Figure 3. Given r > 0, the shape of p(θ,r) and q(θ,r) and intersections between
p(θ,r) and q(θ,r) are determined by M, D and the prior distribution (see Figure 3).
























∂r > 0 >
∂q( 34 π,r)
















∂r > 0 >
∂p( 74 π,r)






∂r∂θ < 0, and for










4π), as r increases,
q(θ,r) always decreases and it decreases relatively faster than p(θ,r). In addition,
given θ ∈ [54π,
7
4π), as r increases, p(θ,r) always decreases and it decreases relatively
faster than q(θ,r).
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According to the comparison between τ ∈ (π, 32π) and
5
4π, we obtain three situations
describing the relationship between p(θ,r) and q(θ,r). The relationship is
determined by M, D and the prior distribution. Because a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
always exists, we can always find a suitable radius r to locate at least one intersection
point on the line y = DD−M . This intersection point is hence an equilibrium according
to equation group (2.7).
Because a symmetric equilibrium always exists, given M, D and the prior, we can
always find an r = rs to make (54π,rs) satisfy equation group (2.5). As r increases away







4π). Therefore, for τ ≥
5
4π, new intersection points will not appear between
p(θ,r) and q(θ,r) for r > rs. Hence, in these cases, except the symmetric equilibrium,
it is impossible to obtain additional equilibrium. Therefore, for cases of τ≥ 54π, there
is a unique equilibrium (54π,rs).
For the case of τ < 54π, there are three intersection points. As r increases away
from rs, because given θ ∈ [34π,
5
4π), q(θ,r) decreases relatively faster than p(θ,r), the
left intersection point decreases vertically and moves towards 54π horizontally. Figure
4 illustrates how the left (and the right) intersection point moves towards the middle
intersection point.
In Figure 4, given r > 0, at θ = c, p(c,r) = q(c,r). For all θ ∈ (34π,c), p(θ,r) >
q(θ,r) and for all θ ∈ (c, 54π), q(θ,r) > p(θ,r). Given θ, as r increases to r
′, at
θ = c, p(θ,r′) > q(θ,r′) because q(θ,r) decreases relatively faster than p(θ,r) given
θ. For all θ ∈ (34π,c), p(θ,r
′)> q(θ,r′). Therefore, for the new left intersection point






∂r < 0, q(c
′,r′) < q(c′,r). Therefore, as r increases, the left intersection point
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Figure 4: An illustration of how intersection points (c,r) and (d,r) move towards








(c,r) moves towards 54π horizontally and downward vertically. Thus, the aggregate
movement as r increases is towards the middle intersection point. Symmetrically, the





downward vertically. The aggregate movement is therefore still toward the middle in-
tersection point as r increases.
From Lemma 1, it is known that ra > rs. For the case of τ < 54π, at r = rs, the













D−M . In addition, it is known that as r increases, the middle





∂r < 0, and the two outer
intersection points moves towards the middle intersection point. Thus, as r increases
away from rs, finally the two outer intersection points will be below y = DD−M , i.e. for










2. Therefore, there exists a unique value ra > 0 such that at r = ra,
the two outer intersection points locate on y = DD−M , i.e. p(θ,ra) = q(θ,ra) =
D
D−M ,
where θ ∈ {θ1,θ2}. Hence, in this situation, given M, D and the prior distribution,
we get asymmetric equilibria (θ1,ra) and (θ2,ra), and symmetric equilibrium (54π,rs).
Therefore, for the case of τ < 54π, there are three equilibria.
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According to the above analysis, for θ ∈ [34π,
7
4π), if τ ≥
5
4π, there is a unique
equilibrium, and if τ < 54π, there are three equilibria. Following the same analysis
approach, we find that for θ ∈ (−π4 ,
3
4π), if τ, which now is the global maximum of
p(θ,r), is greater than or equal to π4 , there is a unique equilibrium. If τ <
π
4 , there are
three equilibria (see Appendix). It is found that for τ > 54π or τ >
π
4 , the symmetric
equilibrium is unstable. For τ = 54π or τ =
π
4 , the stability of the symmetric equilibrium
is not determined. For τ < 54π or τ <
π
4 , the symmetric equilibrium is stable, because
the inequalities τ R 54π or τ R
π
4 can be equivalently transformed into the inequalities
g′(s)Q−1. Therefore, we can differentiate the unique-equilibrium and three-equilibria
situations according to the stability of the symmetric equilibrium.
It has been known that for ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̂], the game is dominance solvable, and hence,
the symmetric equilibrium is stable. Therefore, given other parameters, as ρ increases
from -1 to ρ̃, the comparative statics of the stability of the symmetric equilibrium per-
forms in the following sequence: stable → not determined (→ unstable). The game
can have a unique equilibrium for all ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̃] and, hence, in this situation, the
symmetric equilibrium cannot be unstable. Therefore, we place a parenthesis at the
unstable part of the sequence.
It is found that there exists a unique ρ = ρ̄, where the stability of (s,s) is not deter-
mined. ρ̄ could be greater than ρ̃, or smaller than or equal to ρ̃. If and only if ρ̄ ≤ ρ̃,
the solution (s,s) of the equation group g(x∗) and g∗(x) at ρ = ρ̄ can be regarded as an
equilibrium. If ρ̄ < ρ̃, then for all ρ ∈ (ρ̄, ρ̃], the game has three equilibria. Therefore,
if the game can exhibit multiple equilibria, i.e. ρ̄ < ρ̃, as ρ increases from -1 to ρ̃,
the number of equilibria changes from one to three. Otherwise, the game has a unique
equilibrium for all ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̃].
The analytical expression of ρ̄ depends on the sign of M + D. Specifically, if














where ρ̄ > ρ̂. If M+D < 0, then ρ̄ is the unique solution of the following equation:














where ρ̄ > ρ̂. If M+D = 0, then ρ̄ = ρ̂.
By summarizing the analysis of both cases of θ ∈ [34π,
7





obtain the comparative statics of the number of equilibria with respect to ρ and the
stability of equilibrium. It is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Comparative Statics of the Number of Equilibria with respect to ρ
and Stability of Equilibrium in the Strategic Substitutes Game): For a static 2×2
entry game, suppose M > D and ς = ς∗. If ρ̄≥ ρ̃, then for all ρ∈ (−1, ρ̃], the game has
a unique equilibrium. Conversely, if for all ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̃], the game has a unique equilib-
rium, then ρ̄≥ ρ̃. The equilibrium is stable, except the situation that for M+D 6= 0, at
ρ = ρ̄ = ρ̃, its stability is not determined.
If ρ̄ < ρ̃, then for all ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̄), there exists a unique equilibrium. This equilib-
rium is symmetric and stable. If and only if M+D = 0, it is (0,0).
At ρ = ρ̄, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium. If M +D = 0, it is (0,0)
and is stable. If M+D 6= 0, it is not (0,0) and its stability is not determined.
For all ρ ∈ (ρ̄, ρ̃], there exist three equilibria. The symmetric equilibrium is un-
stable. If and only if M +D = 0, it is (0,0). The stability of asymmetric equilibrium
depends on particular parameter specification.
Proof: see Appendix. 
The equilibria can be described as solutions of a system of both players’ best re-
sponse functions g(x∗) and g∗(x). As ρ→ 1, the limit of g(x∗) is given by 10
10The game at ρ→ 1 does not coincide with the game at ρ = 1. The game at ρ→ 1 is exhibited
in the following part in the main context of this chapter. For games at ρ = 1, ε = ε∗ and both players
are affected by a common payoff shock which is not known ex ante. However, if it is obtained, the
two players play a complete information game. For ε ∈ (−M,−D), there are three equilibria: (1,0),
(0,1) and a mixed strategy (− D+εM−D ,−
D+ε
M−D ), which is the probability of choosing action 0. Given
the cutoff strategy equilibria of games at ρ→ 1, for ε ∈ (−M,−D), the cutoff strategy equilibrium
(−M,−D) implies the action strategy (1,0). Cutoff strategy equilibrium (−D,−M) implies the ac-







Because the game is symmetric, g(x∗) and g∗(x) are symmetrically located around
the 45◦ line. The solutions of the equation system of g(x∗) and g∗(x) are the intersec-
tion points of the two functions. It is found that there are three solutions at ρ→ 1.
They are (−M,−D), (−D,−M) and (−M+D2 ,−
M+D
2 ). Figure 5 shows how these re-
sults arise.
Now we intuitively analyze the formation of the best response function. The aver-
age known payoff of entry is M+D2 . Therefore, if a firm wants to choose entry, from an
ex ante perspective, at least it should obtain a payoff shock ε=−M+D2 .
11 As ρ→ 1, the
player is almost sure that the opponent gets the same payoff shock as theirs. Therefore,
if player i gets a payoff shock ε =−M+D2 such that they are indifferent to being active
or inactive, then as ρ→ 1, player i can almost surely expect the opponent i∗ to get the
same shock ε∗ =−M+D2 . Because i and i
∗ are identically specified, at ε∗ =−M+D2 , i
∗
is also indifferent to being active or inactive. Therefore, if the opponent’s strategy x∗
is given by −M+D2 , a player’s best response will be −
M+D
2 as well.
If the opponent’s strategy x∗ < −M+D2 , it implies that even if a payoff shock ε
∗,
where ε∗ > x∗, is smaller than −M+D2 , which is the average payoff shock that makes
i∗ indifferent to being active or inactive, i∗ will still be expected to choose entry.12
Therefore, from an ex ante perspective, player i∗ becomes more likely to choose entry
if x∗ <−M+D2 . Given such expectation, player i is more likely to get duopoly profit D
if the player chooses entry, and hence, from an ex ante perspective, if i’s payoff shock
tion strategy (0,1), and the cutoff strategy equilibrium (−M+D2 ,−
M+D















)dε), which is the unconditional choice probability of choosing action 0
and is independent from the ex post realization of ε. This choice probability is not equal to the mixed
strategy equilibrium of the game at ρ = 1. Therefore, the incomplete information game at ρ→ 1 does
not coincide with the game at ρ = 1. g(x∗) is continuous with respect to ρ ∈ (−1,1). Therefore, in this
section, the natural benchmark to compare the number of equilibria for games with ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̃] is the
game at ρ→ 1. φ(.) is the density function of the standard normal distribution.
11Ex ante in this chapter means before the payoff shocks are drawn.
12We call −M+D2 the average payoff shock that makes i
∗ indifferent to their action choices because it
corresponds to the average known payoff of entry M+D2







Figure 5: The solid curve (the two horizontal lines and the point in the middle)
represents g(x∗) at ρ→ 1 and the dashed curve (the two vertical dashed lines and the
point in the middle. The point coincides with the one for g(x∗) at ρ→ 1) represents
g∗(x) at ρ→ 1. The dashed-dot line represent the 45◦ line. Because the game is
symmetric, g(x∗) and g∗(x) are symmetrically located around the 45◦ line. By drawing
a graph of g(x∗) and g∗(x), there are always three intersection points, which are
solutions of the equation system of g(x∗) and g∗(x).
ε≥−D, player i will choose entry. Therefore, if i∗’s strategy x∗ <−M+D2 , then i’s best
response entry threshold g(x∗) =−D.
If the opponent’s strategy x∗ > −M+D2 , it implies that even if a payoff shock ε
∗,
where ε∗ < x∗, is greater than −M+D2 , which is the average payoff shock that makes i
∗
indifferent to being active or inactive, i∗ will still be expected to choose being inactive.
Therefore, from an ex ante perspective, i∗ becomes more likely to choose being inac-
tive if x∗ >−M+D2 . Given such expectation, i is more likely to get monopoly profit M
if the player chooses entry, and hence, from an ex ante perspective, if i’s payoff shock
ε ≥ −M, player i will choose entry. Therefore, if i∗’s strategy x∗ > −M+D2 , then i’s
best response entry threshold g(x∗) =−M.
The intuition of the cutoff strategy equilibrium for the game at ρ→ 1 is as follows.
If a player expects the opponent to choose entry, then the player will get payoff D
if they also choose entry. Thus, the player will adopt a cutoff strategy −D at which
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they are indifferent to being active or inactive. In this game, M > D, so −M < −D.
Therefore, as the best response, the opponent will adopt a strategy −M at which the
opponent is indifferent to the two action choices.
Otherwise, if a player expects the opponent to choose being inactive, the player
will get payoff M if they choose to enter. Thus, the player will adopt a cutoff strategy
−M at which they are indifferent to being active or inactive. In this game, −M <−D,
and therefore, as the best response, the opponent will adopt a strategy −D at which
the opponent is indifferent to the two action choices. Therefore, we have the equilibria
(−M,−D) and (−D,−M).
If a player expects that the opponent is ex ante indifferent to the two action choices,
then i thinks that i∗ must adopt an entry threshold −M+D2 such that the total average
payoff of entry (M+D2 + ε
∗) equals 0. As the best response, player i adopts a cutoff
strategy−M+D2 . Symmetrically, the opponent will think in the same way and adopt the
same strategy. Therefore, we have the equilibrium (−M+D2 ,−
M+D
2 ).
For games with ρ≤ ρ̃, if given other parameters, at ρ = ρ̃, the uncertainty between
each other’s private information is low such that f (ε∗|ε) can approximately reflect ε∗
given ε, then like the situation of ρ→ 1, where player i can perfectly predict ε∗ given ε,
asymmetric equilibria arise. The reason is as follows. In a strategic substitutes game,
players always tend to mismatch their action strategies. At ρ = ρ̃ > 0, if f (ε∗|ε) can
approximately reflect ε∗ given ε, then players can obtain enough information to assist
them to mismatch their action strategies and similar to the ρ→ 1 situation, players
can show explicit preferences to each action. However, due to the uncertainty between
players’ private information, the preference to each action is not deterministic. There-
fore, in this situation, we can obtain two equilibria. In each equilibrium, one player is
more probable to choose entry, and the other player is more probable to choose being
inactive. If we translate the representation of these action strategy equilibria into the
representation of the cutoff strategy equilibrium, the translated cutoff strategy equilib-
ria should be close to (−M,−D) and (−D,−M), respectively.
In the case of ρ→ 1, where players can perfectly predict the other player’s private
information, it is possible that players are ex ante expected to be indifferent to being
active or inactive and this situation is captured by the symmetric equilibrium. At ρ= ρ̃,
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the uncertainty between players’ private information can make a player more uncertain
about the other player’s propensity of action choice, hence making the indifference sit-
uation more reasonable to exist. Symmetrically, the opponent will think and behave
in the same way. Thus, this situation is again captured by a symmetric equilibrium.
Therefore, at ρ = ρ̃, if f (ε∗|ε) can approximately reflect ε∗ given ε, the game has three
equilibria.
However, if other parameters are given, at ρ = ρ̃, the uncertainty between each
other’s private information is high and f (ε∗|ε) imprecisely reflects ε∗ given ε, it can
be expected that only a symmetric equilibrium exists. Because f (ε∗|ε) is imprecise to
reflect ε∗ given ε and hence each player does not have enough information to assist
them to mismatch each other’s action strategies; therefore, an asymmetric equilibrium
cannot exist. Still, because the uncertainty between players’ private information is
high such that f (ε∗|ε) imprecisely reflects ε∗ given ε, each player has an unclear ex-
pectation of the opponent’s propensity of action choice.13 Conditional on this unclear
expectation, a player accordingly chooses a strategy as the best response. Symmetri-
cally, the opponent will think in the same way and adopt the same strategy. Therefore,
only the symmetric equilibrium can exist in this situation. The intuition of the games
with M > D at ρ = ρ̃ as discussed above applies to games for all ρ∈ (ρ̄, ρ̃] with M > D.
Similarly, irrespective of whether there are 3 equilibria or a unique equilibrium at
ρ ∈ (ρ̄, ρ̃], for ρ taking values that are far away from 1 and -1, or specifically for all
ρ ∈ (ρ̂, ρ̄], the correlation between ε and ε∗ is much lower and hence the uncertainty
between players’ private information reasonably becomes much higher. Therefore, it
can be expected that f (ε∗|ε) imprecisely reflects ε∗ given ε. In this situation, follow-
ing the same intuition in the last paragraph, only a symmetric equilibrium can exist.
In addition, as we have discussed in Section 2.3, for ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̂], it is certain that the
best response functions are contraction functions and hence the game exhibits a unique
equilibrium. In this situation, as indicated by inequality (2.5), player i’s expected pay-
off of entry is more sensitive to his own strategy than to his opponent’s strategy. It
means player i is more self-focused and the opponent’s private information is less im-
portant in player i’s decision making, no matter whether f (ε∗|ε) can approximately
or imprecisely reflect i∗’s private information given ε. Therefore, in this situation, the
13An unclear expectation of the opponent’s propensity of action choice implies that before the payoff
shocks are drawn, player i is not sure whether i∗ is more likely to choose being active or being inactive,
or more likely to be indifferent to the two action choices.
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game is close to an individual decision problem, and hence there exists a unique equi-
librium.
Therefore, all of above discussions explain why for all ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̃], the game can
contain a unique equilibrium, or if there are multiple equilibria for some ρ∈ (−1, ρ̃], as
ρ decreases from ρ̃ to−1, the number of equilibria will change from 3 to 1. All of these
results are due to the uncertainty between players’ private information. Hence, ρ̄ is a
threshold such that for ρ > ρ̄, the uncertainty between players’ private information is
low, and hence f (ε∗|ε) can approximately reflect ε∗ given ε and both players can obtain
enough information to mismatch their action strategies. For ρ̂ < ρ≤ ρ̄, the uncertainty
between each other’s private information is high such that f (ε∗|ε) imprecisely reflects
ε∗ given ε, and both players have an unclear expectation of the opponent’s propensity
of action choice.
Finally, we provide two numerical examples to conclude this section. They exhibit
how the number of equilibrium changes with respect to different parameter specifica-
tions (see Figures 6 and 7).






















Figure 6: An example of unique equilibrium. The solid curve represents a player’s
best response function, and the dashed curve represents the opponent’s best response
function. In this case, M = 1.6, D = 0.3, ς = ς∗ = 1 and ρ = 0.3.
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Figure 7: An example of multiple equilibria. The solid curve represents a player’s
best response function, and the dashed curve represents the opponent’s best response
function. In this case, M = 1.6, D = 0.3, ς = ς∗ = 1 and ρ = 0.7.
2.6 Comparative Statics of Symmetric Equilibrium Strate-
gies
In this game, a symmetric equilibrium always exists and is unique. Hence, for tech-
nical convenience, it is natural to adopt the symmetric equilibrium for comparative
statics analysis. Assume that players only play the symmetric equilibrium no matter
how parameters change. The comparative statics of exogenous parameters on the sym-
metric equilibrium strategies is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Assume M > D and ς = ς∗. Denote a symmetric equilibrium of the
game by (s,s) where −M < s < −D. It is found that ∂s
∂M < 0 and
∂s
∂D < 0. If s ≤ (or
>) 0, ∂s
∂ρ




≤ (or >) 0, where the equalities are taken when s= 0.
Proof : see Appendix. 
We are interested in the intuition underlying the results in Proposition 3. We begin
from analyzing how a player’s best response changes as exogenous parameters change
given the opponent’s strategy. First, to emphasize the dependence on some parame-
ter ζ, we write h(x∗,x;ζ) := EΠ(x∗,x), where x is the best response towards x∗ and
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where x′(ζ;x∗) := ∂x(x
∗)
∂ζ
















∗,ε)(M−D)+D+1 > 0, hence h′x(x∗,x;θ)> 0. Therefore,
the sign of x′(ζ;x∗) is opposite to the sign of h′
ζ
(x∗,x;ζ).
For parameters M and D, h′M(x
∗,x;M)=σ(x∗,x)> 0 and h′D(x
∗,x;D)= 1−σ(x∗,x)>
0. Thus, x′(M;x∗) < 0 and x′(D;x∗) < 0. Hence, given x∗, an increase in the profit
of entry will make a firm deviate to a lower threshold. Therefore, if both firms are
playing symmetric equilibrium (s,s), they will ultimately deviate to a lower equi-
librium strategy s′ < s after an increase in the profit of entry. Hence, by increas-

















) is the density function of the type distribu-
tion ε∼ N(0,ς2).























∗,x;ρ)(M−D). A marginal increase of ρ is to lower the
mean ρx if x < 0 and raise it if x > 0, and thus increasing the variance if ρ < 0 and
decreasing the variance if ρ > 0.
Suppose x < 0. If x∗ > x
ρ
for ρ > 0, or x∗ < x
ρ
for ρ < 0, the dominating effect of
increasing ρ is the effect from the conditional mean ρx of the opponent’s type distri-
bution (See Figures 8 and 9). Intuitively, as the conditional mean decreases, it means
that, from one firm’s perspective, the opponent’s payoff shock on average will become
lower. Hence, it is more likely that the opponent chooses inactivity. Therefore, the
belief σ(x∗,x;ρ) increases, and correspondingly x′(ρ;x∗)< 0.
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Figure 8: Suppose x < 0 and ρ > 0. If x∗ > x
ρ
, the dominant effect by increasing ρ
on the belief σ(x∗,x) is from the mean ρx. Supposing ρ is increased to ρ′, the mean
of the conditional distribution ρx decreases and the variance ς2(1−ρ2) decreases as
well. Without loss of generality, this figure shows that as long as x∗ is fixed, the new
belief of choosing inactivity by the opponent (the area under the grey curve and on the
left-hand side (LHS) of ε∗ = x∗) must be higher than the original belief of choosing
inactivity by the opponent (the area under the black curve and on the LHS of ε∗ = x∗).
Both curves represent the conditional density functions of the opponent’s type.
For symmetric equilibrium (s,s), where s < 0, it must satisfy s > s
ρ
for ρ > 0 or
s < s
ρ
for ρ < 0. Hence, given the opponent’s strategy, an increase in ρ will make
a firm deviate to a lower strategy. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that the
new symmetric equilibrium threshold s′ must be lower than s. Therefore, in the new














Suppose x > 0. If x∗ < x
ρ
for ρ > 0 or x∗ > x
ρ
for ρ < 0, the dominating effect of
increasing ρ is still from the conditional mean ρx of the opponent’s type distribution
(see Figures 10 and 11). Intuitively, since the conditional mean increases, from one
firm’s perspective, the opponent’s average payoff shock will increase, and hence, it is
more likely that the opponent chooses entry. Therefore, the belief σ(x∗,x;ρ) decreases,
and consequently x′(ρ;x∗)> 0.
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Figure 9: Suppose x < 0 and ρ < 0. If x∗ < x
ρ
, the dominant effect by increasing ρ
on the belief σ(x∗,x) is from the mean ρx. Supposing ρ is increased to ρ′, the mean
of the conditional distribution of the opponent’s type ρx decreases and the variance
ς2(1−ρ2) increases. Without loss of generality, this figure shows that as long as x∗ is
fixed, the new belief of choosing inactivity by the opponent (the area under the grey
curve and on the LHS of ε∗ = x∗) must be higher than the original belief of choosing
inactivity by the opponent (the area under the black curve and on the LHS of ε∗ = x∗).
Both curves represent the conditional density function of the opponent’s type.
For symmetric equilibrium (s,s), where s > 0, it must satisfy s < s
ρ
for ρ > 0 or
s > s
ρ
for ρ < 0. Hence, given the opponent’s strategy, an increase in ρ will make the
opponent deviate to a higher strategy. Consequently, the new equilibrium threshold s′
must be higher than s. Therefore, players will become more likely to choose inactivity















Finally, for symmetric equilibrium (s,s), if s = 0, then the conditional mean ρs
equals 0. Irrespective of how ρ changes, the belief always keeps 12 , and therefore, in
this case, the symmetric equilibrium is always (0,0).
Hence, in conclusion, if a firm’s original equilibrium strategy s < 0, then by in-
creasing ρ, the new equilibrium strategy s′ < s < 0, while if a firm’s original equilib-
rium strategy s > 0, then by increasing ρ, the new equilibrium strategy s′ > s > 0.
2.6. Comparative Statics of Symmetric Equilibrium Strategies 45
Figure 10: Suppose x > 0 and ρ > 0. If x∗ < x
ρ
, the dominant effect by increasing ρ on
the belief σ(x∗,x) is from the mean ρx. Supposing ρ is increased to ρ′, the mean of the
conditional distribution of opponent’s type ρx increases and the variance ς2(1−ρ2)
decreases. Without loss of generality, this figure shows that as long as x∗ is fixed, the
new belief of choosing entry by the opponent (the area under the grey curve and on
the RHS of ε∗ = x∗) must be higher than the original belief of choosing entry by the
opponent (the area under the black curve and on the RHS of ε∗ = x∗). Both curves
represent the conditional density functions of the opponent’s type.






















parently, jointly changing ς and ς∗ only affects the variance ς2(1−ρ2) of the condi-
tional density function of the opponent’s type. A marginal joint increase of ς and ς∗
is to increase the variance ς2(1−ρ2), or vice versa, irrespective of whether ρ ≷ 0 or
x ≷ 0 (see Figure 12). Intuitively, suppose x∗ < ρx. Since the direct consequence
of jointly increasing variances is to make the opponent’s conditional type distribu-
tion assign higher likelihood on low and high payoff shocks, given a low opponent’s
strategy x∗ < ρx, the belief that the opponent chooses inactivity increases, and hence
x′(ς∗,ς;x∗) < 0. However, if x∗ > ρx, since high payoff shocks have been assigned
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Figure 11: Suppose x > 0 and ρ < 0. If x∗ > x
ρ
, the dominant effect by increasing ρ
on the belief σ(x∗,x) is from the mean ρx. Supposing ρ is increased to ρ′, the mean
of the conditional distribution of the opponent’s type ρx increases and the variance
ς2(1−ρ2) increases as well. Without loss of generality, this figure shows that as long
as x∗ is fixed, the new belief of choosing entry by the opponent (the area under the grey
curve and on the RHS of ε∗ = x∗) must be higher than the original belief of choosing
entry by the opponent (the area under the black curve and on the RHS of ε∗ = x∗).
Both curves represent the conditional density functions of the opponent’s type.
with higher likelihood as well after ς and ς∗ are jointly increased, the belief that the
opponent chooses entry must increase, and thus x′(ς∗,ς;x∗)> 0.
For symmetric equilibrium (s,s), if s < 0, then irrespective of whether ρ ≷ 0, we
always have s < ρs. Therefore, given the opponent’s strategy, a joint increase in ς
and ς∗ will make a firm deviate to a lower strategy. Consequently, the new equilib-
rium threshold s′ must be lower than s. Therefore, players will become more likely to















While for symmetric equilibrium (s,s), if s > 0, then irrespective of whether ρ≷ 0,
we always have s > ρs. Therefore, given the opponent’s strategy, a joint increase in ς
and ς∗ will make a firm deviate to a higher strategy. Consequently, the new symmetric
equilibrium threshold s′ must be higher than s. Therefore, players will become more
















Figure 12: Given that ς = ς∗. If the standard deviations ς and ς∗ are jointly
increased, the variance of the conditional distribution of the opponent’s type will
increase. The grey curve represents the new conditional density function after ς and ς∗
are jointly increased, while the black curve represents the original conditional density
function. Therefore, by jointly increasing ς and ς∗, if x∗ < ρx, the belief that the
opponent chooses inactivity increases, while if x∗ > ρx, the belief that the opponent
chooses entry increases.
Finally, for symmetric equilibrium (s,s) = (0,0), no matter how ς and ς∗ change,
the belief always maintains 12 , and hence, the equilibrium strategy does not change.
2.7 Summary
In this section, we present an organized summary of all main results and intuitions of
the game. The game can be summarized by three parameters: ρ̃, ρ̂ and ρ̄. The relation-
ship between these are as follows: ρ̂≤ ρ̄, ρ̂ < ρ̃, and ρ̄ could be smaller than, equal to
or greater than ρ̃.
In Section 2.2, we derive ρ̃. Suppose the game is symmetric. Then, if and only if
ρ≤ ρ̃, the game can be solved by cutoff strategies. The intuition is that if ρ> ρ̃, the ex-
pected payoff EΠ(x∗,ε) is no longer monotonic with respect to ε, and for some x∗ ∈R,
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this contradicts the definition of the cutoff strategy used to solve the game. In fact,
by assuming ς = ς∗, this result can be extended to asymmetric payoff settings, where
each player has different M and D. In this situation, the game can be solved by cutoff




′ and D′ are
player i∗’s known payoffs.
In Section 2.3, we derive ρ̂. For ρ≤ ρ̂, player i’s best response function is a contrac-
tion function. In this symmetric game, ρ ≤ ρ̂ is also the sufficient condition to ensure
that the game is dominance solvable. This condition can be generalized to asymmetric
payoff settings as described above. In this situation, the sufficient condition is gener-
alized to ρ≤min{ρ̂, ρ̂∗}, where ρ̂∗ = 2πς
2−(M′−D′)2
2πς2+(M′−D′)2 .
For ρ̄, if ρ̄ < ρ̃, then ρ̄ is the threshold to differentiate low and high uncertainty be-
tween players’ private information. For ρ> ρ̄, the uncertainty between players’ private
information is low, which means the density function f (ε∗|ε) can approximately reflect
ε∗ given ε, and hence, the players can gather enough information to assist them to mis-
match their action strategies. For ρ̂ < ρ ≤ ρ̄, the uncertainty between players’ private
information is high such that f (ε∗|ε) imprecisely reflects ε∗ given ε, and hence, both
players can only have an unclear expectation of the opponent’s propensity of action
choice. If ρ̄≥ ρ̃, then for all ρ ∈ (ρ̂, ρ̃], the uncertainty between players’ private infor-
mation is high, and therefore, there exists only a symmetric equilibrium, reflecting the
fact that they only have an unclear expectation of the opponent’s propensity of action
choice. For ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̂], the best response functions are contraction function. In this
situation, each player is more focused on the knowledge of himself and the opponent’s
information becomes less important in a player’s decision making. This situation is
close to that of an individual decision problem, and hence the game exhibits a unique
equilibrium.
For the intuition of the comparative statics of symmetric equilibrium strategies, if
we increase M or D, the expected payoff of entry increases and it is not surprising that
in the new symmetric equilibrium, both players will adopt a lower entry threshold.
If we increase ρ, then the dominant effect on players’ strategies come from the
mean of the distribution of opponent’s payoff shock given a player’s own private pay-
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off shock. The mean is given by ρs, where s is the entry threshold in the symmetric
equilibrium. If s < 0, increasing ρ will decrease ρs, and hence, a player can expect
that the opponent will get a lower payoff shock on average, and hence, the player will
adopt a lower cutoff strategy as the best response. This best response adjustment pro-
cess continues and, consequently, in the new symmetric equilibrium (s′,s′), s′ < s. In
contrast, if s> 0, then increasing ρ will increase ρs, and hence, a player can expect that
the opponent will get a higher payoff shock on average, which discourages the player
from choosing entry. As this best response dynamics continues, in the consequent new
equilibrium (s′,s′), s′ > s.
If we jointly change ς and ς∗, the impact on players’ strategies come from the vari-
ance of the distribution of the opponent’s payoff shock given a player’s own private
payoff shock. If we jointly increase ς and ς∗, the tails of the opponent’s payoff shocks
distribution given a player’s own payoff shock will increase; hence, the likelihood of
very good payoff shocks or very bad payoff shocks of the opponent increases accord-
ingly. Therefore, if s < 0, then the belief will be mainly influenced by the increasing
likelihood of very bad payoff shocks of the opponent. In this situation, a player can
expect that the opponent becomes less likely to choose entry, which encourages the
player to adopt a lower entry threshold. Therefore, as this best response dynamics con-
tinues, in the consequent new symmetric equilibrium (s′,s′), s′ < s.
In contrast, if s > 0, the belief will be mainly influenced by the increasing likeli-
hood of very good payoff shocks of the opponent. In this situation, a player can expect
that the opponent to become more likely to choose entry, which motivates the player
to adopt a higher entry threshold. Therefore, as this best response dynamics continues
and, consequently, in the new symmetric equilibrium (s′,s′), s′ > s.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study how private information correlation affects rational agents’
strategic behaviour by investigating a static 2-player entry game based on Pesendorfer
and Schmidt-Dengler’s (2008) dynamic entry game in their numerical analysis. This
game is symmetric, in which players are identically specified. The private information
is modelled by a joint normal distribution and the correlation coefficient is a natural
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measure of the degree of information correlation. This chapter shows that, after in-
troducing information correlation, there exists a restriction on the value of correlation
coefficient, allowing the use of a cutoff strategy to solve the game. Information cor-
relation can be used to select a unique equilibrium. In this strategic substitutes game,
for certain parameter specification, if the correlation coefficient is less than or equal
to a threshold value, a unique equilibrium (symmetric equilibrium) exists, while if
the correlation coefficient is above the threshold value, three equilibria will arise: one
symmetric equilibrium and two asymmetric equilibria. Alternatively, for the other pa-
rameter specifications, the game exhibits a unique equilibrium for any feasible value
of the correlation coefficient. To understand how parameter changes affect players’
equilibrium behaviour, a comparative statics analysis on the symmetric equilibrium is
conducted. It is found that increasing the monopoly profit or the duopoly profit en-
courages players to enter the market, while increasing the information correlation or
jointly increasing the variances of players’ type distribution will make players more
likely to choose entry if the current equilibrium strategies are negative, and less likely
to choose entry if the current equilibrium strategies are positive.
This chapter is also a technical preparation to analytically solve a 2-player dy-
namic entry game with information correlation. The game studied in this chapter can
be viewed as its static version by specifying a discount factor equal to zero. In the
static game, we have proven that there are at most three equilibria. In Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler’s (2008) numerical experiment of a 2-player dynamic entry game
with independent private payoff shocks, they find that their game contains at least five
equilibira. To determine the number of equilibria is crucial for identifying and estimat-
ing a game. Characterizing the equilibrium set of the static game is one of the major
contributions of this chapter, which prepares the research of the dynamic game. More-
over, to analytically understand how information correlation affects players’ behaviour
in a dynamic setting, this chapter can throw more light on information correlation’s
role in strategic interactions.
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Information Correlation in a Strategic
Complements Game and an Extension
of Purification Rationale
In this chapter, we study a 2×2 strategic complements Bayesian entry game with cor-
related private information. The distribution of private information is modelled by a
joint normal distribution. We examine the comparative statics of the model, indicating
how the number of equilibria varies with the correlation coefficient and variances of
the prior distribution. We show that the purification rationale proposed by Harsanyi
(1973) can be extended to games with dependent perturbation errors that follow a nor-
mal distribution if the correlation coefficient is positive for the strategic complements
games or negative for the strategic substitutes games.
3.1 Introduction
This chapter develops a simple model of firm entry with correlated private informa-
tion in a 2-player static strategic complements game. This game is symmetric. In the
game, after observing their respective private payoff shocks, two firms simultaneously
decide whether to enter a market. The private payoff shocks are statistically correlated,
and the correlation coefficient of players’ joint type distribution measures the degree
of information correlation. That is, there are common and idiosyncratic components
of each payoff shock, and each firm only observes its own aggregate shock without
knowing its component. An example of this situation is two firms that produce com-
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plementary inputs entering a local market. Each firm expects its private payoff shocks
of entry to be correlated with the other firm’s, because the shocks depend on certain
common factors of the market.
The game is solved by a cutoff strategy, which is defined as if a player’s private
payoff shock is above a threshold value, they choose entry, or vice versa. By solving
the game, we find a critical value of the correlation coefficient. For correlation coeffi-
cients below this critical value, a cutoff strategy cannot be used to solve the game. This
result is determined by the normality of the joint prior distribution and the definition
of the cutoff strategy. The intuition is that if the correlation coefficient is smaller than
this critical value, the expected payoff function is no longer monotonic with respect to
the player’s own strategies, given any strategy of the opponent. For some strategies of
the opponent, there are multiple (three) best responses. One of the three best responses
will make a player choose entry if the payoff shock is below the best response cutoff
value, which contradicts the definition of cutoff strategies.
Under some parameter specifications, the game exhibits a unique equilibrium. Un-
der other parameter specifications, there may exist two or three equilibria and the num-
ber of equilibria changes in the following order as the correlation coefficient increases
from the lowest feasible value to 1: 3→ 2→ 1 or 3→ 1. The intuition is that the
uncertainty between players’ private payoff shocks is measured by the correlation co-
efficient, and the uncertainty between players’ private information determines whether
a player’s conditional density of the opponent’s payoff shocks given the player’s own
payoff shock can approximately or imprecisely reflect the opponent’s private infor-
mation.1 2 If the uncertainty between players’ private payoff shocks is low (high),
then the conditional density function can approximately (imprecisely) reflect the op-
ponent’s private information. If the density function can approximately reflect the
other players’ private information, then players can obtain enough information to help
them match their action strategies, hence leading to multiple equilibria. Otherwise,
players cannot obtain enough information to help them match their action strategies
1As in Chapter 2, the uncertainty between players’ payoff shocks (random variables) indicate that for
two random variables ε and ε∗, the relation ε∗ = aε+b+η holds, where a and b are two real numbers
and η is a random variable that is used to reflect the uncertainty between players’ private information.
Still, we can consider to use the correlation coefficient between the two random variables to measure
the uncertainty between them.
2To understand how the density function can reflect the opponent’s private information given a
player’s own private information, please refer to Section 2.4 of Chapter 2
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and hence the game exhibits a unique equilibrium. In the strategic complements game,
high (low) value of correlation coefficient usually represents high (low) uncertainty
between players’ private information. However, it is also possible that for certain pa-
rameter specifications, the game has a unique equilibrium for all feasible values of the
correlation coefficient. This is because due to the concerned payoff specification, the
two players’ ex ante expectations of the opponent’s behaviour are unique, irrespective
of what payoff shocks will be drawn. Ex ante in this chapter means the expectation is
formed before the payoff shocks are drawn, and hence, the expectation is taken for all
possible values of payoff shocks. Therefore, we call it ex ante expectation. The ex-
pectations are that both players are more likely to choose being inactive, active or not
sure whether the opponent is more likely to choose being inactive or active, or more
likely to be indifferent to either action choice. Accordingly, the game exhibits a unique
equilibrium to echo the respective expectations.3
The equilibrium strategies are represented by the cutoff strategies, which take all
real numbers. The comparative statics of the correlation coefficient or variances of
prior distribution on players’ equilibrium strategies depend on the sign of the equilib-
rium strategy and the stability of the equilibrium.4 For a stable equilibrium, increasing
the payoff of entry will make a player more likely choose entry. If the given equilibrium
cutoff strategies are negative, increasing the information correlation or jointly increas-
ing the variances of the joint prior distribution will make players less likely choose
entry. If the given equilibrium cutoff strategies are positive, increasing information
correlation or jointly increasing the variances of the joint prior distribution will make
players more likely choose entry. If the given equilibrium cutoff strategies equal zero,
changing the information correlation or variances of the joint prior distribution does
not have any impact on the equilibrium strategies. For unstable equilibrium, increas-
ing the payoff of entry will make a player less likely choose entry, which contradicts
3Specifically, if the expectation is that both players are more likely to choose being inactive or that
both players are more likely to choose being active, the expectation is dominant in a player’s decision
making and the uncertainty between players’ private information takes a minor role in his decision
making. However, if the expectation is that players are not sure whether the opponent is more likely
to choose being inactive or active, or more likely to be indifferent to either action choice, only when
the uncertainty between players’ private information is high, the expectation is dominant in a player’s
decision making. These intuitions are established when the best response functions are not contraction
function. If the best response functions are contraction function, each player is more focused on the
knowledge of himself and the opponent’s information becomes less important in a player’s decision
making. This situation is close to that of an individual decision problem, and hence the game exhibits a
unique equilibrium.
4The stability concept adopted in this chapter is Lyapunov stability.
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our common sense. Because we use a cutoff strategy to solve the game, if the payoff of
entry increases, then given the opponent’s strategy, a player will more likely choose en-
try. Because the game exhibits positive externalities in payoffs, the opponent will also
be more likely to choose entry as the best response to the player’s change of strategies
more favouring entry. Given this best response dynamics, no strategy will converge
to an equilibrium in which increasing the payoff of entry makes a player less likely to
choose entry. This situation satisfies the Lyapunovian instability of an equilibrium and
hence such an equilibrium is unstable.
In this symmetric game, the variances of players’ prior distribution are assumed to
be identical. There is an equivalence relationship between how the number of equilib-
ria varies with the variances and with the correlation coefficient. We find that under
certain parameter specifications, the game exhibits a unique equilibrium. Under other
parameter specifications, the number of equilibria changes in the following order as
variances increase from the lowest feasible value to +∞: 3→ 2→ 1 or 3→ 1. The
intuition is that the uncertainty of a player’s private payoff shock is determined by
the variance of the player’s prior distribution, and the uncertainty of both players’
private payoff shocks determines whether the conditional density of the opponent’s
payoff shocks given the player’s own payoff shock can approximately or imprecisely
reflect the opponent’s private information.5 If the uncertainty of both players’ private
payoff shocks is low (high), then the conditional density function can approximately
(imprecisely) reflect the opponent’s private information. Still, multiple equilibria arise
when the density function can approximately reflect the opponent’s private informa-
tion given the player’s own private information. Otherwise, the game exhibits a unique
equilibrium when the density function is imprecise to reflect the opponent’s private
information given the player’s own private information. The low (high) value of the
variance usually represents low (high) uncertainty of a player’s private information in
the strategic complements game. However, it is also possible that for certain parameter
specifications, the game has a unique equilibrium for all feasible values of variances.
Similar to the corresponding case for the uncertainty between players’ private infor-
mation, this is also because due to the concerned payoff specification, the two players’
ex ante expectations of the opponent’s behaviour are unique, irrespective of what pay-
off shocks will be drawn, and the expectations are that both players are more likely to
5In this chapter, no matter how the variances change, they are always assumed to be identical. There-
fore, we consider the uncertainty of both players’ private information (payoff shocks).
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choose being inactive, active or not sure whether the opponent is more likely to choose
being inactive or active, or more likely to be indifferent to either action choice.6
The comparative statics of the number of equilibria with respect to variances is also
the necessary and sufficient condition to differentiate unique equilibrium and multiple
equilibria. Morris and Shin (2005) study an identically specified game and provide a
sufficient condition for unique equilibrium. They focus on how introducing strategic
uncertainty can reduce the number of equilibria of a complete information game. The
complete information game is symmetric and strategic complements. They also use
the cutoff strategy defined in this chapter to solve the game. They argue that when
the strategic uncertainty (belief) is sufficiently invariant with respect to all possible
strategies, there is a unique equilibrium. Based on this insight, they obtain a suffi-
cient condition to ensure the game exhibits a unique equilibrium. We find that their
sufficient condition is essentially the necessary and sufficient to ensure that the best
response functions are contraction functions. If both players’ best response functions
are contractions, then the game is dominance solvable and hence there exists a unique
equilibrium. Therefore, we nest Morris and Shin’s (2005) result.
The incomplete information entry game can be viewed as a perturbed game of a
complete information entry game. According to Harsanyi (1973)’s purification ratio-
nale, if the perturbation errors on each player’s payoff are independent, a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium exists that will converge to the mixed strategy equilibrium as pertur-
bation errors tend to zero. In our game, we specify that the variances of the perturbation-
error distribution converge to zero, as the process that uncertainty of perturbed games
vanishes. We find that, for the strategic complements complete information games if
the perturbation errors are negatively correlated, or for the strategic substitutes com-
plete information games if the perturbation errors are positively correlated, there does
not exist a Bayesian game that can be solved by the cutoff strategy as perturbation
errors tend to zero. Hence, Harsanyi’s purification rationale cannot be applied to this
situation. The intuition is that by assuming the variances of both players’ type distri-
butions are identical, for negative information correlation in the strategic complements
6Specifically, if the expectation is that both players are more likely to choose being inactive or that
both players are more likely to choose being active, the expectation is dominant in a player’s decision
making and the uncertainty of the player’s private information takes a minor role in his decision making.
However, if the expectation is that players are not sure whether the opponent is more likely to choose
being inactive or active, or more likely to be indifferent to either action choice, only when the uncertainty
of each player’s private information is high, the expectation is dominant in a player’s decision making.
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game or the positive correlation in the strategic substitutes game, there exists a critical
value of variances, below which the expected payoff function is not monotonic with
respect to a player’s own private payoff shock, and it is possible that given some of the
opponent’s strategies, the player can have multiple (three) best responses; around one
of the best responses, a payoff shock that is below the best response cutoff value can
make the player choose entry, which contradicts the definition of the cutoff strategy.
Therefore, for negative information correlation in the strategic complements game or
positive information correlation in the strategic substitutes game, only if the variances
are above the cutoff value, the game can be solved by cutoff strategies.
However, if the information correlation is positive for the strategic complements
games or negative for the strategic substitutes games, the purification rationale is still
applicable. We find that in these situations, the Bayesian games that are supposed
to converge to the complete information game as the perturbation errors degenerate
to zero exist, and during the process, the pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium
will converge to the corresponding Nash equilibrium of the underlying complete in-
formation game. Therefore, we extend Harsanyi’s purification rationale to dependent
perturbation-error situations.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the game. Sec-
tion 3.3 studies the best response function. Section 3.4 studies the comparative statics
of the number of equilibria with respect to the correlation coefficient and the stability
of equilibrium. Section 3.5 studies the comparative statics of equilibrium strategies.
Section 3.6 presents the comparative statics of the number of equilibria with respect
to variances. Section 3.7 explains how purification rationale can be extended to games
with dependent perturbation errors. Section 3.8 summarizes all the main results and
intuitions of the strategic complements game. Section 3.9 concludes this chapter.
3.2 The Game
Consider a 2-player entry game. Each player has two choices, activity or entry (here-
after, 1), or inactivity (hereafter, 0). Each firm makes its own decision after observing
its private payoff shock. Then, both firms implement their decisions, which can be ob-
served by each other. The active firm will enter the market. If both firms are active, a
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coordination will happen between them and the profit D if the opponent chooses to be
active strictly exceeds the profit M if the opponent chooses to be inactive. At the end
of the period, both firms collect their respective payoffs. The inactive firm gets payoff
zero and the active firm obtains the deterministic payoff (D or M) plus its private pay-
off shock. It is assumed that the private payoff shocks are subject to a bivariate normal
distribution (ε,ε∗)∼ N(0,0,ς,ς∗,ρ). In this chapter, we use ‘*’ to denote variables of
the opponent. It is always assumed that ς = ς∗ to ensure that the game is symmetric.
The strategic form of this game is depicted as follows:
Firm i∗















Table 1: The incomplete information entry game where D > M
Firms adopt cutoff strategies: if payoff shock ε is above a threshold value ε̄, a
player chooses to be active, or vice versa. Therefore, the interim belief that the op-




f (ε∗|ε) is the conditional density of ε∗ given ε. σx∗(x∗,ε) is the first-order partial
derivative of σ(x∗,ε) with respect to x∗, and σε(x∗,ε) is the first order partial derivative
of σ(x∗,ε) with respect to ε. It is found that σx∗(x∗,ε)> 0, σε(x∗,ε)< 0 if ρ > 0, and
σε(x∗,ε) > 0 if ρ < 0. σε(x∗,ε) = 0 at ρ = 0. So given a player’s own payoff shock
ε, if the opponent’s cutoff strategy becomes higher, then the belief that the opponent
chooses being inactive will increase. Given the opponent’s strategy, if the correla-
tion coefficient is positive, a high payoff shock of a player indicates that probably the
opponent also gets a high payoff shock; thus, the belief that the opponent chooses be-
ing inactive decreases. Given the opponent’s strategy, if the correlation coefficient is
negative, a high payoff shock of a player indicates that probably the opponent gets a
negative payoff shock; hence, the belief that the opponent chooses being inactive in-
creases. If the correlation coefficient equals 0, a player’s own payoff shock does not
have any impact on their belief of the opponent’s behaviour. Firm i’s expected payoff
of entry can be written as
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EΠ(x∗,ε) = σ(x∗,ε)(M+ ε)+(1−σ(x∗,ε))(D+ ε)
= σ(x∗,ε)M+(1−σ(x∗,ε))D+ ε (3.1)
Equation (3.1) indicates that a player’s expected payoff is composed of two parts:
the payoff induced by strategic uncertainty, σ(x∗,ε)M +(1−σ(x∗,ε))D, and the re-
alised payoff shock, ε. If ρ ≥ 0, given ρ, M, D, ς2 and ς∗2, both parts are non-
decreasing with respect to ε. Intuitively, if both firms’ private payoff shocks are pos-
itively correlated, a high payoff shock ε for one firm would on average imply a high
payoff shock ε∗ for the opponent, which provides an incentive that encourages the
player to be active in the strategic complements game. Therefore, the expected payoff
should be non-decreasing with respect to ε for ρ≥ 0. Thus, for a positively correlated
private information situation, the cutoff strategy can always be applied.
However, if ρ is negative, then given all parameter values, the payoff induced by
strategic uncertainty σ(x∗,ε)M+(1−σ(x∗,ε))D is decreasing with respect to ε. Thus,
whether the expected payoff EΠ(x∗,ε) is monotonically increasing with respect to ε
depends on the trade-off between the payoff induced by strategic uncertainty and by
the realized payoff shock. For negative ρs, if one firm draws a high payoff shock, it can
be expected that its opponent draws a low payoff shock, and hence, it is highly prob-
able that the opponent chooses being inactive, which provides strategic disincentives
for the firm to choose entry in the strategic complements context. It is also known that
ε itself is a part of the payoff and it incentivizes entering. Therefore, whether the firm
will choose to be active essentially depends on the trade-off between the two contrast-
ing effects.
If the correlation between players’ private information is loose, i.e. ρ is slightly
negative, it can be deduced that the positive incentive generated by a high value of
ε dominates its negative impact, and hence, in total, its expected payoff should in-
crease with respect to ε. However, if the correlation coefficient between the players’
private information is tight, i.e. ρ is close to -1, then it can be reasonably expected
that the strategic disincentive induced by the realization of a high value of ε will be
strong, and hence, a high payoff shock does not necessarily bring a high expected pay-
off EΠ(x∗,ε). In fact, it is found that there exists a unique boundary ρ̃ in the strategic
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complements discrete game such that if ρ ≥ ρ̃, given the expected opponent’s cutoff
strategy x∗ ∈ R, the expected payoff EΠ(x∗,ε) is increasing with respect to ε, but if
ρ < ρ̃, the expected payoff is no longer monotonic; it is then certain that for some x∗,
equation EΠ(x∗,ε) = 0 has multiple (three) solutions (best responses) of ε and there
is one solution below which a payoff shock can make a player choose entry, which
contradicts the definition of the cutoff strategy (see Appendix). Therefore, given D, M,
ς2 and ς∗2, a player can legitimately use a cutoff strategy to play the game if and only




7 Thus, for each player, there exists
a boundary of ρ and for the value of ρ above the boundary value, a cutoff strategy can
be used to solve the game. Due to the assumption ς = ς∗, the boundary for both players
are the same, i.e. ρ̃ = ρ̃∗, and therefore, this boundary defines the range of ρ for which
a cutoff strategy can be used to solve the game. This result is formally given by the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Restriction of Applying a Cutoff Strategy to Solve the Game) :
Suppose D > M and ς∗ = ς. A cutoff strategy can be applied to solve the game if and




Proof: See Appendix. 
π = 3.14... is the ratio of a circle’s circumference to its diameter. Given ρ ∈ [ρ̃,0)




for all x∗ ∈ R; hence,
1≥ σε(x∗,ε)(D−M)












As ς increases, the variance of the distribution f (.|ε), which equals ς2(1−ρ2), in-
creases, and hence the density function flattens.8 Particularly, the maximum value of
f (x∗|ε), which equals 1√
2π(1−ρ2)ς
and is taken at the mean x∗ = ρε, decreases. Hence,
(3.2) is easier to be satisfied and it is more certain that at the given value of ρ, EΠ(x∗,ε)
increases with respect to ε for all x∗ ∈ R. Therefore, the range of ρ that makes the
expected payoff increase with respect to ε should be broadened as ς increases, and ac-
cordingly, ρ̃ decreases.
If D−M decreases, the RHS of (3.2) increases. Hence, (3.2) is easier to be satis-
fied, and it is more certain that at the given value of ρ, EΠ(x∗,ε) increases with respect
to ε for all x∗ ∈ R. Therefore, the range of ρ that makes the expected payoff of entry
increase with respect to ε should be broadened as D−M decreases, and accordingly, ρ̃
decreases.
3.3 The Best Response Function
Given the opponent’s cutoff strategy x∗ ∈ R, a firm’s cutoff best response g(x∗) is de-
termined by EΠ(x∗,g(x∗)) = 0. That is,
σ(x∗,g(x∗))(M−D)+D+g(x∗) = 0
It is found that g(x∗) ∈ [−D,−M] because as long as D > M, the maximum of
σ(x∗,ε)(M−D)+D equals D, where σ(x∗,ε) = 0, and the minimum of σ(x∗,ε)(M−
D)+D equals M, where σ(x∗,ε) = 1. Given the joint normal distribution, we obtain
the best response function in its reverse form:
8The density function f (.|ε) refers to f (ε∗|ε). For the explicit expression, please refer to Appendix
A.










where Φ(.) is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution.





In this game, we can divide the best response functions into two types: contraction
and non-contraction.9 The contraction best response function, according to Zimper
(2004), makes the game dominance solvable, and hence, there exists a unique equilib-
rium. If the best response function is a non-contraction, it may contain multiple equi-
libria. Figure 1 exhibits a numerical example of a contraction and a non-contraction
best response function. The properties of the best response functions are summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Properties of Best Response Functions): Given that ς = ς∗ and
D > M, there exists a ρ̂ = (D−M)
2−2πς∗2
(D−M)2+2πς∗2 which differentiates contraction and non-
contraction best response functions:
1) for ρ ∈ [ρ̃, ρ̂],




2πς∗2 )−D), 0 < g
′(x∗)< 1;


























2πς∗2 )−D,−M], 0 < g
′(x∗)< 1;
9For the description and properties of contraction and non-contraction functions, please refer to
Appendix H of Chapter 2.
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2) for ρ ∈ (ρ̂,1), 0 < g′(x∗)< 1 globally.
Proof: see Appendix. 




















Figure 1: A numerical example of a contraction best response function and a
non-contraction best response function. D = 1, M = −1, ς (and ς∗)=1 and ρ = −0.3
(for the solid curve) and 0.1 (for the dashed curve). In this case, ρ̂ = −0.2220. The
solid curve represents a non-contraction best response function, and the dashed curve
represents a contraction best response function.
Due to the positive externalities of payoff specification, the game exhibits strate-
gic complements; therefore, it is not surprising that the best response function in this
game is increasing. For the opponent, ρ̂∗= (D−M)
2−2πς2
(D−M)2+2πς2 . If both players’ best response
functions are contraction, the game is dominance solvable, and hence a unique equi-
librium exists. Because we consider a symmetric game, ρ̂ = ρ̂∗. Therefore, a sufficient
condition to make the game have a unique equilibrium is that given D, M and ς = ς∗,
ρ ∈ [ρ̂,1). This sufficient condition can be generalized to asymmetric payoff settings,
where each player has different D and M. Therefore, the generalized sufficient condi-
tion to ensure a unique equilibrium is ρ ∈ [max{ρ̂, ρ̂∗},1).
If the best response functions are contraction function and hence the game is dom-
inance solvable, then according to the implicit function theorem, it implies that for all
x∗ ∈ R, a player’s expected payoff responds more to their own strategy than to the op-

















Equation (3.5) can be explicitly written as
σε(x∗,g(x∗))(M−D)+1 >−σx∗(x∗,g(x∗))(M−D)
where σε(x∗,g(x∗)) = σε(x∗,ε)|ε=g(x∗) and σx∗(x∗,g(x∗)) = σx∗(x∗,ε)|ε=g(x∗). Fur-
thermore, the above inequality can be written as
ρ f (x∗|g(x∗))(D−M)+1 > f (x∗|g(x∗))(D−M)
and we obtain
1 > (1−ρ)(D−M) f (x∗|g(x∗))





The inequality (3.6) is held for all ρ ∈ [ρ̂,1). From (3.6), it can be seen that as
ρ→ 1, the RHS of (3.6) increases to +∞, and hence (3.6) is certainly satisfied. In this
situation, it is certain that the best response functions are contraction functions and so
the game is dominance solvable.
Given ρ∈ [ρ̂,1), as ς increases, the variance of f (.|g(x∗)), which equals ς2(1−ρ2),
increases and hence the density function flattens.10 Particularly, the maximum value
of f (.|g(x∗)), which is equal to 1√
2π(1−ρ2)ς
and is taken at the mean ρg(x∗) of the
distribution f (.|g(x∗)), decreases. Hence, (3.6) is easier to be satisfied and it is more
10The density function f (.|g(x∗)) is exactly the density function f (ε∗|ε), where ε = g(x∗). For its
explicit expression, please refer to Appendix A.
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certain that at the given value of ρ, g′(x∗) < 1 for all x∗ ∈ R. Therefore, the range of
ρ that ensures g(x∗) is a contraction function should be broadened as ς increases, and
accordingly ρ̂ decreases.
If D−M decreases, the RHS of the inequality (3.6) increases. Hence, (3.6) is eas-
ier to be satisfied and it is more certain that at the given value of ρ, g′(x∗) < 1 for all
x∗ ∈R. Therefore, if D−M decreases, the range of ρ that ensures g(x∗) is a contraction
function should also be broadened, and accordingly ρ̂ decreases.
3.4 Comparative Statics of the Number of Equilibria with
respect to the Correlation Coefficient
Since the best response function in this game increases and the two players’ best re-
sponse functions are located symmetrically around the 45◦ line, all equilibria of the
strategic complements game must be symmetric and locate at the 45◦ line. Hereafter,
we denote any equilibrium of the strategic complements game by (e,e), which should











Therefore, equivalently, the equilibria of the strategic complements game are also


















we can analyse the equilibria of the game separately in terms of D+M > 0, D+M < 0
and D+M = 0 (see Figures 2–4).
Figures 2 to 4 exhibit all possible cases of the intersections between y = Φ(α(ρ)x)
and y= D+xD−M for all ρ∈ [ρ̃,1). The dashed curves describe the limit case y=Φ(α(ρ̃)x),
and the intersection points between y = Φ(α(ρ̃)x) and y = D+xD−M will be used to judge
whether the game is able to contain multiple equilibria for all ρ ∈ [ρ̃,1). Irrespec-
tive of the value of ρ, given D, M and ς (and hence ς∗), y = D+xD−M always crosses the






















Figure 2: In the 2×2 strategic complements game, for all ρ ∈ [ρ̃,1), if D+M > 0,
there could be either one, two or three equilibria, which are intersection points
between y = Φ(α(ρ)x), where ρ ∈ (ρ̃,1), which is represented by the solid curve, and
y = D+xD−M , which is represented by the solid line. The dashed curve represents the limit






















Figure 3: In the 2×2 strategic complements game, for all ρ ∈ [ρ̃,1), if D+M < 0,
there could be either one, two or three equilibria, which are intersection points
between y = Φ(α(ρ)x), where ρ ∈ (ρ̃,1), which is represented by the solid curve, and
y = D+xD−M , which is represented by the solid line. The dashed curve represents the limit



















Figure 4: In the 2×2 strategic complements game, for all ρ ∈ [ρ̃,1), if D+M = 0,
then −D+M2 = 0 and there could be either one or three equilibria, which are
intersection points between y = Φ(α(ρ)x), where ρ ∈ (ρ̃,1), which is represented by
the solid curve, and y = D+xD−M , which is represented by the solid line. The dashed
curve represents the limit case y = Φ(α(ρ̃)x).
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point (−D+M2 ,
1
2), and y = Φ(α(ρ)x) always crosses the point (0,
1
2). The intersec-
tion points are the equilibria of the game. We can directly judge the stability of each
equilibrium in Figures 2 to 4 by comparing the slopes of y = D+xD−M and y = Φ(α(ρ)x)
for all ρ ∈ [ρ̃,1). We denote φ(.) as the probability density function of the standard
normal distribution. It is found that at an equilibrium (e,e), g′(e) < 1 if and only if
φ(α(ρ)e)α(ρ)< 1D−M ; g
′(e)> 1 if and only if φ(α(ρ)e)α(ρ)> 1D−M ; g
′(e) = 1 if and
only if φ(α(ρ)e)α(ρ) = 1D−M . Therefore, by comparing the slopes of the two curves
at each intersection point, we can learn whether the corresponding eigenvalues at the
equilibrium are smaller than one.11 Hence, we obtain the stability property of all equi-
libria.
We are interested in the comparative statics of the number of equilibria with respect
to ρ. Take Figure 2 as an example. Sub-figures 2-1, 2-2 and 2-3 represent three possi-
ble cases of intersections between y = Φ(α(ρ̃)x) and y = D+xD−M . If at ρ = ρ̃, there exists
a unique intersection point between y = Φ(α(ρ̃)x) and y = D+xD−M , then as ρ increases
away from ρ̃, y = Φ(α(ρ)x) will decrease given x > 0 and increase given x < 0, and
thus, a unique intersection point exists after the change (see sub-figure 2-1). Hence,
the games for all ρ ∈ [ρ̃,1) always contain a unique equilibrium (intersection point)
given D, M and ς (and hence ς∗). Because in this case, y = D+xD−M is always steeper than
y = Φ(α(ρ)x), the unique equilibrium is stable. Sub-figure 2-2 represents a boundary
situation, which means at ρ = ρ̃, y = Φ(α(ρ̃)x) and y = D+xD−M have one intersection
point and one tangent point.12 In this situation, by comparing the slopes of the two
curves, the intersection point is stable, while the tangent point’s stability cannot be
determined. As ρ increases away from ρ̃, again y = Φ(α(ρ)x) will decrease given
x > 0 and increase given x < 0, and only one intersection point exists. It represents
the unique equilibrium for all ρ ∈ (ρ̃,1), and it is stable. Sub-figure 2-3 represents the
11In this symmetric strategic complements game, an equilibrium cutoff strategy (e, e) should
simultaneously satisfy e = g(e) and e = g∗(e). g(.) and g∗(.) are player i’s and player i∗’s best response








It is straightforward to find that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are g∗
′
(e) and g′(e), respec-
tively. Thus, if the first-order derivatives of best response functions at an equilibrium are known, the
stability of this equilibrium can be judged.
12The tangency situation, which represents an equilibrium, can only arise if D > 0 >M. If D >M > 0
or 0 > D > M, the game always has a unique equilibrium for ρ ∈ [ρ̃,1) (see Appendix).
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most subtle case. At ρ = ρ̃, y = Φ(α(ρ̃)x) and y = D+xD−M have three intersection points.
By comparing the slopes of the two functions at each intersection point (equilibrium),
the middle intersection point (equilibrium) is unstable, while the two outer intersection
points (equilibria) are stable. As we increase ρ away from ρ̃, the multiplicity situation
continues until ρ = ρ̄, where y = Φ(α(ρ̄)x) has one tangent point and one intersection
point with y = D+xD−M ; hence, the number of equilibria becomes two. As ρ continues
to increase away from ρ̄, y = Φ(α(ρ)x) will further decrease given x > 0 and further
increase given x < 0 such that only one intersection point is left, which represents the
unique equilibrium and is stable.
We can apply the same approach of deriving how the number of equilibria changes
with respect to ρ and the stability of equilibrium to cases of D+M < 0 and D+M =
0. Figures 3 and 4 describes how many intersections points (equilibria) can exist if
D+M < 0 or D+M = 0. Finally, from previous analysis, it can be determined that ρ̄
exists if and only if D > 0 > M. If ρ̄ exists, ρ̄ ≤ ρ̂, but ρ̄ could be smaller than ρ̃, or
greater than or equal to ρ̃.
Suppose D > 0 > M and hence ρ̄ exists. Its analytical expression depends on the































where ρ̄ < ρ̂. If D+M = 0, then ρ̄ = ρ̂.
When there are three equilibria, we name the equilibrium located at the middle
part of a best response function the middle equilibrium, and the equilibrium located at
the outer part of a best response function the outer equilibrium. By summarizing the
analysis of all three cases (D+M R 0), we obtain the comparative statics results of the
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number of equilibrium with respect to ρ and the stability of equilibrium. It is given by
the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Comparative Statics of the Number of Equilibria with respect to ρ
and Stability of Equilibrium in the Strategic Complements Game): For the static
2× 2 entry game, suppose D > M and ς = ς∗. ρ̄ exists if and only if D > 0 > M.
If D > 0 > M and ρ̄ < ρ̃, or if 0 > D > M or D > M > 0 in which case ρ̄ does not
exist, then for all ρ ∈ [ρ̃,1), the game has a unique equilibrium. Conversely, if for
all ρ ∈ [ρ̃,1), the game has a unique equilibrium, then it is either because ρ̄ < ρ̃ if
D > 0 > M or because 0 > D > M or D > M > 0 in which case ρ̄ does not exist. The
unique equilibrium is stable.
If ρ̄≥ ρ̃, then for all ρ ∈ [ρ̃, ρ̄), there exist three equilibria. The middle equilibrium
is unstable, while the two outer equilibria are stable. In particular, if D+M = 0, the
middle equilibrium is (0, 0).
At ρ = ρ̄: 1) if D+M 6= 0, there are two equilibria. One is stable. Stability of the
other is not determined; 2) if D+M = 0, there exists a unique equilibrium (0,0) and it
is stable.
For all ρ ∈ (ρ̄,1), there exists a unique equilibrium and it is stable. In particular, if
D+M = 0, the unique equilibrium is (0, 0).
Proof: see Appendix. 
The equilibria can be described as solutions of the equation system of g(x∗) and
g∗(x). As ρ→−1, g(x∗) at the limit is given by 13
13The game at ρ→−1 does not coincide with the game at ρ =−1. The game at ρ→−1 is exhibited
in the following part in the main context of this chapter. For the game at ρ = −1, ε = −ε∗ and both
players are affected by the opposite payoff shocks which are not known ex ante. However, if these
shocks are known, the two players play a complete information game. For ε ∈ (−D,−M), there are
three equilibria: (0,0), (1,1) and a mixed strategy ( D+εD−M ,
D+ε
D−M ), which is the probability of choosing
action 0. This probability depends on ex post realizations of payoff shocks. In contrast, for the game at
ρ→−1, the number of equilibria and the cutoff value of the equilibrium depends on the relation among
D, M and 0. Even if we express the equilibria of the game at ρ→−1 in the form of action strategies,
none of them depends on the ex post realization of ε and ε∗. Therefore, the incomplete information
games at ρ→ −1 does not coincide with the games at ρ = −1. g(x∗) is continuous with respect to
ρ ∈ (−1,1). Therefore, in this section, the natural benchmark to compare the number of equilibria for
games at ρ ∈ [ρ̃,1) is the game at ρ→−1.














0 < M < D
Figure 5: In each sub-figure, the two horizontal lines and the point between the two
lines together represent the piecewise function g(x∗) at ρ→−1. The dashed line
represents the 45◦ line. The intersection point between the horizontal line and the
dashed line is denoted by (e,e). g(x∗) and g∗(x) are symmetrically located around the
45◦ line, and therefore the solution (e,e) that satisfies e = g(e) is also the intersection
point between g(x∗) and the 45◦ line. For M < D < 0, the intersection point (solution)
is (−M,−M). For 0 < M < D, the intersection point (solution) is (−D,−D).
g(x∗) =

−D x∗ < D+M2
−D+M2 x
∗ = D+M2
−M x∗ > D+M2
Because g(x∗) and g∗(x) are symmetrically located around the 45◦ line as well, all
solutions are symmetric and a solution (e,e) of the equation system should be an in-
tersection point between g(x∗) and the 45◦ line. If M < D < 0, g(x∗) and g∗(x) have a
unique solution (−M,−M). If 0 < M < D, the equation system has a unique solution
(−D,−D). Figure 5 describes how these solutions arise .
If D > 0 > M, this situation is complicated. In this situation, if D+M2 < −D, then
there is a unique solution (−M,−M), and if D+M2 > −M, there is a unique solution
(−D,−D). Supposing −D < D+M2 < −M, if D + M 6= 0, there are two solutions
(−M,−M) and (−D,−D), while if D+M = 0, there are three solutions (−M,−M),
(0,0) and (−D,−D). Figure 6 exhibits how these solutions arise.
The intuition of Theorem 1 is as follows. The average known payoff of entry is

























D > 0 > M and
−D < D+M2 <−M
Figure 6: In each sub-figure, the two horizontal lines and the point between the two
lines together represent the piecewise function g(x∗) at ρ→−1. The dashed line
represents the 45◦ line. As in Figure 5, solution(s) (e,e), where e = g(e), are
intersection points between g(x∗) and the 45◦ line. Given D > 0 > M, if D+M2 <−D,
there is a unique solution (−M,−M). If D+M2 >−M, there is a unique solution
(−D,−D). If −D < D+M2 <−M and D+M 6= 0, there are two solutions (−D,−D)
and (−M,−M), and if D+M = 0, there are three solutions (−D,−D), (−M,−M)
and (0,0).
D+M
2 . Therefore, if a firm wants to choose entry, from an ex ante perspective, it should
at least obtain a payoff shock ε =−D+M2 . We call this shock the average payoff shock
required for entry. If −D+M2 > D > M, the average payoff shock required for entry
is even higher than the highest known payoff of being active. Thus, ex ante, i.e. be-
fore the payoff shock is drawn, each player will be expected to prefer being inactive
to entry. The expectation that the opponent prefers being inactive is formed before
the payoff shocks are drawn and there do not exist alternative expectations due to the
payoff specification. Hence, the contingent payoff shocks cannot affect the ex ante ex-
pectation. Therefore, given this expectation, a player expects that if they choose entry,
they will get profit M; therefore, if the payoff shock ε ≥ −M, the player will choose
entry. In the symmetric strategic complements game, players can behave identically
for matching their strategies. Hence, the opponent will think in the same way and
adopt cutoff strategy−M. This intuition applies to cases of 0 > D > M and D > 0 > M
with D+M2 < −D. Both cases satisfy the requirement −
D+M
2 > D > M. This fact can
be judged from concerned sub-figures in Figures 5 and 6.
If D > M >−D+M2 , the average payoff shock required for entry is smaller than the
lowest known payoff of being active. Thus, ex ante, each player will be expected to
prefer being active to being inactive. The expectation that the opponent prefers entry
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is formed before the payoff shocks are drawn and is determined by such payoff spec-
ifications. Hence, the contingent payoff shocks cannot affect the ex ante expectation.
Therefore, in this situation, a player expects that if they choose entry, they will get
profit D, and thus, if the payoff shock ε ≥ −D, the player will choose entry. In the
strategic complements game, players behave identically for matching their strategies;
hence, the opponent will think in the same way and adopt the strategy −D. This intu-
ition applies to the case of D > M > 0 and D > 0 > M with D+M2 > −M. Both cases
satisfy the requirement D > M > −D+M2 , which can be judged from concerned sub-
figures in Figures 5 and 6.
If D > −D+M2 > M, the average payoff shock required for entry is between the
highest and lowest payoff of being active. This situation happens when D > 0 > M,
and hence, reasonably in this situation, −D+M2 could be higher or lower than, or equal
to 0, which is the payoff of being inactive. Thus, ex ante, each player can either prefer
being inactive to being active, or vice versa. Both possibilities are reasonable to hap-
pen. If each player prefers being inactive to being active, then the intuition follows the
case of −D+M2 > D > M and both players will choose cutoff strategy (−M,−M). If
each player prefers being active to being inactive, then the intuition follows the case
of D > M > −D+M2 and both players will choose cutoff strategy (−D,−D). Thus, if
D >−D+M2 > M, two cutoff strategies (−M,−M) and (−D,−D) exist.
In addition, for D > −D+M2 > M, if
D+M
2 = 0, then the average known payoff
of being active equals that of being inactive, which is 0. Therefore, each player
can be indifferent to being active or inactive ex ante. In this situation, conditional
on the expectation that the opponent is indifferent to either action choice, if payoff
shock ε≥−D+M2 = 0, the player will choose entry. Symmetrically, the opponent will
think in the same way and also choose a cutoff strategy that equals 0. Therefore, if
D >−D+M2 > M and D+M = 0, another cutoff strategy (0,0) exists.
At ρ = ρ̃, there exists uncertainty between players’ payoff shocks. Players cannot
predict each other’s private information via the conditional density function f (ε∗|ε) as
precisely as in the case of ρ→−1.14 Suppose 0 > D > M. Then, the payoff of being
inactive is higher than the highest payoff of being active. Thus, each player is ex ante
14To understand how the density function f (ε∗|ε) can reflect the opponent’s private information given
a player’s own private information, please refer to Section 2.4 of Chapter 2.
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expected more likely to choose being inactive. In this situation, irrespective of whether
f (ε∗|ε) can approximately or imprecisely reflect ε∗ given ε, the ex ante expectation that
the opponent is more likely to choose being inactive is not affected, because this ex-
pectation is formed before the payoff shock is drawn and there do not exist alternative
expectations due to the payoff specification. In this situation, there still exists a unique
equilibrium, and reasonably the equilibrium strategy should be close to (−M,−M) if
we translate the action strategy equilibrium into a cutoff strategy equilibrium represen-
tation. This intuition can apply to the games for all ρ ∈ [ρ̃,1) given 0 > D > M.
Suppose D > M > 0. Then, the payoff of being inactive is smaller than the lowest
payoff of being active. Thus, each player is ex ante expected more likely to choose
being active. Although the payoff shocks are negatively correlated at ρ = ρ̃, as in the
case of 0 > D > M, irrespective of whether f (ε∗|ε) can approximately or imprecisely
reflect ε∗ given ε, the players’ expectations that both are more likely to choose being
active will not be affected, because the expectation is formed before the payoff shock
is drawn and there do not exist alternative expectations due to the payoff specifica-
tion. Therefore, there exists a unique equilibrium; that is, both players are more likely
to choose being active. If we translate the action strategy equilibrium into a cutoff
strategy equilibrium representation, the equilibrium strategy is expected to be close to
(−D,−D). This intuition can apply to the games for all ρ ∈ [ρ̃,1) given D > M > 0.
Suppose D > 0 > M. In this situation, at ρ = ρ̃, the game could have a unique
equilibrium for the following three possibilities:
1) D+M2 <−D < 0: the average known payoff of entry is lower than the payoff of
being inactive. The intuition in this situation follows the case of 0 > D > M, in which
the payoff specification also satisfies D+M2 < −D. The intuition at ρ = ρ̃ can apply to
games for all ρ ∈ [ρ̃,1) given D+M2 <−D.
2) D+M2 > −M > 0: the average known payoff of entry is higher than the payoff
of being inactive. The intuition in this situation follows the case D > M > 0, in which
the payoff specification also satisfies D+M2 >−M. The intuition at ρ = ρ̃ can apply to
games for all ρ ∈ [ρ̃,1) given D+M2 >−M.
3) −D < D+M2 < −M: in this situation, the average known payoff of entry could
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be higher or lower than, or equal to the payoff of being inactive. If at ρ = ρ̃, the un-
certainty between players’ private information is very high, then this uncertainty will
make players’ attempt to match their strategies difficult, because f (ε∗|ε) is imprecise to
reflect ε∗ given ε and players cannot get enough information to match their strategies.
In this situation, a player’s strategy choice is conditional upon an unclear expectation of
the opponent’s propensity of action choice.15 Symmetrically, the opponent will think
in the same way and adopt the same strategy. Therefore, the game exhibits a unique
equilibrium to capture this unclear situation. Reasonably, it can be expected that in this
situation, the value of the equilibrium entry threshold should be between −D and −M.
Alternatively, in the situation of −D < D+M2 <−M, if at ρ = ρ̃, the uncertainty be-
tween players’ private information is low such that f (ε∗|ε) can approximately reflect
ε∗ given ε for player i, then this situation is close to the case of −D < D+M2 < −M
with ρ→ −1. In this situation, players are either more likely to choose being inac-
tive or to choose being active. In addition, due to the uncertainty existing between
players’ private information, there is a possibility that each player is unclear about
the other player’s propensity of action choice. In particular, as ρ→ −1, the payoff
shocks for both players are opposite, which makes matching strategies difficult; hence,
each player’s propensity of action choice is blurred and this situation is more likely to
happen. Accordingly, a player will choose a strategy conditional on this unclear expec-
tation. Symmetrically, the other player will think in the same way and adopt the same
strategy. Hence, the game has another equilibrium to capture this unclear situation.
Reasonably, it can be expected that the value of this equilibrium entry threshold is be-
tween −D and −M. The intuition of the games with D > 0 > M at ρ = ρ̃ as discussed
above applies to games for all ρ ∈ [ρ̃, ρ̄) with D > 0 > M.
For ρ taking values that are far from -1 and 1, or specifically for all ρ ∈ [ρ̄, ρ̂),
the correlation between ε and ε∗ are much lower and hence the uncertainty between
players’ private information becomes much higher. Therefore, f (ε∗|ε) is imprecise to
reflect the opponent’s private information. In this situation, it is difficult for players
to get enough information to match their action strategies. Hence, the possibility that
players are unclear about the opponent’s propensity of action choice becomes the only
reasonable situation to exist. Therefore, the game only has a unique equilibrium, which
15An unclear expectation of the opponent’s propensity of action choice means that before the payoff
shocks are drawn, player i is not sure whether i∗ is more likely to choose being active or being inactive,
or more likely to be indifferent to either action choice.
76Chapter 3. Information Correlation in a Strategic Complements Game and an Extension of Purification Rationale
captures this unclear situation.
For ρ ∈ [ρ̂,1), as we have shown in Section 3.3, it is certain that the best response
functions are contraction functions and hence the game has a unique equilibrium. The
intuition is that, in this situation, as indicated by inequality (3.5), player i’s expected
payoff of entry is more sensitive to his own strategy than to his opponent’s strategy.
It means player i is more self-focused and the opponent’s private information is less
important in player i’s decision making, no matter whether f (ε∗|ε) can approximately
or imprecisely reflect i∗’s private information given ε. Therefore, in this situation, the
game is close to an individual decision problem, and hence there exists a unique equi-
librium.
Therefore, ρ̄, if greater than ρ̃, is the threshold that differentiates the high uncer-
tainty and low uncertainty between players’ private information. The uncertainty be-
tween players’ private information determines how players can behave (i.e. whether
f (ε∗|ε) can approximately or imprecisely reflect ε∗ given ε, and thus, the players can
(cannot) collect enough information to help them match their strategies) and hence
how many equilibria could exist.
All of these intuitions mentioned above explain why for all ρ ∈ [ρ̃,1), the strategic
complements game can have a unique equilibrium, or if there are multiple equilibria
for some values of ρ ∈ [ρ̃,1), as ρ increases from ρ̃ to 1, the number of equilibria will
decrease from 3 to 1.
Finally, to conclude this section, we provide a list of numerical examples. They
exhibit how the number of equilibrium varies with respect to different parameter spec-
ifications (see Figures 7–9).
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Figure 7: A numerical example of unique equilibrium in the 2× 2 strategic comple-
ments game. The solid curve represents a player’s best response function and the
dashed curve represents the opponent’s best response function. In this case, D=3.5,
M=-3, ρ = 0.5, ς = ς∗ = 1.5.
3.5 Comparative Statics of Players’ Equilibrium Strate-
gies
In this section, we present the comparative statics of exogenous parameters on the
equilibrium strategy. It is given as
Proposition 3 (Comparative Statics of Players’ Equilibrium Strategies): As-
sume D > M and ς = ς∗. We denote an equilibrium of the game by (e,e), where
−D < e <−M. We obtain that
(3.1) For a stable equilibrium, ∂e
∂M < 0 and
∂e
∂D < 0. If e ≤ (or >) 0,
∂e
∂ρ











equal 0 when e = 0.
(3.2) For an unstable equilibrium, ∂e
∂M > 0 and
∂e














equal 0 when e = 0.
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Figure 8: A numerical example of unique equilibrium in the 2× 2 strategic comple-
ments game. The solid curve represents a player’s best response function and the
dashed curve represents the opponent’s best response function. In this case, D=3.5,
M=-3, ρ = 0.3, ς = ς∗ = 1.5. This case is close to a boundary case where there exist
one intersection point and one tangent point. However, in fact, there is no tangency in
this case.
Proof: see Appendix. 
It is found that for τ ∈ {D,M}, sign(∂e
∂τ
) = sign( 1
φ(α(ρ)e)α(ρ)− 1D−M
) and for τ ∈ {ρ,ς
and ς∗}, sign(∂e
∂τ
) = sign( 1
φ(α(ρ)e)α(ρ)− 1D−M
)× sign(e). In Section 3.4, we have shown
that at an equilibrium (e,e), φ(α(ρ)e)α(ρ)R 1D−M if and only if g
′(e)R 1. Therefore,
in the symmetric strategic complements game, the stability of each equilibrium deter-
mines the sign of the comparative statics results.
For a stable equilibrium, increasing the payoff of entry D or M will encourage
players to adopt lower cutoff strategies, and hence, they become more likely to choose






are opposite towards the signs of correspond-
ing results in the strategic substitutes game in Chapter 2. This is determined by the













in the strategic substitutes game
























Figure 9: A numerical example of multiple equilibria in the 2× 2 strategic comple-
ments game. The solid curve represents a player’s best response function and the
dashed curve represents the opponent’s best response function. In this case, D=3.5,
M=-3, ρ = 0.3, ς = ς∗ = 1.2.
presented in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2. Generally, the intuition is that if we change
the correlation coefficient, the mean of the conditional distribution of the opponent’s
payoff shock given the player’s own payoff shock changes and the mean has a dom-
inant impact on the player’s belief towards the opponent’s strategy given the player’s
own strategy. The change of mean depends on the sign of the equilibrium strategies.
If we jointly change the variances of the prior distribution, only the variance of the
conditional distribution of the opponent’s payoff shock given the player’s own shock
changes. Increasing the variances will assign higher likelihood on low and high payoff
shocks in the conditional distribution of the opponent’s payoff shock, and the sign of
an equilibrium strategy determines whether this strategy is located in the high or low
payoff shock area in the distribution. The different location determines the different
impacts of changing variances on a player’s belief. The only difference of the analysis
for the strategic complements game from that for the strategic substitutes game is that
because D > M, the effect of increasing ρ or ς2 and ς∗2 on the expected payoff of entry
is opposite to the effect in the strategic substitutes game, which leads to the opposite
comparative statics results in the strategic complements game.
It should be noted that for an unstable equilibrium, increasing D and M will in-
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crease e, i.e. increasing the payoff of entry will make a player less likely choose entry.
In this game, only the middle equilibrium, when there are three equilibria, is unstable.
Therefore, in the middle equilibrium, players’ behaviour contradicts with our common
sense. The intuition is that because we use a cutoff strategy to solve the game, if the
payoff of entry increases, then given the opponent’s strategy, a player will become
more likely to choose entry. Because the game exhibits positive externalities in pay-
offs, the opponent will also become more likely to choose entry as the best response
to the player’s change of strategies more favouring entry. Given this best response dy-
namics, no strategy will converge to an equilibrium in which increasing the payoff of
entry makes a player less likely choose entry. This situation satisfies the Lyapunovian
instability of an equilibrium, and hence is unstable.
3.6 Comparative Statics of the Number of Equilibria with
respect to Variances
In this section, we study the comparative statics to determine how the number of equi-
libria changes by simultaneously changing ς2 and ς∗2. Because ς2 = ς∗2, in the follow-
ing, we specify ς2 and ς∗2 as the same variable. From Proposition 1, it is known that
if and only if ρ ≥ −
√
2πς2
2πς2+(D−M)2 , a cutoff strategy can be used to solve the game.





for ρ < 0
The inequality indicates that given D > M and ρ < 0, there exists a lower bound of
ς2, which is denoted by ς̃2; hence, ς̃2 = ρ
2(D−M)2
2π(1−ρ2) and ς̃ =
√
ς̃2. Given variances below
this lower bound in the case of D > M and ρ < 0, the game cannot be solved using a
cutoff strategy. The intuition for this result is similar to the intuition of Proposition 1.



























+ 1 = 0.
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Therefore, for ρ< 0, if ς≥ ς̃, ∂EΠ(x
∗,ε)
∂ε
≥ 0 ∀x∗ ∈R. For ρ< 0, if ς< ς̃, EΠ(x∗,ε) is no
longer monotonic with respect to ε, and for some x∗ ∈ R, EΠ(x∗,ε) = 0 has multiple
(three) solutions of ε, which are the best response threshold values. One of the three
solutions has the following property: a payoff shock that is below the threshold value
can make a player choose entry, which contradicts the definition of the cutoff strategy.
This situation parallels the property of expected payoff function with ρ < ρ̃ given ς
and D > M (see Appendix B). Therefore, by assuming ς = ς∗, given D > M and ρ, a
player can legitimately use a cutoff strategy to play the game if and only if ς ∈ [ς̃,+∞)
for ρ < 0 or ς ∈ (0,+∞) for ρ≥ 0.
Proposition 4: Assuming ς = ς∗, given D > M and ρ ∈ (−1,1), a player can use a
cutoff strategy to solve the game if and only if ς ∈ [ς̃,+∞) for ρ < 0 or ς ∈ (0,+∞) for
ρ≥ 0.
Proposition 4 can be generalized to asymmetric payoff settings. Suppose the oppo-
nent has different payoffs D′ and M′ with respect to D and M, respectively. Therefore,
for ρ < 0, ς̃∗2 = ρ
2(D′−M′)2
2π(1−ρ2) . In this situation, Proposition 4 can be generalized such that
the games with asymmetric payoff specifications can be solved by a cutoff strategy if
and only if ς ∈ [max{ς̃, ς̃∗},+∞) for ρ < 0 or ς ∈ (0,+∞) for ρ≥ 0.
Assume ς = ς∗. For ρ ∈ (−1,0), given a ς ∈ [ς̃,+∞) and an x∗ ∈ R, if EΠ(x∗,ε)








and it is inequality (3.2).
As the negative ρ increases, the variance of f (.|ε), which equals ς2(1− ρ2), in-
creases and hence the density function flattens. The mean of f (.|ε), which equals ρε,
also changes. The maximum value of f (.|ε), which equals 1√
2π(1−ρ2)ς
and is taken at
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the mean x∗ = ρε, decreases. Meanwhile, the RHS of (3.2) increases as ρ increases.
Therefore, as ρ increases, the LHS of (3.2) decreases and the RHS of (3.2) increases;
hence, (3.2) is easier to be satisfied and it is more certain that at the given ς, EΠ(x∗,ε)
increases with respect to ε for all x∗ ∈ R. Therefore, given the ρ < 0, the range of ς
that makes the expected payoff increase with respect to ε should be broadened as ρ
increases, and accordingly, ς̃ decreases.
If D−M decreases, the RHS of (3.2) increases. Hence, (3.2) is easier to be satis-
fied and it is more certain that at the given ρ < 0, EΠ(x∗,ε) increases with respect to
ε for all x∗ ∈ R. Therefore, given ρ < 0, the range of ς that makes the expected payoff
increase with respect to ε should be broadened as D−M decreases, and accordingly, ς̃
decreases.
Let us recall inequality (3.6), which is the necessary and sufficient condition to en-
sure g(x∗) is a contraction function for all x∗ ∈ R and is hence the sufficient condition
to ensure that the symmetric game is dominance solvable. This inequality can be ex-
plicitly written as
σε(x∗,g(x∗))(M−D)+1 >−σx∗(x∗,g(x∗))(M−D)
By rearranging the LHS and RHS, we obtain
1 > (σx∗(x∗,g(x∗))+σε(x∗,g(x∗)))(D−M) (3.7)











From inequality (3.7), it can be seen that if the maximum value of (σx∗(x∗,g(x∗))+
σε(x∗,g(x∗)))(D−M), which is D−M√2πς
√
1−ρ
1+ρ , is smaller than 1, inequality (3.7) and in-
equality (3.6) always hold and g(x∗) is a contraction function for all x∗ ∈ R. Hence,
the game is dominance solvable.




1+ρ = 1. That is, ς̂
2 =
(D−M)2(1−ρ)
2π(1+ρ) . Therefore, for ς






for all x∗ ∈ R. Hence, for all ς2 ≥ ς̂2, inequality (3.7) and inequality (3.6) always hold
and g(x∗) is a contraction function for all x∗ ∈ R. Hence, the game is dominance solv-
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able in this situation.




1+ρ > 1. In this situation, inequality (3.7) and
equivalently inequality (3.6) cannot hold for all x∗ ∈ R; hence, g(x∗) is not a contrac-
tion function for all x∗ ∈ R. Therefore, ς̂2 is the critical value that differentiate the
contraction and non-contraction best response functions. Hence, given other parame-
ters, ς2 ∈ [ς̂2,+∞) is the necessary and sufficient condition to ensure the best response
function of this game to be a contraction function.
Proposition 5: Given ρ ∈ (−1,1), supposing that ς = ς∗ and D > M, the game is
dominance solvable if and only if ς2 ∈ [ς̂2,+∞), where ς̂2 = (D−M)
2(1−ρ)
2π(1+ρ) .
Proposition 5 can be generalized to asymmetric payoff settings. Suppose the other
player i∗ has the known payoffs D′ and M′ with respect to D and M, respectively. In
this situation, i∗’s best response function g∗(x) is a contraction function if and only if
ς∗2 ∈ [ς̂∗2,+∞), where ς̂∗2 = (D
′−M′)2(1−ρ)
2π(1+ρ) . Hence, Proposition 5 can be generalized
such that given ρ ∈ (−1,1), supposing ς = ς∗, D > M and D′ > M′, the game is domi-
nance solvable if and only if ς2 ∈ [max{ς̂2, ς̂∗2},+∞).
Inequality (3.7) can be written as
1 > (1−ρ)(D−M) f (x∗|g(x∗))
because σx∗(x∗,g(x∗)) = f (x∗|g(x∗)) and σε(x∗,g(x∗)) = −ρ f (x∗|g(x∗)). More-
over, as before, the above inequality implies inequality (3.6):
f (x∗|g(x∗))< 1
(1−ρ)(D−M)
Given ρ ∈ (−1,1), (3.6) is held for all ς2 ∈ [ς̂2,+∞).
Suppose ρ < 0. Given ς2 ∈ [ς̂2,+∞), as ρ increases, the variance of f (.|g(x∗)),
which equals ς2(1− ρ2), increases and hence the density function flattens. As we
know, in this situation, the maximum value of f (.|g(x∗)) decreases, while the RHS
of (3.6) increases. Hence, (3.6) is easier to be satisfied and it is more certain that at
the given ς, g′(x∗) < 1 for all x∗ ∈ R. Therefore, the range of ς that ensures g(x∗) is
a contraction function should be broadened as ρ increases, and accordingly ς̂ decreases.
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Suppose ρ > 0. Given ς2 ∈ [ς̂2,+∞), as ρ increases, the variance of f (.|g(x∗)) de-
creases and hence the maximum value of f (.|g(x∗)), which is 1√
2π(1−ρ2)ς
, increases.
However, the change of 1√
2π(1−ρ2)ς
by increasing 0.1 unit of ρ is always smaller than










given that all parame-
ters satisfy (3.6). Therefore, in this situation, the net effect by increasing ρ is that the
RHS of (3.6) relatively increases. Hence, again (3.6) is easier to be satisfied and the
range of ς which ensures that g(x∗) is a contraction function should be broadened as ρ
increases, and accordingly ς̂ decreases.
If D−M decreases, the RHS of (3.6) increases, and hence (3.6) is easier to be sat-
isfied. In this situation, given ρ ∈ (−1,1), the range of ς which ensures that g(x∗) is a
contraction function should be broadened, and accordingly ς̂ decreases.
Following the same logic for deriving ρ̄ in Theorem 1, correspondingly we obtain
ς̄2 as a critical value to differentiate the unique equilibrium and multiple equilibria.
Similar to ρ̄, ς̄2 exists if and only if D > 0 > M. It is found that ς̄2 ≤ ς̂2. If ρ < 0 such
that ς̃2 exists, ς̄2 could be smaller than, or greater than or equal to ς̃2. If ς̄2 exists, its
analytical expression depends on the sign of D+M. Specifically, if D+M > 0, then































where ς̄2 < ς̂2. If D+M = 0, ς̄2 = ς̂2. The comparative statics of the number of
equilibrium with respect to ς2 is thus given by the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Comparative Statics of the Number of Equilibria with respect to
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ς2 and ς∗2 in the Strategic Complements Game): For a static 2×2 entry game, sup-
pose D > M and ς = ς∗. For D > M, ς̃2 exists if and only if ρ < 0. ς̄2 exists if and only
if D > 0 > M. If D > 0 > M and ς̄2 < ς̃2, or if 0 > D > M or D > M > 0 in which ς̄2
does not exist, then for all ς2 ∈ [ς̃2,+∞) for ρ < 0 or ς2 ∈ [0,+∞) for ρ≥ 0, the game
has a unique equilibrium. Conversely, if for all ς2 ∈ [ς̃2,+∞) for ρ < 0 or ς2 ∈ [0,+∞)
for ρ≥ 0, the game has a unique equilibrium, then it is either because D > 0 > M and
ς̄2 < ς̃2 or because 0 > D > M or D > M > 0 in which ς̄2 does not exist. The unique
equilibrium is stable.
Given that D > 0 > M for all ς2 ∈ [ς̃2, ς̄2) if ρ < 0 and ς̄2 > ς̃2 or for all ς2 ∈ (0, ς̄2)
if ρ≥ 0, there exist three equilibria. The middle equilibrium is unstable, while the two
outer equilibria are stable. Particularly, if D+M = 0, the middle equilibrium is always
(0, 0).
At ς2 = ς̄2, where ς̄2 ≥ ς̃2, if ρ < 0, then 1) if D+M 6= 0, there are two equilibria,
of which one is stable and the other’s stability is not determined; and 2) if D+M = 0,
there exists a unique equilibrium (0,0), which is stable.
∀ς2 ∈ (ς̄2,+∞), where ς̄2 ≥ ς̃2, if ρ < 0, there exists a unique equilibrium which is
stable. Particularly, if D+M = 0, the unique equilibrium is always (0, 0).
Proof: see Appendix. 
Games with ς = ς∗ = 0 are complete information games. If 0 > D > M, the game
has a unique action strategy equilibrium (0,0), which implies a cutoff strategy equi-
librium (−M,−M). If D > M > 0, the game has a unique action strategy equilibrium
(1,1), which implies a cutoff strategy equilibrium (−D,−D). If D > 0 > M, there are
three action strategy equilibria: (0,0), (1,1) and a mixed strategy ( DD−M ,
D
D−M ), which
imply cutoff strategy equilibria (−M,−M), (−D,−D) and (0,0), respectively. In the
next section, we explain how these cutoff strategy equilibria are translated into action
strategy representations, and we prove that the games with ς = ς∗ = 0 coincide with
the games with ς and ς∗→ 0.
Given other parameters, for games with small variances, it is possible that f (ε∗|ε)
can approximately reflect ε∗ given ε, because the uncertainty of each player’s private
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information is low. Therefore, in games where D > 0 > M, for variances close to zero,
if ρ ≥ 0, f (ε∗|ε) can approximately reflect ε∗ given ε, and hence players are able to
get enough information to match their strategies. This situation is close to games with
ς = ς∗ = 0, in which players can perfectly predict the opponent’s private information.
The intuition of the equilibria of games with D > 0 > M and ς = ς∗ = 0 will be ex-
plained in next section. Hence, for D > 0 > M, the game can exhibit three equilibria,
which are close to (−M,−M), (−D,−D) and (0,0), respectively.
In contrast, for games with small variances, it is also possible that f (ε∗|ε) impre-
cisely reflect ε∗ given ε, because the uncertainty of each player’s private information
is high. In this situation, for games with D > 0 > M, each player is unclear about
the opponent’s propensity of action choice, and accordingly, they will choose a strat-
egy conditional on this expectation. Therefore, in this situation, the game has only a
unique equilibrium that captures this unclear situation.
When variances of payoff shocks increase such that f (ε∗|ε) imprecisely reflects ε∗
given ε, the game with D > 0 > M always has a unique equilibrium. The intuition ex-
actly follows the corresponding intuitions for small variances of private payoff shocks
but f (ε∗|ε) imprecisely reflects ε∗, conditional on ε given D > 0 > M and ρ ∈ (−1,1).
This is discussed in the last paragraph. Therefore, for D > 0 > M, where ς̄ exists, if
ρ < 0 and ς̄ > ς̃ or ρ≥ 0, then ς̄ is exactly the threshold such that for ς < ς̄, the uncer-
tainty of both players’ private information is low and hence f (ε∗|ε) can approximately
reflect ε∗ given ε, and for ς > ς̄, the uncertainty of both players’ private information is
high and hence f (ε∗|ε) imprecisely reflects ε∗ given ε. At ς = ς̄, even if f (ε∗|ε) can
still approximately reflect ε∗ given ε, if the uncertainty of both players’ private infor-
mation increases a little bit, f (ε∗|ε) will imprecisely reflect ε∗ given ε.
For games with 0 > D > M or D > M > 0, supposing variances are small, for all
feasible values of variances given ρ ∈ (−1,1), irrespective of whether f (ε∗|ε) can ap-
proximately or imprecisely reflect ε∗ given ε, there always exists a unique equilibrium.
It is because in these situations, players are either expected to be more likely to choose
being inactive (0 > D > M) or more likely to choose being active (D > M > 0). These
expectations are formed before the payoff shocks are drawn and there do not exist
alternative expectations given each payoff specification. Hence the contingent payoff
shocks cannot affect these expectations. Therefore, the game exhibits a unique equilib-
3.6. Comparative Statics of the Number of Equilibria with respect to Variances 87
rium based on these expectations and if it is 0 > D > M, the cutoff strategy equilibrium
should be close to (−M,−M), and if it is D > M > 0, the cutoff strategy equilibrium
should be close to (−D,−D).
Morris and Shin (2005) study the same incomplete information game by assuming
ς2 = ς∗2, and give a sufficient condition to ensure the game has a unique equilibrium.
Their sufficient condition is also expressed by a critical value of variance: if ς2 is above
this critical value, the game exhibits a unique equilibrium. Morris and Shin (2005) fo-
cus on how introducing strategic uncertainty can reduce the number of equilibrium
of a complete information game. The complete information game is symmetric and
strategic complements. They also use the cutoff strategy defined in this chapter to
solve the game. They argue that when the strategic uncertainty (belief) is sufficiently
invariant with respect to all possible strategies, a unique equilibrium exists. Based on
this insight, they get the sufficient condition to ensure that the game exhibits a unique
equilibrium.
Specifically, take our game as an example to explain Morris and Shin’s rationale.
We denote an equilibrium by (e,e). The equilibrium should satisfy the following equa-
tion:
EΠ(e,e) = σ(e,e)(M−D)+D+ e = 0
If σ(e,e) is sufficiently invariant with respect to e ∈ R, then EΠ(e,e) is close to
be a linear function with respect to e ∈ R. In this situation, EΠ(e,e) = 0 has a unique
solution of e. Hence, a sufficient condition to make σ(e,e) sufficiently invariant with
respect to e ∈ R is that ∂EΠ(e,e)
∂e ≥ 0 for all e ∈ R. Thus, the linear part of EΠ(e,e),
which is e, dominates the non-linear part of EΠ(e,e), which is σ(e,e)(M−D). In this
way, σ(e,e) is sufficiently invariant with respect to e in the sense of Morris and Shin,















+ 1 ≥ 0 for all e ∈ R. Because D > M, equiva-
lently to make ∂EΠ(e,e)
















The RHS of the above inequality is only ς̂ in our study. This inequality indicates






∂e ≥ 0 for all e ∈ R, and hence, a unique equilib-
rium exists. ς̂2 differentiates contraction and non-contraction best response functions.
As we mentioned in Section 3.3, if both players’ best response functions are contrac-
tions, then the game is dominance solvable and hence there exists a unique equilibrium.
Corollary 1 provides a complete range of parameter specifications ensuring a unique
equilibrium, and the complete range is broader than the range of variances that ensures
that the best response functions are contraction function. Therefore, Corollary 1 nests
Morris and Shin’s (2005) sufficient condition of uniqueness.
3.7 An Extension of Purification Rationale
Now consider the following complete information entry game:
Firm i∗















Table 2: The complete information entry game where D > M
Assume D > 0 > M. The game has three equilibria, (0,0), (1,1) and ( MM−D ,
M
M−D),
where MM−D is the probability to choose being active. The game shown in Table 1 is the
perturbed game of this complete information game. In the following, for simplicity,
we call the game shown in Table 2 as the complete information entry game, and the
game shown in Table 1 as the perturbed entry game.
Harsanyi (1973) proposed a purification rationale for the play of mixed strategy
equilibria. According to Harsanyi (1973), suppose that a player has some small private
propensity to choose being active or being inactive, and this propensity is independent
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of the payoff specification. However, this information is not known to the other player
at all. Then, the behaviour of such player will look as if they are randomizing between
their actions to the other player. Because of the private payoff perturbation, the op-
ponent will not in fact be indifferent to their actions, but will almost always choose
a strict best response. Harsanyi’s purification theorem showed that all equilibria of
almost all complete information games are the limit of pure strategy equilibria of per-
turbed games where players have independent small private payoff shocks.
Note that, in Harsanyi’s purification theorem, he specifies that the uncertainty of
perturbed games vanishes in scale. That is, a constant η times the perturbation er-
ror ε, and let η→ 0. But in our game, we use an alternative approach to model the
process that the uncertainty of perturbed games vanishes. That is, to let the variances
of the perturbation-error distribution converge to zero. Here we make a clarification.
For Harsanyi’s (1973) purification rationale, it literally describes the idea that every
Nash equilibrium of a complete information game can always be approached by a pure
strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a perturbed game. For Harsanyi’s (1973) pu-
rification theorem, it further requires that the uncertainty of perturbed games vanishes
in scale.
Following Morris’ (2008) approach to decomposing Harsanyi’s purification the-
orem, we can correspondingly decompose Harsanyi’s purification rationale into two
parts. The ‘purification’ part, where all equilibria of the perturbed game are essentially
pure, and the ‘approachability’ part, where every equilibrium of a complete informa-
tion game is the limit of equilibria of such perturbed games. For the first part, both
Harsanyi’s purification rationale and Harsanyi’s purification theorem use the assump-
tion of sufficiently diffuse independent payoff shocks. For our 2× 2 games, the pu-
rification rationale indicates that provided that ρ = 0, all pure-strategy Bayesian Nash
equilibria of the perturbed game obtained by using cutoff strategies (see Table 1) will
finally converge to a Nash equilibrium of the complete information game (see Table
2). According to our Corollary 1, given that D > 0 > M and ρ = 0, for ς2 ∈ (0, ς̃2),
the Bayesian games that can be solved by cutoff strategies exist and they have three
equilibria. As we will exhibit in the following, these equilibria will finally converge
to (0,0), (1,1) and ( MM−D ,
M
M−D), which are action strategy equilibria of the complete
information game expressed as in Table 2 as ς and ς∗→ 0. Therefore, the purification
rationale is still applicable if the uncertainty of perturbed games vanishes as the vari-
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ances of the perturbation-error distribution converge to zero.
However, what will be the situation if we relax the purification rationale by assum-
ing the perturbation errors are dependent? Will Harsanyi (1973)’s purification rationale
be still held for dependent payoff shocks?
Carlsson and van Damme (CvD, Appendix B, 1993) compare their global game
model with Harsanyi’s model. CvD’s game is identical to our game shown in Table
1. Both are symmetric and strategic complements. The only difference is that in their
game the ε of our game is additively decomposed into a common shock and an id-
iosyncratic shock χ, i.e. ε = θ+χ. θ and χ are independent and both follow a normal
distribution. We denote µθ and µχ as the mean of θ and χ, respectively, and ς2θ and
ς2χ as the variances of θ and χ. Therefore, ε ∼ N(µθ +µχ,ς2θ + ς2χ), where µθ +µχ = 0
and ς2
θ
+ ς2χ = ς







. In contrast, in our games, ε and ε∗ can be dependent or correlated in any
way, and due to the normal distribution specification, correlation coefficient ρ can re-
flect the dependence relation between ε and ε∗, rather than a simple correlation relation
between the two shocks.
By specifying ς2
θ
6= 0 and ς2χ → 0, their model is the global game, and a unique
equilibrium will be selected. The latter result can be accounted by our Theorem 1,
which shows that as ρ→ 1, the game can only have a unique equilibrium, because
during the process, the best response functions become contraction functions. How-
ever, CvD’s work cannot show whether Harsanyi’s (1973) purification rationale can be
extended to perturbed games with correlated perturbation errors. It is because CvD’s
model requires that ς2
θ
+ ς2χ→ 0, but due to the additive error structure ε = θ+χ, as
ς2
θ






changes as well and ρ→ 1. Therefore, CvD’s framework can-
not isolate ρ’s impact on the game as the perturbation errors ε and ε∗ degenerate to a
constant 0.
In last section of this work, we see that by assuming D > M and ρ≥ 0, the games
for ς2 ∈ (0,+∞) can be solved by cutoff strategies. The game closest to the complete
information entry game is the Bayesian game, where ς and ς∗ → 0. If ς = ς∗, the best
response function in its reverse form is given by
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As ς→ 0, if x∗ > −ρM, g(x∗) = −M, and if x∗ < −ρD, g(x∗) = −D (see Ap-
pendix). Therefore, the best response function of the Bayesian games with ς and ς∗






x∗ −ρD≤ x∗ ≤−ρM
−M x∗ >−ρM
The intuition of the piecewise expression of g(x∗) as ς and ς∗ → 0 is as follows.
Supposing D > M, if the opponent i∗ is expected to adopt a very high (low) cutoff
strategy, it implies that player i expects that i∗ is more likely to choose being inactive
(active). In a strategic complements context, players always tend to match their action
strategies, and hence as a best response, i will adopt the highest (lowest) cutoff strategy
that can be achieved to indicate that the player also prefers being inactive (active). This
highest (lowest) strategy is −M (−D).
Assuming ς = ς∗, as ς and ς∗ → 0, the likelihood of the mean of the distribu-
tion of the opponent’s payoff shock given a player’s own payoff shock increases,
while the likelihood of the payoff shocks at both sides of the distribution around the
mean decreases, because the variance of the conditional payoff shock distribution,
ς2(1−ρ2), degenerates. Suppose the payoff shock that makes player i indifferent to
entry or being inactive equals g(x∗), where reasonably g(x∗) ∈ [−D,−M] for D > M
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or g(x∗) ∈ [−M,−D] for M > D, then the mean of the opponent’s payoff shock distri-
bution is ρg(x∗), which happens with a very high likelihood as ς and ς∗→ 0.
In symmetric games, no matter whether the game exhibits strategic complements
or strategic substitutes, if a player is expected to be indifferent to being active or being
inactive, the opponent will also adopt a strategy such that the opponent is also indiffer-
ent to entry or being inactive as a best response. Thus, the opponent i∗ will choose a
strategy x∗ indicating indifference to their own action choices.
Therefore, based on the analysis from the previous two paragraphs, given g(x∗) be-
tween −M and −D, i expects that the payoff shock that is most likely to happen for i∗
is ρg(x∗). Because at g(x∗), i is indifferent to either action choice, as a best response,
at ρg(x∗), i∗ will also be indifferent to either action choice. Therefore, i∗’s strategy
x∗ should be equal to ρg(x∗) when ς and ς∗ → 0 if g(x∗) ∈ [−D,−M] for D > M or
g(x∗) ∈ [−M,−D] for M > D. Obviously, this intuition applies to both the strategic
complements and strategic substitutes cases.
Because the game is symmetric, for the strategic complements game, the equilibria
can be described by the intersection points between g(x∗) and the 45◦ line. Specifically,
if D > 0 > M, there are three equilibria (intersection points): (−M,−M), (−D,−D)
and (0,0) (see Figure 10-1).16 As ς and ς∗ → 0, the payoff shocks ε and ε∗ converge
to 0. Therefore, given cutoff strategy equilibrium (−M,−M), since −M > 0, both
players always choose action 0 in this equilibrium. Given cutoff strategy equilibrium
(−D,−D), since −D < 0, both players always choose action 1 in this equilibrium.
Given strategy (0,0), the equilibrium belief σ(0,0) equals DD−M given any value of
ρ ∈ (0,1). Thus, in this situation, σ(0,0) is independent of ρ and it is always equal
16The intuition of the cutoff strategy equilibrium is that given D > 0 > M, a player can expect that
the opponent either chooses being active or inactive. If a player expects the opponent to choose entry,
the player will get payoff D if they also choose entry. Thus, the player will adopt a cutoff strategy −D.
As the best response, the opponent will adopt a strategy −D.
In contrast, if a player expects the opponent to choose being inactive, then the player will get payoff
M if they choose to enter. Thus, the player will adopt a cutoff strategy −M. As the best response, the
opponent will adopt a strategy −M.
If a player expects the opponent is indifferent to being active or being inactive, it indicates that irre-
spective of what value ε∗ is, the expected payoff of entry for opponent i∗ is equal to 0. Therefore, player
i∗’s cutoff strategy is equal to 0. Hence, given D > 0 > M, player i will adopt a strategy 0 as a best
response. Therefore, another cutoff strategy equilibrium ς and ς∗→ 0 is (0,0).


















10-3: D > M > 0
Figure 10: The solid curve represents g(x∗) as ς and ς∗→ 0. The dashed line
represents the 45◦ line. The intersection points between g(x∗) and the 45◦ line are the
equilibria of the game with ς and ς∗→ 0. If D > 0 > M , there are three equilibria,
(−M,−M), (−D,−D) and (0,0). If 0 > D > M, there is a unique equilibrium
(−M,−M). If D > M > 0, there is a unique equilibrium (−D,−D).
to the unconditional probability of player i∗ choosing action 0. Therefore, as ς and ς∗
→ 0, the equilibria of the game expressed in the form of action strategies are given by
(0,0), (1,1) and ( DD−M ,
D
D−M ). These equilibria are exactly equal to the equilibria of
the games with ς = ς∗ = 0 and D > 0 > M. Similarly, if 0 > D > M or D > M > 0,
the equilibrium cutoff strategies are (−M,−M) or (−D,−D) respectively, which im-
ply the action strategies (0,0) or (1,1) (see Figures 10-2 and 10-3).17 These equilibria
are exactly equal to the corresponding equilibria of the games with ς = ς∗ = 0 and
0 > D > M or with ς = ς∗ = 0 and D > M > 0. Therefore, as ς and ς∗→ 0, the equilib-
ria of the perturbed games finally converge to the equilibria of the underlying complete
information game.
Therefore, if D > M and perturbation errors ε and ε∗ follow a joint normal dis-
tribution, all equilibria of the complete information entry games are the limit of pure-
strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria of perturbed games where players have non-negatively
dependent perturbation errors.
17The intuitions of these cutoff strategy equilibria are as follows. Suppose 0 > D > M. As ς and
ς∗→ 0, it is very likely that each player will choose being inactive. Conditional on this expectation, a
player choosing entry must get a payoff shock ε >−M since M+ ε > 0 and M is the payoff the player
can obtain by choosing entry given this expectation. As the best response, the opponent will adopt the
same cutoff strategy. Hence, the cutoff strategy equilibrium (−M,−M) exists in this situation.
Similarly, suppose D > M > 0. As ς and ς∗→ 0, it is very likely that each player will choose being
active. Conditional on this expectation, a player choosing entry must get a payoff shock ε > −D since
D+ε > 0 and D is the payoff the player can obtain by choosing entry given this expectation. As the best
response, the opponent will adopt the same cutoff strategy. Hence, in this situation, we have the cutoff
strategy equilibrium (−D,−D).
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However, if D > M and ρ < 0, then ς̃2 arises. In the previous section, we have
shown that if and only if ς2 ∈ [ς̃2,+∞), the Bayesian games can be solved by cutoff
strategies. If ς2 ∈ (0, ς̃2), the Bayesian games that can be solved by cutoff strategies do
not exist due to the violation of the definition of the cutoff strategy concept, as we have
exhibited in Section 3.6. Therefore, the sequence of such perturbed Bayesian games
that are supposed to converge to the complete information game does not exist. Hence,
the ‘approachability’ part of the purification rationale cannot be satisfied, and so the
purification rationale cannot be applied in this situation. Therefore, in the strategic
complements games (D > M), if and only if ρ≥ 0, Harsanyi’s purification rationale is
still applicable.
Extending purification rationale in the strategic substitutes game where M > D is
similar to extending it in the strategic complements game discussed above. In Chapter
2, it has been proven that if and only if ρ ≤
√
2πς2
2πς2+(M−D)2 , a cutoff strategy can be
used to solve the game (see Wang, 2016). Equivalently, it also implies a restriction on





for ρ > 0 (3.8)
This inequality indicates that given M > D and ρ > 0, there exists a lower bound of
ς2, which is denoted by ς̃2 and ς̃2 = ρ
2(D−M)2
2π(1−ρ2) . For variances below this lower bound,
the game cannot be solved by a cutoff strategy. For ρ≤ 0, a cutoff strategy is still appli-




ρ̃ always holds for all ς2 ∈ (0,+∞).
The intuition of the existence of ς̃2 for M > D and ρ > 0 is similar to the intuition
for D > M and ρ < 0. Recall that if M > D, for ρ≤ 0, ∂EΠ(x
∗,ε)
∂ε
> 0 for all ς∈ (0,+∞).







+1 = 0 ∀x∗ ∈ R. There-
fore, if ρ> 0, for ς≥ ς̃, ∂EΠ(x
∗,ε)
∂ε
≥ 0 ∀x∗ ∈R. For ς< ς̃ if ρ> 0, this situation parallels
that of ρ > ρ̃ given ς = ς∗ in the strategic substitutes game. In this situation, EΠ(x∗,ε)
is no longer monotonic with respect to ε, and for some x∗ ∈R, EΠ(x∗,ε) = 0 has mul-
tiple (three) solutions of ε. One of the solutions gets the following property: a payoff
shock that is below this threshold can make a player choose entry, which contradicts
the definition of the cutoff strategy (see Appendix B in Chapter 2). Therefore, by as-
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suming ς = ς∗, given M > D and ρ, a player can use a cutoff strategy to play the game
if and only if ς ∈ [ς̃,+∞) for ρ > 0 or ς ∈ (0,+∞) for ρ≤ 0.
If M > D and ρ ≤ 0, games that can be solved by cutoff strategies exist for all
ς2 ∈ (0,+∞). Since the equilibria of a game are solutions of the equation system com-
posed of both players’ best response functions, a small perturbation of the equation
system will result in a nearby equilibrium. The most closets game is the game with







x∗ −ρD≤ x∗ ≤−ρM
−M x∗ >−ρM
where x∗ ∈ R and ρ < 0.
Although the expression of the best response function is the same as the one
for D > M and ρ > 0, the intuitions are not exactly the same. For the intuition of
g(x∗) ∈ [−M,−D], we have explained it in the previous part of this section when we
analysed the case of D>M and ρ> 0. Given that M >D, if the opponent i∗ is expected
to adopt a very high (low) strategy, it means player i expects that i∗ is most likely to
choose being inactive (active). In a strategic substitutes context, players always tend to
mismatch their action strategies, and hence as the best response, i will adopt the low-
est (highest) strategy that can be achieved to indicate the player’s preference of being
active (inactive). This lowest (highest) strategy is −M (−D).
Because the game is symmetric, g(x∗) and g∗(x) are symmetrically located around
the 45◦ line. The equilibria are the intersection points between g(x∗) and g∗(x). Specif-





) and (0,0) (see Figure 11).18
18The intuition of the cutoff strategy equilibrium is that given M > 0 > D, a player can expect that
the opponent either chooses being active or inactive. If a player expects the opponent to choose entry,
the player will get payoff D if they also choose entry. Thus, the player will adopt a cutoff strategy −D.
As the best response, the opponent will adopt a strategy −D
ρ
.
In contrast, if a player expects the opponent to choose being inactive, then the player will get payoff
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As ς and ς∗→ 0, the payoff shocks ε and ε∗ are always equal to 0. Therefore, given




< 0 and −D > 0, in this equilibrium,
player i always chooses action 1 and player i∗ always chooses action 0. Hence, the
action strategy representation of this equilibrium is (1,0). In the same way, the cutoff
strategy equilibrium (−D,−D
ρ
) indicates the action strategy (0,1). Given cutoff strat-
egy equilibrium (0,0), the equilibrium belief σ(0,0) is always equal to DD−M given any
value of ρ ∈ (−1,0). Thus, σ(0,0) is always equal to the unconditional probability
of player i∗ choosing action 0. Therefore, as ς and ς∗ → 0, the equilibria of the game
expressed in the form of action strategies are given by (1,0), (0,1) and ( DD−M ,
D
D−M ).
These equilibria are exactly equal to the equilibria of the games with ς = ς∗ = 0 and
M > 0 > D. Therefore, as ς and ς∗ → 0, the equilibria of the perturbed games finally
converge to the equilibria of the underlying complete information games.
For M > 0 > D and ρ < 0, if M < ρD and D < ρM, there are three cutoff strategy




) and (0,0) (see Figure 12).19 20
As ς and ς∗ → 0, the payoff shocks ε and ε∗ are always equal to 0. Therefore, given
M if they choose to enter. Thus, at least when ε ≥ −M, the player will consider entry. However,
M > ρD and hence −M < −ρD, where −ρD is the entry threshold that opponent i∗ expects player i
to most likely adopt conditional on that i∗ expects i will choose entry. Thus, if i gets a payoff shock ε
such that −M < ε <−ρD, the opponent expects that i will not choose entry but in fact i indeed chooses
entry. Hence, a contradiction arises and i cannot adopt −M. Therefore, based on the opponent’s belief
that i will choose entry and accordingly i∗ will adopt a strategy −D, i’s best response will be −D
ρ
.
If a player expects the opponent is indifferent to being active or being inactive, it indicates that ir-
respective of what value ε∗ is, the expected payoff of entry for i∗ is equal to 0. Therefore, player i∗’s
cutoff strategy is equal to 0. Hence, given M > 0 > D, as a best response, player i will adopt a strategy
0. Therefore, another cutoff strategy equilibrium as ς and ς∗→ 0 is (0,0).
19For M > 0 > D and ρ < 0, the following parameter specifications cannot be held: M > ρD and
D < ρM or M < ρD and D > ρM. It is because if ρ = −1, in either parameter specification, one
inequality indicates M+D> 0, while the other one indicates M+D< 0. Obviously, the two inequalities
cannot be held simultaneously.
20The intuitions of these cutoff strategy equilibria are similar to the previous case where M > ρD
and D > ρM. Given M > 0 > D, a player can expect that the opponent either chooses being active or
inactive. If player i expects the opponent to choose being inactive, then the player will get payoff M if
they choose entry. Thus, player i will adopt a cutoff strategy −M. As the best response, the opponent i∗
will adopt a strategy −M
ρ
.
Otherwise, if player i expects the opponent i∗ to choose being active, the player will get payoff D
if they choose to enter. Thus, at least ε ≥ −D, i will consider entry. However, D < ρM and hence
−D > −ρM, where −ρM is the entry threshold that i∗ expects i is most likely to adopt conditional on
that i∗ expects i will choose being inactive. Thus, if i gets a payoff shock ε such that −D > ε > −ρM,
the opponent will expect that i will choose being active but in fact i chooses being inactive. Hence, a
contradiction arises and i cannot adopt −D. Therefore, based on the opponent’s belief that i will choose
being inactive and accordingly i∗ will adopt a strategy −M, i’s best response will be −M
ρ
.







Figure 11: The solid curve represents g(x∗) as ς and ς∗ → 0. The dashed curve
represents g∗(x) as ς and ς∗ → 0. The dashed-dot line represents the 45◦ line. The
intersection points between g(x∗) and g∗(x) are the equilibria of the game with ς and










> 0 and−M < 0, in this equilibrium
player i always chooses action 0 and player i∗ always chooses action 1. Hence, the
action strategy representation of this equilibrium is (0,1). In the same way, the cutoff
strategy equilibrium (−M,−M
ρ
) indicates the action strategy (1,0). Given cutoff strat-
egy equilibrium (0,0), the equilibrium belief σ(0,0) is equal to DD−M given any value
of ρ ∈ (−1,0). Hence, it equals the unconditional probability of i∗ choosing action 0.
Therefore, as ς and ς∗ → 0, the equilibria of this game are given by (1,0), (0,1) and
( DD−M ,
D
D−M ). These equilibria are exactly equal to the equilibria of the games with
ς = ς∗ = 0 and M > 0 > D.
It should be noted that in the case of M > 0 > D, irrespective of whether M > ρD
and D > ρM, or M < ρD and D < ρM, given M, D, and ς and ς∗→ 0, as ρ changes, the
best response function changes and the cutoff strategy equilibria, except (0,0), change
as well. However, when we translate these cutoff strategies with respect to different
values of ρ into action strategies, they indicate the same action strategies. For exam-
The intuition of cutoff strategy (0,0) is the same as that in the previous case where M > ρD and
D > ρM.
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ple, if M > ρD and D > ρM, where ρ < 0, a cutoff strategy equilibrium is (−D
ρ
,−D).
For different values of ρ, (−D
ρ








Figure 12: The solid curve represents g(x∗) as ς and ς∗ → 0. The dashed curve
represents g∗(x) as ς and ς∗ → 0. The dashed-dot line represents the 45◦ line. The
intersection points between g(x∗) and g∗(x) are the equilibria of the game with ς and






Similarly, if 0>M >D or M >D> 0, the equilibrium cutoff strategies are (−M,−M)
and (−D,−D), respectively, which imply the action strategy equilibria (0,0) and (1,1)
(see Figures 13-1 and 13-2).21 These equilibria are exactly equal to the equilibria of the
games with ς = ς∗ = 0 and 0 > M > D or with ς = ς∗ = 0 and M > D > 0. Therefore,
as ς and ς∗→ 0, the equilibria of the perturbed games finally converge to the equilibria
21The intuitions of these cutoff strategy equilibria are as follows. Suppose 0 > M > D. As ς and
ς∗→ 0, it is very likely that each player will choose being inactive. Conditional on this expectation, a
player choosing entry must get a payoff shock ε >−M since M+ ε > 0 and M is the payoff the player
can obtain by choosing entry given this expectation. As the best response, the opponent will adopt the
same cutoff strategy. Hence, the cutoff strategy equilibrium (−M,−M) exists in this situation.
Similarly, suppose M > D > 0. As ς and ς∗→ 0, it is very likely that each player will choose being
active. Conditional on this expectation, a player choosing entry must get a payoff shock ε > −D since
D+ ε > 0 and D is the payoff they can obtain by choosing entry given this expectation. As the best
response, the opponent will adopt the same cutoff strategy. Hence, in this situation, we have the cutoff
strategy equilibrium (−D,−D).














13-2: M > D > 0
Figure 13: The solid curve represents g(x∗) as ς and ς∗→ 0. The dashed curve
represents g∗(x) as ς and ς∗→ 0. The dashed-dot line represents the 45◦ line. The
intersection points between g(x∗) and g∗(x) are the equilibria of the game with ς and
ς∗→ 0. For ρ < 0, if 0 > M > D, the equilibrium is (−M,−M), and if M > D > 0,
the equilibrium is (−D,−D).
of the underlying complete information games.
Therefore, Harsanyi’s purification rationale can also be extended to perturbed games
with non-positively dependent perturbation errors in a strategic substitutes context.
However, if M > D and ρ > 0, the Bayesian games that can be solved by cutoff
strategies do not exist for ς2 ∈ (0, ς̃2). Therefore, the sequence of perturbed games
that are supposed to converge to the complete information game does not exist. Since
the ‘approachability’ requirement cannot be satisfied, Harsayni’s purification rationale
cannot be applied in this situation.
In conclusion, irrespective of whether the perturbation errors are positively depen-
dent in strategic complements games or negatively dependent in strategic substitutes
games, as the perturbation errors degenerate to zero, the Bayesian games that are sup-
posed to converge to the underlying complete information game exist. Supposing the
perturbed games exist as variances of the prior distribution tend to 0, given the same
primitives except the correlation coefficient, the best response function differs with dif-
ferent values of the correlation coefficient because the slope changes. Except the case
of M > 0 > D, the value of cutoff strategy equilibria does not depend on the correlation
coefficient. For the case of M > 0 > D, except the cutoff strategy equilibrium (0,0), all
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cutoff strategy equilibria differs with different values of correlation coefficient. How-
ever, in any situation, given different values of correlation coefficient, if we translate
these cutoff strategy equilibria into action strategy equilibria, they represent the same
action strategy equilibria given the same payoffs M and D. These action strategy equi-
libria are equal to the corresponding Nash equilibria of the complete information game.
Finally, we formally describe the extension of Harsanyi’s purification rationale to
the normally distributed dependent perturbation-error situations in the following corol-
lary:
Corollary 2: (An Extension of Purification Rationale): In a 2×2 symmetric en-
try game, described in Table 2, all equilibria are the limit of the pure-strategy Bayesian
Nash equilibria of a sequence of perturbed games described in Table 1 as (ς,ς∗)→ 0, if
and only if D > M and ρ≥ 0 or M > D and ρ≤ 0. (ε,ε∗) follows a joint normal distri-
bution N(0,0,ς2,ς∗2,ρ) and the perturbed games are solved by using cutoff strategies,
as defined in Section 3.2.
3.8 Summary
In this section, we give an organized summary of all main results and intuitions of the
strategic complements game. The game can be described in two ways by six parame-
ters: given ς = ς∗ ∈ (0,+∞), ρ̃, ρ̂ and ρ̄, or given ρ ∈ (−1,1), ς̃, ς̂ and ς̄. ς̃ exists if and
only if ρ < 0. ρ̄ and ς̄ can exist if and only if D > 0 > M. The relationships between
these parameters are as follows: ρ̂≥ ρ̄, ρ̂ > ρ̃ and ρ̄ could be smaller than, equal to or
greater than ρ̃; ς̂≥ ς̄, ς̂ > ς̃ and ς̄ could be smaller than, equal to or greater than ς̃.
In Section 3.2, we derive ρ̃. Supposing the game is symmetric, if and only if ρ≥ ρ̃,
the game can be solved by cutoff strategies. The intuition is that if ρ < ρ̃, the ex-
pected payoff EΠ(x∗,ε) is no longer monotonic with respect to ε and for some x∗ ∈R,




contradicts the definition of the cutoff strategy that is used to solve the game. In fact,
by assuming ς = ς∗, this result can be extended to asymmetric payoff settings, where
each player has different D and M. In this situation, the game can be solved by a cutoff






are player i∗’s known payoffs.
In Section 3.3, we derive ρ̂. For ρ≥ ρ̂, player i’s best response function is a contrac-
tion function. In this symmetric game, ρ ≥ ρ̂ is also the sufficient condition to ensure
that the game is dominance solvable. This condition can be generalized to asymmetric
payoff settings as described above. In this situation, the sufficient condition is gener-
alized to ρ≥max{ρ̂, ρ̂∗}, where ρ̂∗ = (D
′−M′)2−2πς2
(D′−M′)2+2πς2 .
In the strategic complements game, ρ̄ exists if and only if D> 0>M. If ρ̄≥ ρ̃, then
ρ̄ is the threshold to differentiate low and high uncertainty between players’ private in-
formation. For ρ < ρ̄, the uncertainty between players’ private information is low,
which means f (ε∗|ε) can approximately reflect ε∗ given ε; hence, players can gather
enough information to assist them to match their action strategies. For ρ̂ > ρ > ρ̄, the
uncertainty between players’ private information is high such that f (ε∗|ε) imprecisely
reflects ε∗ given ε; hence, each player has an unclear expectation of the other player’s
propensity of action choice. At ρ = ρ̄, the uncertainty between players’ private infor-
mation is at the margin such that if the uncertainty between players’ private information
increases slightly, f (ε∗|ε) will imprecisely reflect ε∗ given ε. If ρ̄ does not exist, then
for all ρ ∈ [ρ̃, ρ̂), the game has a unique equilibrium because the payoff shocks do not
have any impact on players’ ex ante expectations of the opponent’s behaviour. The
ex ante expectations are that either both players are more likely to choose being inac-
tive (0 > D > M) or more likely to choose being active (D > M > 0). Accordingly,
based on these expectations, the game exhibits a unique equilibrium (−M,−M) with
respect to the specification 0 > D > M or (−D,−D) with respect to the specification
D > M > 0. For ρ ∈ [ρ̂,1), the best response functions are contraction function. In this
situation, each player is more focused on the knowledge of himself and the opponent’s
information becomes less important in a player’s decision making. This situation is
close to that of an individual decision problem and hence the game exhibits a unique
equilibrium.
In Section 3.6, we first derive ς̃. It exists if and only if ρ < 0. Then, if and only
if ς ≥ ς̃ for ρ < 0 or ς > 0 for ρ ≥ 0, the game can be solved by a cutoff strategy.
The intuition is that if ρ ≥ 0, for all ς > 0, EΠ(x∗,ε) increases with respect to ε for
all x∗ ∈ R. If ρ < 0, for ς < ς̃, EΠ(x∗,ε) is no longer monotonic with respect to ε.
In this situation, for some x∗ ∈ R, EΠ(x∗,ε) = 0 has three solutions of ε and at one
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of the solutions, ∂EΠ(x
∗,ε)
∂ε
< 0. This result can also be extended to asymmetric payoff
settings. For details, please refer to Section 3.6.
Next, we derive ς̂. For ς≥ ς̂, player i’s best response function is a contraction func-
tion. In this symmetric game, ς ≥ ς̂ is also the sufficient condition to ensure that the
game is dominance solvable. This condition can be generalized to asymmetric payoff
settings as well (see Section 3.6).
In the strategic complements game, ς̄ exists if and only if D > 0 > M. By assuming
ς = ς∗, if ς̄ ≥ ς̃, then ς̄ is the threshold to differentiate low and high uncertainties of
a player’s private information. For ς < ς̄, the uncertainty of players’ private informa-
tion is low, which indicates that f (ε∗|ε) can approximately reflect ε∗ given ε; hence,
players can gather enough information to assist them to match their action strategies.
For ς > ς̄, the uncertainty of players’ private information is high such that f (ε∗|ε)
imprecisely reflect ε∗ given ε; hence, each player has an unclear expectation of the
opponent’s propensity of action choice. At ς = ς̄, the uncertainty of players’ private
information is at the margin such that if the uncertainty of players’ private informa-
tion increases slightly, f (ε∗|ε) will imprecisely reflect ε∗ given ε. If ς̄ < ς̃, then for
ς ∈ [ς̃,+∞), the game has a unique equilibrium. It is because in this situation f (ε∗|ε)
is imprecise to reflect ε∗ given ε.
The final and important result obtained is that based on this game, we extend
Harsanyi’s (1973) purification rationale to a dependent-perturbation error setting for
both strategic complements and strategic substitutes games. In our game, the uncer-
tainty of perturbed games vanishes as the variances of perturbation-error distribution
degenerate to zero. By assuming that the perturbed games are solved by cutoff strate-
gies and the perturbation errors follow the joint normal distribution as given in this
paper, the purification rationale can be extended to perturbed games with positively
dependent perturbation errors if the complete information game exhibits strategic com-
plements or negatively dependent perturbation errors if the complete information game
exhibits strategic substitutes. If we assume that the perturbation errors are negatively
dependent if the complete information game exhibits strategic complements or posi-
tively dependent if the complete information game exhibits strategic substitutes, then
the ‘approachability’ part of the purification rationale cannot be satisfied, and hence,
we cannot extend the purification rationale to such situations.
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3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study a 2 × 2 strategic-complements entry game in which players’
private information are correlated. The game is symmetrically specified. Given other
parameters, there exists a critical value of correlation coefficient below which a cutoff
strategy cannot be used to solve the game. We explore the comparative statics of the
number of equilibria with respect to the correlation coefficient. As the correlation coef-
ficient increases from the lowest feasible value, ρ̃, to 1, the sequence of the number of
equilibria will be 3→ 2→ 1 if D+M 6= 0 and 3→ 1 if D+M = 0. Alternatively, under
certain parameter specification, the game exhibits a unique equilibrium for all feasible
values of the correlation coefficient. The comparative statics of equilibrium strategies
with respect to the correlation coefficient and variances of the joint prior distribution
depend on the sign of the equilibrium and the equilibrium’s stability. For unstable
equilibrium, increasing the payoff of entry makes a player less likely to choose entry,
which contradicts our common sense.
We obtain the comparative statics of the number of equilibria with respect to vari-
ances of the joint prior distribution. It is a necessary and sufficient condition to dif-
ferentiate unique equilibrium and multiple equilibria. This necessary and sufficient
condition nests Morris and Shin’s (2005) sufficient condition to ensure a unique equi-
librium of the same game. Finally, if the correlation coefficient is negative for the
strategic complements games or positive for the strategic substitutes games, there ex-
ists a critical value of variance. For variances below this critical value, a cutoff strategy
cannot be used to solve the game. With specifying the process that the uncertainty of
perturbed games vanishes by letting the variances of the perturbation-error distribution
degenerate to zero, this result implies that Harsanyi’s (1973) purification rationale can-
not be applied for a game with dependent perturbation errors that follow a joint normal
distribution with negative correlation coefficient for the strategic complements games
or with positive correlation coefficient for the strategic substitutes games.
However, if the correlation coefficient is positive for the strategic complements
games or negative for the strategic substitutes games, the purification rationale is still
applicable. The Bayesian games that are supposed to converge to the underlying com-
104Chapter 3. Information Correlation in a Strategic Complements Game and an Extension of Purification Rationale
plete information game as perturbation errors degenerate to zero exist, and the pure-
strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria of the perturbed games will converge to the corre-
sponding Nash equilibrium of the complete information game during this process.
For future research, we can study the comparative statics of the number of equilib-
ria with respect to variances in a strategic substitutes setting, i.e. M > D. In addition,
the characterization of equilibria set in the strategic complements game is helpful for
further econometric studies such as identification of such type of games. Besides, we
will study whether and how the purification with dependent randomization rationale
can be applied to more general games.
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Bayesian Games with Rationally
Inattentive Players
We study how scarcity of attention affects strategic choice behaviour in a 2-player in-
complete information entry game. Scarcity of attention is a common psychological
character among population (Kahnemann, 1973) and it is modelled by the rational
inattention approach introduced by Sims (1998). In this game, players acquire infor-
mation about their private payoff shocks at a cost, which follows a high-low binary
distribution. We find that high information cost can generate multiple equilibria and
the number of equilibria differs with respect to different ranges of information cost.
The number of equilibria could be 1, 5 or 3. Increasing the information cost could
encourage or discourage a player to choose entry in some equilibria. This depends on
whether the prior probability of high payoff shocks is greater than a given threshold
value. We also exhibit a necessary and sufficient condition of parameter specification
such that with the same set of parameters satisfying this condition, both the rational
inattention Bayesian game and a Bayesian quantal response equilibrium game where
the observation errors are additive and follow a Type I extreme value distribution can
have a common equilibrium.
4.1 Introduction
Usually, in a study of decision problems or game theoretical problems, a scenario
where the economic agents can perform ideally in every aspect is assumed. At least,
in terms of dealing with available information, we consider that the agents can pay full
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attention to any observation without a cost. However, according to a series of psycho-
logical studies, human being’s ability to pay attention to their observations is found
to be actually limited (Kahnemann, 1973). This inevitable feature differentiates real
scenario from an ideally perfect economic agent scenario.
Economists have studied the influence of attention scarcity on individual decision
problems (Woodford, 2008, 2009, Matějka and McKay, 2015). In this chapter, we
study how attention scarcity affects economic agent’s strategic choice behaviour in an
incomplete information environment in a strategic substitutes context.
Attention scarcity is usually modelled by rational inattention that was first intro-
duced by Sims (1998). In this chapter also, we adopt rational inattention to model
attention scarcity for players in a game. By far, the literature most relevant to this
chapter is Yang (2014). In an independent work, Yang studies a 2 × 2 symmetric
strategic complements game. Players’ payoffs are affected by a common payoff shock
θ, which is a continuous random variable. However, each player cannot perfectly ob-
serve θ due to scarcity of attention, which is modelled by rational inattention. Players













Table 1: The coordination game in Yang (2014). θ is the fundamental state dis-
tributed according to a prior distribution P with support θ ∈ R. It is assumed that P
is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure over R. Parameter r > 0
is the cost of miscoordination, which measures the degree of strategic complementarity.
The game studied in this chapter is a 2 × 2 symmetric strategic substitutes game.
Each player’s payoff is affected by a private payoff shock subject to a binary distri-
bution. The players cannot perfectly observe their own payoff shock due to attention
scarcity. The game is shown in Table 2 in Section 4.3.
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In this chapter, we study how information cost affects players’ strategic choice be-
haviour. By far, no literature has studied this problem yet, including Yang (2014).
Yang focuses on players’ information acquisition behaviour. By making appropri-
ate assumptions on payoff specifications, he excludes the possible existence of non-
information acquisition equilibrium. In our model, we allow the existence of any type
of equilibrium, and it is found that in certain asymmetric equilibria, one player ac-
quires information to make choices, while the opponent does not acquire information
to make choices.
In terms of the results, Yang (2014) finds that when the information cost is smaller
than a threshold value, there are infinitely multiple equilibria. However, it is not clear
whether there exists a unique equilibrium when the information cost is greater than or
equal to the threshold value. In our model, if there exist multiple equilibria, they arise
when the information cost is greater than or equal to a threshold value. If the infor-
mation cost is smaller than the threshold value, there exists a unique equilibrium. In
addition, under proper parameter specification, our game can always exhibit a unique
equilibrium for any value of information cost.
Finally, because of our particular focus on information cost’s impact, in this chap-
ter, we also study comparative statics of information cost on players’ equilibrium be-
haviour. There is no comparative statics work of information cost in Yang’s paper.
This chapter is in line with the literature of entry games. Entry games have been
widely studied in industrial organization literature, and it is the most typical form for
modelling strategic substitutes behaviour. However, no literature exists that study how
psychological factors affect firms’ competition. There is a void related to this topic in
the industrial organization literature, which this chapter is initially motivated to fill.
In the remaining parts of introduction, we first introduce the evolution of studies on
rational inattention choice problems, and present a binary choice example to explain
the rationale of modelling a rational inattention discrete choice problem. This binary
choice model is a particular case of Matějka and McKay’s (2015) general model.
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4.1.1 Psychological Motivation of Random Choice
Many experiments suggest that individual choice is not deterministic (e.g. Loomes
and Sugden, 1995). The experimental choice behaviour explored in recent litera-
ture matches with a much older literature in the branch of experimental psychology
known as ‘psychophysics’, which showed that subjects cannot dependably make the
same judgment about the relative strength of two similar but not identical stimuli when
facing the same choice on repeated occasions. These experimental data are often ex-
plained by models that assume a random factor in the subject’s perception of a constant
stimulus; however, the randomness is clearly a feature of the subject’s nervous system
rather than of preferences (Woodford, 2008).
Therefore, in terms of these studies, random choice behaviour results precisely
from the decision maker’s difficulty in discriminating among different choice situa-
tions, a human cognitive limitation extensively documented by the psychophysicists.
How does the difficulty in differentiating different choice situations arise? In the psy-
chology literature, this cognitive limit can be accounted for by the scarcity of attention
(e.g., Kahneman, 1973). In most economics literature, economic agents have full ac-
cess to all available information and have no difficulty in paying full attention to all
information available. The first attempt to incorporate attention scarcity into an eco-
nomic model is Sims (1998). Sims’ hypothesis of ‘rational inattention’ is a widely
applied approach to model the limited attention and it motivates a very specific theory
of the randomized choice (conditional on states) (see Sims, 1998, 2003, 2006; Wood-
ford, 2008, 2009; Matějka and McKay, 2015).
Woodford (2008, 2009) and Matějka and McKay (2015) independently develop
the randomized choice theory in the rational inattention framework. Their theories ex-
plain how scarcity of attention leads to decision maker’s difficulty in discriminating
among different choice situations that ultimately results in random choice behaviour.
It bridges a fundamental psychological activity—scarcity of attention—and a human
cognitive limitation—difficulty in clearly differentiating different choices—via an eco-
nomic approach.
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4.1.2 The Principle of Rational Inattention
To explain the rationale of rational inattention, we now specify a rational inattention
binary choice model. This model adopts Sims’ (1998, 2003, 2006) hypothesis of ‘ra-
tional inattention’: firms have precisely that information that is most valuable to them,
given the decision problem that they face, subject to a constraint on the overall quantity
of information that they access. In Woodford (2008, 2009) and Matějka and McKay
(2015), rather than specifying a quantity constraint, it is assumed that there is a cost
λ > 0 per unit of information obtained each period by the decision maker and that the
total quantity of information obtained is optimal given this cost. This chapter, which
studies rationally inattentive players’ strategic choice behaviour in a Bayesian game,
still follows Woodford (2008, 2009) and Matějka and McKay (2015)’s specification in
which λ rather than the overall quantity of information they access, i.e. I, is given. This
is because under this specification, the decision problem is a free-constraint utility-
maximization problem. Hence, decision makers have complete freedom to allocate
their attention, and could certainly allocate more attention to the information that is
most relevant to their choice. It makes more sense to suppose that there is a given cost
of additional attention, determined by the opportunity cost of reducing the attention
paid to other matters, rather than a fixed bound on the attention that can be paid to the
discrete choice problems.1
4.1.2.1 The Information Cost
Following the rational inattention literature, we shall suppose that any information
about the current choice state can be available to the decision maker (DM, hereafter),
as long as the quantity of information obtained by the firm without a thorough in-
vestigation is within a certain finite limit, representing the scarcity of attention, or
information-processing capacity, that is used for this purpose. The quantity of infor-
mation obtained by the DM is defined as in the information theory of Claude Shan-
non (1946). In this theory, the quantity of information contained in a given signal is
measured by the reduction in the entropy of the DM’s posterior over the state space,
relative to the prior distribution. Let us suppose that the agents are interested simply
1If there exists a constraint k on the overall information an agent can access such that I ≤ k, then λ
becomes the shadow price which varies with respect to k, and thus, the choice probability also varies
with respect to k. Therefore, how much information an agent can process to make a choice is ultimately
determined by the constraint in this situation.
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in information about the current value of the unknown state ε ∈ {u,d}, and the firm’s
prior is given by the distribution p = Pr(u) and 1− p = Pr(d), where p ∈ (0,1). Let
rs = Pr(u|s) and 1− rs = Pr(d|s) be the firm’s posterior, conditional upon observing
a particular signal s. The entropy functions associated with a given binary distribution
(a measure of the degree of uncertainty) are given by
H(p) =−p ln p− (1− p) ln(1− p)
and
H(rs) =−rs lnrs− (1− rs) ln(1− rs)
and as a consequence, the entropy reduction when signal s is received is given by
I(s) = [−p ln p− (1− p) ln(1− p)]− [−rs lnrs− (1− rs) ln(1− rs)]
The average information revealed is therefore
I ≡ Es[I(s)] = H(p)−Es[I(rs)]
where the expected value is taken over the set of signals that were possible ex ante,
using the prior probabilities of that each of these signals would be observed. (The prior
over s is the one implied by the DM’s prior over ε ∈ {u,d}, together with the known
statistical relation between ε and the signal s that will be obtained).
According to Matějka and McKay (2015), in a rational inattention binary choice
problem, under an optimal information structure qεs = Pr(s|ε), the signal s will only
contain two possible values, say s ∈ {0,1} (we will elaborate the notations and the re-
sult in Sections 4.1.2.2 and 4.1.2.3). Denote qs = pqus +(1− p)qds . Hence, q0+q1 = 1.
The entropy functions associated with the information structure are given by
H(qs) =−q0 lnq0−q1 lnq1
and
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H(qεs) =−qε0 lnqε0−qε1 lnqε1
Therefore, the amount of information conveyed by the information structure qεs is
I(qs) = H(qs)−Eε[H(qεs)]
=−q0 lnq0−q1 lnq1 + p[qu0 lnqu0 +qu1 lnqu1]+ (1− p)[qd0 lnqd0 +qd1 lnqd1]
Matějka and McKay (2015) prove that according to the symmetry property of mu-
tual information, I(qs) = I. In the strategic choice problem studied in this chapter, we
mainly use I(qs) to express the mutual information for analytical purpose.
4.1.2.2 Formulation of the Decision Problem
Now, suppose the DM is a firm. The firm faces the following choice problem of






Figure 1: A firm’s entry decision problem
If the firm chooses entry (1), its payoff will be either u > 0 or d < 0, and if it
chooses inactive (0), its payoff will be 0. The state is drawn before the DM observes
it and makes a choice. The problem is that the DM cannot perfectly observe the state
because of scarcity of attention; therefore, it has to arrange to acquire a signal s at a
cost by paying λI(s) in order to obtain the information that is most relevant to this
choice problem. Then, this knowledge about ε ∈ {u,d} is updated via the posterior rs
and 1− rs. Given the posterior, the DM chooses the action with the highest expected
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payoff. Let V (rs) = max{µ̄(s),0}, where µ̄(s) = rsu+(1− rs)d, denote the maximal
payoff. The theory of rational inattention reveals the mechanism behind the above
(psychological) decision process in a utility maximization framework. It aggregates
all possibilities of such a process and posits that both the design of this signal (the set
of possible values of s, and the probability that each will be observed conditional upon
any given state ε, i.e. qεs = Pr(s|ε), also referred to as information structure), and the
decision about whether to choose action 1 or 0 conditional upon the signal observed,
will be obtained, in the sense of maximizing
E[V (rs)]−λI
Therefore, this solution concept (the information strategy and the ultimate choice
behaviour as the essence of this psychological process) can account for when a payoff
shock is drawn, what aspects of information about the payoff shock a rationally inatten-
tive agent can and should pay attention to and what choice should be made contingent
on this information. The expectation operator sums over possible states ε∈ {u,d}, pos-
sible signals s and possible action choice decisions under the firm’s prior probability
distribution, which is that payoff shock u happens with probability p and payoff shock
d happens with probability 1− p. λ > 0 is the cost per unit of information of being
more informed when making the action choice decision. This design problem is solved
from an ex ante perspective: players must decide how to allocate their attention, which
determines what kind of signal players will observe under various circumstances, be-
fore learning anything about the current state.
4.1.2.3 Main Results of Rational Inattention Binary Choice Problem
Here, we summarize Matějka and McKay (2015)’s main results of the decision prob-
lem. They are expressed in the binary choice context as shown in Figure 1.
The first result of this binary choice problem is that under an optimal information
structure qεs , the signal s will take only two possible values, and can be interpreted as
a ‘0-1’ signal as to whether under the current state, the firm should enter the market.
Since the only use of the signal is to decide whether to enter the market, more elabo-
rate signals (e.g. a third signal) will convey redundant information. In addition, since
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more informative signal would have a greater cost without improving the quality of
the decision, it would be inefficient. Correspondingly, an optimal action decision will
necessarily be a deterministic function of the signal (i.e. entry is always chosen if and
only if the signal is 1). Therefore, the information structure qεs is identical to the con-
ditional probability of action given the state (see Woodford, 2008, 2009; Matějka and
McKay, 2015).
Second, about the choice behaviour, we find that given other primitives, there exists
a boundary value of λ denoted by λ̄DP, which can be equal to +∞. For λ smaller than
or equal to λ̄DP, i.e. the cost of acquiring information is not high for the DM, and its
choice will be made by acquiring information. For λ greater than λ̄DP, since acquiring
information is too costly for the DM, it will solely rely on its prior knowledge to make
a choice rather than by acquiring information. Therefore, λ̄DP is a boundary point dif-
ferentiating two distinct choice behaviours, and a DM’s evaluation of λ̄DP depends on
its preference. Proposition 1 gives us an accurate description of rationally inattentive
agents’ choice behaviour.
Define fDP := w(0,λ), FDP(λ) := S(λ,0), GDP(λ) := T (λ,0) and µDP := e(0),
where the expressions of w(x,λ), S(λ,x), T (λ,x) and e(x) are given in Appendix A
of this chapter. The analytical expression of λ̄DP is given by
λ̄DP =

F−1DP (1) if µDP < 0
+∞ if µDP = 0
G−1DP(1) if µDP > 0
where µDP = pu+(1− p)d. In addition, define the following function:
1{P}=
1 if P is true0 otherwise
Therefore, Proposition 1 is stated as follows.
Proposition 1 (A Binary-State Binary Choice Model, Matějka and McKay
(2015)): Given that u > 0 > d and λ > 0, the unconditional choice probability is given
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by






∀λ ∈ (λ̄DP,+∞), q = 0×1{µDP < 0}+1×1{µDP > 0}.
Alternatively, the choice probability can be written in a simplified form as
q = 0×1{ fDP < 0}+ fDP×1{0≤ fDP ≤ 1}+1×1{ fDP > 1}
Proof: see Appendix. 
In Proposition 1, the exponential functions in fDP come from the entropy function.
At λ̄DP, the average information revealed by signal I equals 0. Therefore, the agent’s
action is deterministic and is the interior solution at λ = λ̄DP. If λ > λ̄DP, generally,
fDP will be smaller than 0 or greater than 1. Hence, the agent has to choose a boundary
solution of q to maximize their utility. The boundary solution is equal to the interior
solution at λ = λ̄DP. It is q = 1 if µDP > 0 and q = 0 if µDP < 0.
4.1.3 The Relationship of Rational Inattention Discrete Choice Model
and Statistical Decision Problems
Rational inattention discrete choice problems and statistical decision problems (SDPs)
are different problems, although the components of these problems (e.g. utility func-
tions, signal, state, prior) are the same. The differences are reflected by two points:
1) an SDP is given the joint distribution of signal and state and the prior distribution
of state to derive the optimal decision rule, while a rational inattention discrete choice
problem is given the optimal decision rule and the prior distribution of state to obtain
the optimal information structure (the joint distribution of signal and state); 2) in ratio-
nal inattention binary choice problems, the optimal strategy should contain two signals
indicating two different action choices, otherwise more elaborate signals are redun-
dant and hence undesirable. The same rationale applies to rational inattention multiple
choice problems. In SDPs, the dimension of signal space is not necessarily equal to
the dimension of action space. For binary action problems, it allows more than two
signals. However, at the optimum, agents can always divide the signal set into two
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subsets with respect to the two different action choices.
Therefore, rational inattention discrete choice problems and SDPs can be regarded
as the same question but viewed from two different perspectives. A rational inattention
discrete choice problem is the ‘reinterpretation’ of an SDP.
4.2 Main Results of the Rational Inattention Bayesian
Game
In this chapter, we are interested in agents’ strategic choice behaviour if scarcity of at-
tention exists. We examine this subject in a 2 × 2 incomplete-information entry game
and focus on the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In industrial organization literature,
entry games are typically of strategic substitutes, so is our game. By extending the
rational inattention approach into a 2 × 2 strategic-substitutes incomplete information
game, we establish a model that allows us to study how information cost affects an
agent’s strategic choice behaviour. Here, we present a summary of the main results of
this chapter.
First, assuming both players’ information costs are identical, we find that there ex-
ists a critical value of information cost.2 If the given information costs of both players
are below this value, the game is a Bayesian game, in which the payoff of being active
is the production profit plus the private payoff shock. If the given information costs of
both players are above or equal to this value, the game becomes a complete information
game, in which the payoff of being active is the production profit plus the mean of the
distribution of payoff shocks, and players’ best responses are made without acquiring
information given any strategy of the opponent.
Next, by studying symmetric games, we find that scarcity of attention can generate
multiple equilibria, and that different values of information costs lead to different num-
bers of equilibria.3 A general rule is that jointly increasing both players’ information
costs first increases and then decreases the number of equilibria. Specifically, in the
2In this chapter, for simplicity, we refer to information cost to indicate the unit information cost.
3Symmetric game is defined such that the parameter specification of both players are identical. Par-
ticularly, the information costs of both players are identical.
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symmetric rational inattention Bayesian games, we find that given other primitives, by
jointly raising the information costs from 0 to +∞, the number of equilibria appears
in the following sequence: 1→ 3→ 5→ 3 if multiple equilibria can arise. Alterna-
tively, there always exists a unique equilibrium for any value of the information cost.
Besides, we find that in any multiplicity situation, there always exists one pair of asym-
metric equilibria in which at least one player plays without acquiring information and
relies on their prior knowledge. These results about the game’s equilibria are mainly
caused by the concavity–convexity property of the part of the second iteration of the
best response functions in which both players play the game by acquiring information.
Furthermore, the concavity–convexity property is ultimately induced by the structure
of entropy functions.4 Thus, because information processing capacity is modelled by
the reduction in the entropy of players’ posterior over the state space relative to the
prior distribution, there are at most five ways to play the game. For any result, it is ei-
ther that both players make choices by acquiring information or that one player makes
choices by acquiring information and the other player makes choices without acquiring
information and only relying on prior knowledge.
For comparative statics of equilibrium strategies, we find that in the symmetric
equilibrium and outer asymmetric equilibrium, any improvement in players’ expected
payoff of entry can increase the probability of entry.5 If we jointly increase both play-
ers’ information costs, its impact depends on the relative magnitude between the prior
probability of high payoff shock and a threshold value. If the prior probability of high
payoff shock is higher (or lower) than the threshold value, increasing the information
cost will increase (or decrease) the probability of entry. If the prior probability of high
payoff shock equals the threshold value, increasing the information cost does not have
any impact on the probability of entry. There is no conclusive result about comparative
statics of inner asymmetric equilibrium without particular parameter specification. Fi-
nally, in any equilibrium, if we change only one player’s information cost, its impacts
on both players’ equilibrium strategies are not clear without particular parameter spec-
ification, but it is found that its impact on one player’s strategy is always opposite to
its impact on the opponent’s strategy.
4The concavity–convexity property means that as the value of a player’s strategy increases, the part
of the second iteration of the best response functions in which both players acquire information exhibits
first concavity and then convexity. For details, please refer to Section 4.7.
5In this game, there are three types of equilibrium: symmetric equilibrium, outer asymmetric equilib-
rium and inner asymmetric equilibrium. They are named according to their location at the best response
functions.
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We also study how information cost affects a player’s expected payoff. A player’s
information cost does not have any impact on the player’s expected payoff, but the op-
ponent’s information cost can affect the player’s expected payoff through the player’s
belief towards the opponent’s behaviour. Except particular parameter specification,
there is no conclusive result about at what value of opponent’s information cost, the
player’s expected payoff reaches its highest value.
Finally, we study a game in which the players observe their private payoff shocks
with an additive noise that follows Type I extreme value distribution. The solution con-
cept is therefore (Bayesian) Quantal Response Equilibria (QRE). The similar-looking
strategic choice models motivate us to further consider under what conditions the two
games can be identical. It is found that there exists a specific set of parameter specifica-
tion under which both games have a common equilibrium (12 ,
1
2). Except this situation,
the two games will not coincide.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.3 describes the model.
Section 4.4 analyses three particular cases of the game with some special value of in-
formation cost. Section 4.5 analyses the general case. Section 4.6 studies the impact of
information cost on players’ best responses. Section 4.7 presents the equilibria set of
the game. Section 4.8 studies the impact of information cost on players’ equilibrium
strategies. Section 4.9 studies how information cost affects a player’s expected payoff
of entry. Section 4.10 compares a Bayesian quantal response equilibrium game and the
rational inattention Bayesian game to determine under what conditions the two types
of games can coincide or be identical. Section 4.11 concludes this chapter.
4.3 The Model
We study rationally inattentive players’ strategic choice behaviour in the following
Bayesian game. Two firms decide whether to enter a market. If a firm enters, it can
either get a monopoly profit or a duopoly profit, plus an exogenous payoff shock drawn
by nature at the beginning of the time. Each player’s payoff shock is independent from
each other, and it is the private information for each player. Each firm can only know its
own payoff shock. However, although a firm has full access to its own payoff shocks,
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due to scarcity of attention, it is only able to possess partial information about some
aspects of the payoff shock, and this information is obtained by acquiring a signal at
a cost. What kind of signal a player (firm) will observe is unconsciously designed in
their mind and the player only acquires information about their own shock. A player
cannot acquire any information about the opponent’s private payoff shock because it is
the opponent’s private information and it is independent from the player’s own payoff
shock. Both players make decisions according to observed private signals.
We define our game as follows. The firms’ strategic entry behaviour is character-













Table 2: The Strategic Entry Game
We use ∗ to denote all variables of the opponent. In this chapter, except in some
particular situations, for simplicity we do not describe i∗’s specification separately and
its specifications are correspondingly symmetric with i’s. Here, ε ∈ {u,d} is i’s pri-
vate payoff shock, and ε∗ ∈ {u,d} is opponent i∗’s payoff shock. Assume u > d. The
shocks ε and ε∗ have the same distribution, namely p = Pr(u) and 1− p = Pr(d), and
we assume that ε and ε∗ are independent and p ∈ (0,1). The payoff shocks are private
information for each player. Nature draws ε and ε∗, respectively, for the players at
the beginning of the time, and since they cannot perfectly observe ε or ε∗, they have
to acquire a signal at cost, which can reveal some aspects of ε or ε∗. To acquire at
a cost what type of signals is designed by each player, the efficient signal should un-
doubtedly be the most relevant to the player’s choice decision. We assume that each
player’s signal is conditionally independent of the opponent’s signal given the player’s
own payoff shock. The true value of the payoff shock can only be known after they
make their choices. The action set of player i is A = {0,1}, where 1 stands for ‘entry’
(being active) and 0 stands for ‘staying outside’ (being inactive). If both firms enter,
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they will engage in a Cournot competition and each firm gets a payoff D that is strictly
lower than the monopoly profit M.
The game exhibits strategic substitutes because when the probability that the op-
ponent chooses entry increases, the marginal expected payoff gain of being active over
inactive decreases.6 Therefore, the opponent’s more aggressive behaviour imposes a
negative externality on a player’s marginal payoff.
Now let us turn to discuss what kind of signal they will acquire. As stated above,
before selecting an action, both players can privately acquire information about their
own payoff shocks at a cost. The root of the inability to grasp the full knowledge about
ε or ε∗ is still scarcity of attention, and the information acquisition process in this game
is thus modelled in the rational inattention framework. The signal the players intend
to acquire is characterized by the set of realizations of player i’s signal, S ∈ R, and
the information structure qεs = Pr(s|ε), which is the probability measure of that signal
conditional on state ε. In addition, we denote σ(s) the probability of choosing action 1
upon observing s ∈ S, i.e. σ : S→ [0,1]. Then, player i’s strategy can be characterized
by a triplet (S,qεs,σ).
According to the results of the rational inattention binary choice problem described
in the last section, rationally inattentive agent’s optimal information structure just con-
tains two signal realizations because essentially, acquiring more elaborate signal not
only is costly but also provides no extra benefit to the player, since the player must
always take either action 1 or action 0. Hence, without loss of generality, i’s strategy
can be represented by the following function.
qε = Pr(a = 1|ε)
That is, when i’s private payoff shock is ε, player i receives signal 1 (signal 0) with
probability qε (1-qε) and then takes action 1 (action 0) as instructed.
Given i∗’s strategy qε
∗
, player i’s expected payoff of playing qε is
6The expected payoff could be the one in which a player makes decisions by acquiring information of
contingent payoff shocks or the one in which a player makes decisions based only on prior knowledge.
We will present the formulation of expected payoffs in detail in the following parts of this chapter.





where q∗ = pqu
∗
+(1− p)qd∗ . Equation (4.1) is directly derived from Table 2. As
a standard setup in rational inattention literature, the information cost associated with
a strategy qε is given by λI(qε), where I(qε) is the amount of information conveyed by
qε, and λ > 0 is a scaling parameter that controls the difficulty of acquiring informa-
tion. Specifically,
I(qε) = H(q)−Eε[H(qε)]
=−(1−q) ln(1−q)−q lnq+ p[(1−qu) ln(1−qu)+qu lnqu]+(1− p)[(1−qd) ln(1−qd)+qd lnqd]
(4.2)
where q = pqu + (1− p)qd . According to the symmetry property of mutual in-
formation, I(qε) = I = Es[I(s)], which has been discussed in the rational inattention
decision problem in Section 4.1.2.1. Hence, I(qε) reflects the average information re-
vealed by the designed signals, and λI(qε) is the average cost of acquiring information.
Taking information cost into account, i’s and i∗’s overall expected payoff in terms
















For simplicity, in the rest of this chapter, we abstract from the story of market entry
and deal with the problem simply as a 2-player game with preferences (4.3) and (4.4)
and strategy profile (qε,qε
∗
). Since qε and qε
∗
are probabilities, we can further restrict
the players’ strategies to qε ∈ [0,1] and qε∗ ∈ [0,1]. We write G(M,D,λ,λ∗) for the
game with monopoly profit M, duopoly profit D, i’s information cost λ and i∗’s infor-
mation cost λ∗. Furthermore, to make this incomplete information always interesting,
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we assume the following:
Assumption 1: Given that M > D, the random payoff shocks u and d satisfy
D+u > 0 > M+d.
Under Assumption 1, random payoff shocks dominates deterministic payoffs in
players’ decision making. If λ = λ∗ = 0, the ex ante choice probability of each action
totally depends on the prior distribution, and hence, there exists a unique equilibrium.
Therefore, Assumption 1 makes the underlying game a good benchmark to compare
games with scarcity of attention.7
4.4 Three Particular Cases
Before we analyse the general game, let us begin from three particular cases: (1)
λ = λ∗ = 0, (2) λ = λ∗ = +∞ and (3) λ = 0 and λ∗ = +∞. These particular cases
provide useful benchmarks for further analysis. Remember that we only consider pure-
strategy equilibrium.
In Case 1, signals are free, and hence players can possess full information about
private payoff shocks, and this game then comes back to a typical incomplete informa-
tion game. According to Assumption 1, in such games, there exists a unique Bayesian
Nash equilibrium, (q,q∗) = (p, p). Under Assumption 1, given the payoff shock u, a
player will certainly choose action 1 and hence qu = 1. Given the payoff shock d, a
player will certainly choose action 0 and hence qd = 0. Therefore, the unconditional
probability of choosing action 1 is q = pqu +(1− p)qd and in this situation, the un-
conditional choice probability is a sufficient statistic to describe the equilibrium.
In Case 2, when λ = λ∗=+∞, any signal is too costly to acquire. Then, a Bayesian
player will make a choice by simply comparing the ex ante expected payoffs for each
action, which are the expected payoff before payoff shocks are drawn by nature and
are simply formulated based on prior knowledge as well as the opponent’s strategy.
Case 2 can be further analysed in three specific situations:
7Underlying games refer to games with λ = λ∗ = 0.
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1) If D+ pu+(1− p)d > 0, then there exists a unique equilibrium (q,q∗) = (1,1),
since under this condition, for all q∗ ∈ [0,1], (1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d > 0;
2) If M+ pu+(1− p)d < 0, then there exists a unique equilibrium (q,q∗) = (0,0),
since under this condition, for all q∗ ∈ [0,1], (1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d < 0;
3) If M + pu+ (1− p)d > 0 and D+ pu+ (1− p)d < 0, then generically there
exist three equilibria (q,q∗) = (1,0), (0,1), and (M+pu+(1−p)dM−D ,
M+pu+(1−p)d
M−D ), where
the last equilibrium is essentially a mixed strategy and strictly between 0 and 1. Un-
der these two conditions, (1− q∗)M + q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d is not necessarily always
greater than or lower than 0 for all q∗ ∈ [0,1]. Therefore, in this situation, there exist
two (pure strategy) Nash equilibria. Since in this situation players just rely on prior
information and do not consider payoff shocks, this game is equivalent to a complete













Table 3: The Strategic Entry Game when λ = λ∗ =+∞
The three generical equilibria in 3) are obtained in this way and in fact, 1) and 2)
can also be analysed in this complete-information-game framework. The equilibria in
1) and 2) are dominant strategies.
Finally in Case 3, λ = 0 and λ∗ = +∞. In this situation, player i possesses full
information about their private payoff shock and knows nothing about player i∗’s pri-
vate payoff shock, while player i∗, as in Case 2, only relies on prior information and
knows nothing about player i’s contingent payoff shock either. Then, for player i, the
equilibrium strategy is p for the probability of choosing action 1, and hence, 1− p for
the probability of choosing action 0. Correspondingly, player i∗’s equilibrium strategy
is a∗= 1{(1− p)(M+d)+ p(D+u)> 0}. Therefore, in this situation, there still exists
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a unique equilibrium. Player i’s strategic choice, where λ = 0, depends on contingent
payoff shocks, and player i∗’s decision, where λ∗ = +∞, depends only on prior infor-
mation. Note that 1) in all three particular cases, there is no information acquisition,
either because players have perfect observation or because signals are too costly to
acquire, and 2) the choice behaviour where a player does not acquire information does
not just belong to λ (or λ∗) → +∞. We will show that given the opponent’s strategy
q∗ ∈ [0,1], a player will not make a choice by acquiring information when λ is greater
than a certain value, and in this situation, the choice behaviour is just the one we have
presented for λ→+∞.
4.5 General Case
Now, we deal with the general game. A Nash equilibrium of game G(M,D,λ,λ∗) is a
strategy profile (qε,qε
∗


















where ε (or ε∗) ∈ {u,d}.
























where ε (or ε∗) ∈ {u,d}, and q = pqu+(1− p)qd and q∗ = pqu∗+(1− p)qd∗ . Ac-
cording to equation group (4.5), and the relation between unconditional probability and
126 Chapter 4. Bayesian Games with Rationally Inattentive Players
corresponding conditional probabilities, we can see that the strategy profile (qε,qε
∗
)
can be equivalently represented by the unconditional probabilities (q,q∗), since one
(qε,qε
∗
), where ε (or ε∗) ∈ {u,d}, corresponds to a specific (q,q∗), and vice versa.
To obtain (q,q∗), rather than using the relation q = pqu+(1− p)qd or q∗ = pqu∗+
(1− p)qd∗ , we substitute the solutions in (4.5) back to the objective functions in G-1,

















)+(1−q∗)]+(1− p) ln[q∗ exp((1−q)M+qD+d
λ∗
)+(1−q∗)]}
s.t. 0≤ q∗ ≤ 1
where q and q∗ are strategic choices. We define f (q∗,λ) := w((1−q∗)M+q∗D,λ).
The function w(x,λ) is the same one in the decision problem. If interior solutions exist,
we obtain the following best response functions:













for all q∗ ∈ [0,1], and q∗ = f (q,λ∗) for all q ∈ [0,1]. We can prove that, given
all primitives, the interior solution q from G-2 and corresponding qε from G-1 satisfy
q = pqu + (1− p)qd , so satisfy q∗ = pqu∗ + (1− p)qd∗ . Then, naturally, the ques-
tion is under what conditions, q and q∗ are interior solutions of G-2. To answer
this question, we find that, given a q∗ ∈ [0,1], to ensure that the best response q is
an interior solution, i.e. q = f (q∗,λ) ∈ [0,1], it is equivalent to letting all parame-
ters satisfy the following conditions. Defining F(λ,q∗) := S(λ,(1−q∗)M+q∗D) and
8If we directly solve q = pqu +(1− p)qd to obtain q given any q∗ ∈ [0,1], there are three solutions:
0, 1 and the equation (4.6). However, 0 and 1 cannot maximize player i’s utility if we substitute them
back to the objective function in G-2.
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G(λ,q∗) := T (λ,(1−q∗)M +q∗D), where S(λ,x) and T (λ,x) are the same in the de-








G(λ,q∗) = pexp[− (1−q
∗)M+q∗D+u
λ





The first equation in (4.7) is derived from f (q∗,λ) ≥ 0 and the second equation
from f (q∗,λ)≤ 1.
We are interested in given M, D, and the prior distribution, the range of λ that en-
sures the existence of interior solutions of G-2. In this chapter, for a bivariate function
y = f (x,v), its inverse function with respect to x is expressed as x = f−1(y;v). We
define µ(q∗) := e((1− q∗)M + q∗D) = (1− q∗)M + q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d. It is found
that there indeed exists a λ = λ̄q∗ such that for all λ≤ λ̄q∗ , the interior solutions of G-2
exist. It is given by
λ̄q∗ =

F−1(1;q∗) if µ(q∗)< 0
+∞ if µ(q∗) = 0
G−1(1;q∗) if µ(q∗)> 0
If λ > λ̄q∗ , f (q∗,λ) will be either below 0 or above 1. In this situation, the player’s
behaviour changes. He will make a choice by comparing the ex ante expected payoff
of each action, disregarding any contingent information. This alternative behaviour is
grounded on the following reasons. First, this behaviour, reflected by its mathematical
representation, matches with the interior solution where the information acquired at
the equilibrium is zero. Second, mathematically, it coincides with the boundary solu-
tions of G-2. Hence, the continuity of the best response function q(q∗) with respect
to λ is ensured. The description of the best response functions is formally given by
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (Best Response Functions): Given q∗ ∈ [0,1], a player’s best re-
sponse q(q∗) is given by
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∀(λ̄q∗,+∞), q(q∗) = 0×1{µ(q∗)< 0}+1×1{µ(q∗)> 0}.
Alternatively, the best response function can be written in a simplified form as
follows:
q(q∗) = 0×1{ f (q∗,λ)< 0}+ f (q∗,λ)×1{0≤ f (q∗,λ)≤ 1}+1×1{ f (q∗,λ)> 1}
(4.8)
Proof: see Appendix. 
The exponential form of f (q∗,λ) comes from the entropy function. At λ = λ̄q∗ , the
average information revealed I equals 0. In this situation, the interior solution q(q∗) is
deterministic. For λ > λ̄q∗ , the boundary solutions of G-2 are the same as the solution
at λ = λ̄q∗ . It is q(q∗) = 1 if µ(q∗)> 0 and q(q∗) = 0 if µ(q∗)< 0.
From Proposition 2, we can learn that given a λ > 0, if q(q∗) = f (q∗,λ), the best
response function is a decreasing curve with respect to q∗. If q(q∗) = 0× 1{µ(q∗) <
0}+ 1× 1{µ(q∗) > 0}, the best response function is a horizontal line with respect to
q∗. In addition, given Assumption 1, it is found that limλ→0+ q= limλ→0+ f (q∗,λ) = p,
which implies that a player’s strategy as λ→ 0+ coincides with the strategy at λ = 0.
Since this game exhibits strategic substitutes, it is not surprising that the best re-
sponse function is non-increasing. The best response function can reflect two distinct
strategic choice behaviour: one by acquiring information, represented by the curvature
part of the best response function, and another by comparing ex ante expected pay-
off of each action, represented by the horizontal parts of the best response function.
Only prior knowledge matters for the latter approach. Therefore, the best response of
a player in this game reflects not only the player’s rational choice of an action but also
their choice of behaviour, i.e. the decision is made whether by acquiring information
or by comparing ex ante expected payoff of each action.
To conclude this section, we exhibit some numerical examples of the best response
function. In these examples, we maintain the values of M, D, u, d, p constant and only
change the value of λ from 0.01 to 10. From Figure 2, we see that when λ is large
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enough, some parts of the best response function become horizontal, which indicates
that given the relevant opponent’s strategy, a player’s best response is made without
paying heed to any contingent information and just relying on the prior knowledge
(see Figure 2).






















Figure 2: A series of numerical examples of the best response function. In these
examples, M=5, D=3, u=-2, d=-5.1, p=0.2, and λ increases from 0.01 to 10. When
λ = 0.01, the best response function is close to a horizontal line and approximately
equals p = 0.2. When λ = 0.3, given any q∗ ∈ [0,1], the player always makes the best
response by acquiring information, which is reflected by the curvature of the entire
best response function. When λ = 0.7 and 10, the horizontal parts emerge on the
best response function, which indicates that given relevant opponent’s strategies, a
player’s best response is made by comparing ex ante expected payoff of each action.
4.6 The Impact of Information Cost on a Rational Inat-
tentive Player’s Best Response
For the comparative statics analysis in this section, we focus on the case that q ∈ (0,1)
given q∗ ∈ [0,1]. That means a player’s best response is made by acquiring informa-
tion. In fact, it is not interesting to investigate the boundary cases (q = 0 or q = 1). If
q = 1, there is no scope of increasing it further. If q = 0 and λ≤ λ̄q∗ , entry may be so
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unattractive to start with that any type of improvement in this action (increasing M, D,
u, d or p) will not lead player i to choose it.
By increasing M, D, u and d, the expected payoff of entry increases, and hence
q(q∗) increases given q∗ ∈ [0,1]. If p increases, the high payoff shock u will happen
more often, and it encourages the player to choose entry. Therefore, q(q∗) increases as
p increases given q∗.
We define p̄(q∗) := r((1−q∗)M+q∗D), whose expression is given in Appendix A.
λ’s impact on a player’s own best response and the opponent’s best response are given
by Proposition 3
Proposition 3: Suppose Assumption 1 is satisfied. Given q∗ ∈ [0,1], if and only
if p ≥ (or <) p̄(q∗), ∂q(q
∗)
∂λ








Proof: see Appendix. 





























The parameter λ converts bits of information to utils. Therefore, (1−q
∗)M+q∗D+ε
λ
is the expected payoff of entry measured by bit. By simple calculation, it can be
found that the condition p > p̄(q∗) indicates that the first term in the above equation
dominates the second term. In this situation, the impact induced by (1−q
∗)M+q∗D+d
λ
overwhelms the impact induced by (1−q
∗)M+q∗D+u
λ
. As λ increases, the worst expected
payoff of entry, (1−q
∗)M+q∗D+d
λ
, increases, and hence it will encourage the player to
choose entry. Therefore, in this situation, raising λ increases q(q∗).
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To interpret the second result in Proposition 3, we can use the chain rule, according










Therefore, the impact of λ on q∗(q) can be decomposed into two separate effects:
∂q∗(q)




impact of the player’s information cost on their own best response. The impact of λ on
q∗(q) is transmitted through this mechanism. Because ∂q
∗(q)
∂q < 0, the impact of λ on
the opponent’s best response is always opposite to λ’s impact on the player’s own best
response.
4.7 The Equilibrium
Proposition 2 implies that the best response function is continuous with respect to the
opponent’s strategy. Therefore, according to Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, we obtain
the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Existence): Given Assumption 1, a pure-strategy (Bayesian) Nash
equilibrium always exists.
Proof: see Appendix. 
We use parenthesis to denote the word ‘Bayesian’ because there exists a critical
value λ = λc, and for λ > λc, the game turns into a complete information game. We
will show this in detail later in Proposition 6.
4.7.1 Dominance Solvability
The next question is under what conditions the game is dominance solvable. If the
game is dominance solvable, the game will exhibit a unique equilibrium. A sufficient
condition to ensure that the game is dominance solvable is that both players’ best re-
sponse functions are contraction. Therefore, we have the following proposition.
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Proposition 5: Given other parameters, f (q∗,λ) is a contraction if and only if
λ∈ (0, λ̃], where λ̃=min{ f ′−1q∗ (−1;q∗= 0), f
′−1
q∗ (−1;q∗= 1)}. Therefore, if λ∈ (0, λ̃]
and λ∗ ∈ (0, λ̃∗], the game is dominance solvable.
Proof: see Appendix. 
f (q∗,λ) is expressed by equation (4.6). f ′q∗(q
∗,λ) is its first-order derivative. It
is found that at q∗ = 0 or 1, there exists a λ = λ̃ such that f ′q∗(q
∗,λ) = −1. Because
f ′q∗(q
∗,λ) is invertible at λ = λ̃, according to the expression rule defined in Section 4.5,
λ̃ = f ′−1q∗ (−1;q∗).
Now, we look at the intuition of Proposition 5. According to our proof, it is found
that the lowest value of f ′q∗(q
∗,λ) happens at either q∗ = 0 or q∗ = 1 for any parameter
specification. It is caused by the exponential functions in the best response function
and Assumption 1. By Assumption 1, f ′q∗(q
∗,λ) either increases, or decreases, or first
increases and then decreases, as q∗ increases from 0 to 1. Therefore, the lowest value
of f ′q∗(q
∗,λ) happens at either q∗ = 0 or q∗ = 1.
If min{ f ′q∗(q∗= 1,λ), f ′q∗(q∗= 0,λ)}≥−1, then for all q∗ ∈ (0,1), f ′q∗(q∗,λ)>−1
and hence f (q∗,λ) is a contraction; similarly, q(q∗) is a contraction. If both players’
best response functions satisfy this situation, the game is dominance solvable.





the lowest value of f ′q∗(q
∗,λ) happens at q∗ = 0 or q∗ = 1, for all λ ∈ (0, λ̃], where
λ̃ = min{ f ′−1q∗ (−1;q∗ = 0), f
′−1
q∗ (−1;q∗ = 1)}, −1 ≤ f ′q∗(q∗,λ) < 0, which implies
that −1≤ dq(q
∗)
dq∗ ≤ 0. Therefore, we get Proposition 5.
4.7.2 From a Bayesian Game to a Complete Information Game
From Section 4.5, it is found that when the information cost is too high, a player’s best
response will be made by comparing ex ante expected payoff of each action. Neverthe-
less, the game may still be a Bayesian game since the player’s best response towards
some other strategies is still made by acquiring information. However, the game can
4.7. The Equilibrium 133
turn into a complete information game where λ is higher than some critical value. We
obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 6: In a symmetric game where λ= λ∗, there exists a λc =maxq∗∈[0,1] λ̄q∗
such that ∀λ ∈ [0,λc), the game is a Bayesian game as shown in Table 2, and ∀λ ∈
[λc,+∞), the game is a complete information game as shown in Table 3.
From Proposition 2, it is known that given q∗ ∈ [0,1], ∀λ ∈ (λ̄q∗,+∞), the best
response is made by comparing the ex ante expected payoff of each action. If all λ̄q∗
given q∗ ∈ [0,1] is smaller than the given λ, the player’s reaction will always be made
by comparing the ex ante expected payoffs. In this situation, the game becomes a com-
plete information game, as expressed by Table 3. Therefore, if λ > maxq∗∈[0,1] λ̄q∗ , the
game is a complete information game. Hence, Proposition 6 is obtained.
Further, we determine the analytical expression of λc. They are given by the fol-
lowing corollary.
Corollary 1: If µ(q∗ = 0) > 0 and µ(q∗ = 1) < 0, λc = +∞; if µ(q∗ = 1) > 0,
λc = G−1(1;q∗ = 1)<+∞; if µ(q∗ = 0)< 0, λc = F−1(1;q∗ = 0).
Proof: see Appendix. 
µ(q∗) is as defined in Section 4.5. F(λ,q∗) and G(λ,q∗) are expressed by equation
(4.7).
4.7.3 Equilibria of the Game
Here we give a complete characterization of the equilibrium set of the game for all
parameter specifications. It is given by Proposition 7.
Proposition 7: For the equilibrium set of the game where λ = λ∗, there are two
possibilities:
(1) Under some parameter specifications, there exist λ1 and λ2 such that 0 < λ1 <
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λ2 < λc. ∀λ ∈ [0,λ1), there is a unique equilibrium. At λ = λ1, there are three equilib-
ria. ∀λ ∈ (λ1,λ2), there are five equilibria. ∀λ ∈ [λ2,λc), there are three equilibria.
∀λ ∈ (0,λ2), the symmetric equilibrium is stable.9 At λ = λ2, the stability of the
symmetric equilibrium cannot be determined. ∀λ ∈ (λ2,λc), the symmetric equilib-
rium is unstable.
(2) Otherwise, under some parameter specification satisfying µ(q∗ = 0) < 0 or
µ(q∗ = 1)> 0, there is a unique equilibrium ∀λ ∈ [0,λc), which is stable.
Proof: see Appendix. 
In the following, we explain Proposition 7. The equilibria are solutions of an equa-
tion group comprising the 2 players’ best response functions. By putting the oppo-
nent’s best response function into i’s best response function, we get the following
function with respect to q, which is the second iteration of the best response func-
tions, g(q∗(q)):












and q∗(q) is given
by equation (4.8). Thus, any equilibrium must be a solution of the following equation:
q = g(q∗(q)) (4.10)
Geometrically, equation (4.10) shows that the equilibria are intersection points be-
tween 45◦ line and g(q∗(q)). g(q∗(q)) and A(q∗(q)) are continuous and non-decreasing
with respect to q for all λ∈ (0,+∞). Because the game is symmetric and best response
function q∗(q) is non-increasing, there always exists a unique symmetric equilibrium.
In addition, if asymmetric equilibria exist, one asymmetric equilibrium always has
a corresponding equilibrium obtained by switching players’ identities. Therefore, in
such games, asymmetric equilibria always appear in pairs and hence the total number
9The stability concept adopted in this chapter is Lyapunov stability.
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of equilibrium is odd.
We define set h := {q|0≤ f (q,λ∗)≤ 1 and 0≤ A(q∗(q))≤ 1}. A(q∗(q)) of q ∈ h
represent the part of A(q∗(q)) that is between 0 and 1 and no horizontal parts. Its
economic sense is that both players’ best response functions are made by acquiring
information. The horizontal parts of g(q∗(q)) indicates that there is at least one player
not playing the game by acquiring information. It is proven that when multiple equilib-
ria arise, as q increases, g(q∗(q)) where q ∈ h first exhibits concavity until q = τ, and
then exhibits convexity afterwards, where τ ∈ (0,1). Therefore, we call this property
as concavity–convexity property of A(q∗(q)).
In addition, we denote the symmetric equilibrium of the Bayesian game by (s,s).
It can be found that s ∈ h. This is because the Bayesian game exhibits strategic substi-
tutes, and the best response function is non-increasing and not constant. Therefore, in
the Bayesian game, there is no equilibrium like (0,0) or (1,1). Hence, in the symmet-
ric equilibrium, both players always make decisions by acquiring information.
We define set k := {q|0 ≤ f (q,λ∗) ≤ 1}. The last component we need in order to




> 0, where q ∈ k. A(q∗(q)) of q ∈ k could be
greater than 1 or smaller than 0. In the following, we first explain the result (1) of
Proposition 7.
4.7.3.1 Multiple Equilibria with Stable Symmetric Equilibrium
When λ is small, the game is dominance solvable and the symmetric equilibrium (s,s)
is stable. Thus, at q = s, g′q(q
∗(q)) < 1. Therefore, if we consider the multiplicity
situation, we should first consider if the symmetric equilibrium is stable, how many
equilibria exist. Because of the concavity–convexity property and that asymmetric
equilibria appear in pairs, in this situation, A(q∗(q)) of q ∈ h should have three inter-
section points with the 45◦ line. Otherwise, there is a unique intersection point (see
Figure 3).
To complete the solid curve in Figure 3 as the geometric representation of g(q∗(q))
with respect to q ∈ [0,1], we should draw two horizontal lines at the two sides of
A(q∗(q)) of q ∈ h. According to the symmetry property of the game, there are three
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Figure 3: The solid curve represents A(q∗(q)) of q ∈ h in the multiplicity situation. If
the game exhibits multiple equilibria, A(q∗(q)) of q ∈ h has three intersection points
with the 45◦ line. Otherwise, there is a unique intersection point indicated by the
dashed curve, which is also a A(q∗(q)) of q ∈ h function.
possible situations of a complete g(q∗(q)) curve. They are determined by whether
g(q∗(0)) = 0 or not, or g(q∗(q)) = 1 or not. Irrespective of the possible situation,
g(q∗(q)) will have five intersection points with the 45◦ line (see Figure 4).
Situations such that shown in Figure 5 cannot happen. Figure 5 is characterized by
g(q∗(0))> 0 and g(q∗(1))< 1. In Figure 5, (a, b) and (b, a), where a, b ∈ (0,1), form
a pair of asymmetric equilibria in which both players make their equilibrium strate-
gies by acquiring information. However, the intersection points a and b are made by
the horizontal part of g(q∗(q)) and the 45◦ line. It implies that there is at least one
player not acquiring information, and hence that player’s strategy (a or b) is either 0
or 1. However, both a and b are between 0 and 1. Hence, a contradiction arises, and
(a, b) and (b, a) in Figure 5 cannot be equilibria of the symmetric rational inattention
Bayesian game. Thus, if there are five equilibria, only the three situations in Figure 4
are the correct situations.
At the boundary situation (λ= λ1), where the game transits from a unique-equilibrium





> 0 ∀q ∈ k, there are three equilibria which are intersections between
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(1) (2) (3)
Figure 4: Three possible situations of g(q∗(q)) when there are multiple equilibria
and the symmetric equilibrium is stable. There are five intersection points,
representing the five equilibria of the symmetric rational inattention Bayesian game.
Figure 5: The situation that cannot happen if there are five equilibria.
A(q∗(q)) of q ∈ h and the 45◦ line. They are described by the three figures in Figure 6.
From Figure 6, we can see that if we slightly increase λ to λ1 + ε, where ε > 0




> 0 ∀q ∈ k, the shape of g(q∗(q)) in
each sub-figure will come back to the shape in the corresponding sub-figure with the




> 0 ∀q ∈ k, the slope of g(q∗(q)) in each sub-figure of Figure 6 will become
the one represented by the dashed curve, which is flatter than the solid curve; hence,
there is a unique equilibrium for λ = λ1− ε.
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(1) (2) (3)
Figure 6: Three possible situations of g(q∗(q)) at λ = λ1. They are represented by the
solid curves. Dashed curves represent the g(q∗(q)) function at λ = λ1− ε. From these
figures, it can be seen that when λ increases from λ1− ε to λ1, the number of
equilibria changes from one to three.
Therefore, as long as the symmetric equilibrium is stable, there are at most five
equilibria in this game.
4.7.3.2 Multiple Equilibria with Unstable Symmetric Equilibrium




< 0 ∀q∗ ∈ [0,1], symmetric equilibrium will
finally become unstable. At the boundary situation (λ = λ2), where the symmetric
equilibrium will transit from being stable to unstable as λ increases, the stability of the
symmetric equilibrium cannot be determined, i.e. q′(q∗) = −1 at q∗ = s ∈ (0,1). We
can use the undetermined stability of the symmetric equilibrium to characterize λ2. It
can be proven by contradiction that at λ = λ2, the lowest value of A′q(q
∗(q)) of q ∈ h
equals 1 and it occurs at q = s.
Suppose that ∀q ∈ (s− ε,s), A′q(q∗(q)) > 1, and ∀q ∈ (s,s+ ε), A′q(q∗(q)) < 1.
Then (s,s) is the tangent point of A(q∗(q)) with the 45◦ line, and it should be tangent
with the 45◦ line from below (see Figure 7).
From Figure 7, we can see that if the symmetric equilibrium is tangent with the 45◦
line, the number of equilibria will be even. Therefore, a contradiction arises.
In addition, situations indicated by Figure 8 also cannot happen. In Figure 8, the
stability of the symmetric equilibrium is not determined and there are three equilibria.




> 0, where q∈ k, there will be five
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(1) (2) (3)
Figure 7: The situation that A′q(q∗(q)) = 1 at q = s (1) and its two possible
realizations ( (2) and (3) ). In this situation, A′q(q
∗(q)) = 1 at q = s is not the lowest
value of A′(q∗(q)) of q ∈ h. Because the intersection points and the tangent point are
of even number in total, this situation cannot happen.
intersection points and the middle intersection point s′ (symmetric equilibrium) will
become stable. This contradicts the prerequisite condition that the symmetric equilib-
rium should not be stable for λ > λ2 (see Figure 8).
Figure 8: The situation that A′q(q∗(q)) = 1 at q = s. Because we are studying the
boundary situation that leads to unstable symmetric equilibrium for λ > λ2, this
situation cannot happen, because here the new symmetric equilibrium s′ by increasing
λ with ε > 0 is stable.
Therefore, at λ = λ2, A′q(q
∗(q)) of q ∈ h reaches its lowest value 1 at q = s. In this
situation, there are three equilibria. Furthermore, we draw an arbitrary curve whose
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(1) (2) (3)
Figure 9: The three possible situations of g(q∗(q)) at λ = λ2. They are represented by
the solid curves. Dashed curves represent g(q∗(q)) at λ = λ2 + ε, where ε > 0 is
arbitrarily small. Therefore, as λ increases from λ2 to λ2+ε, the number of equilibria
will be maintained as three, and the stability of the symmetric equilibrium will change
from undetermined to unstable.
slope is greater than 1 to represent A(q∗(q)) of q ∈ h; there is a unique intersection
point with the 45◦ line. The other two intersection points with the 45◦ line are realized
by the horizontal lines which complete g(q∗(q)) with the A(q∗(q)) of q ∈ h. Figure 9
provides a complete description of the intersection points between g(q∗(q)) and 45◦





> 0, where q ∈ k, for λ = λ2 + ε, A′q(q∗(q)) > 1 for all q ∈ k;
hence, there are three equilibria. This situation will be maintained for all λ ∈ (λ2,λc).
Therefore, for all λ ∈ [λ2,λc), the game has three equilibria.
Therefore, if players with scarcity of attention play the Bayesian game of Table 2
and the scarcity of attention is modelled by the reduction in the entropy of players’
posterior over the state space relative to the prior distribution, there are at most five
ways to play the game. For any result, either both players make choices by acquiring
information or one player makes choices by acquiring information and the other player
makes choices without acquiring information and relying only on prior knowledge.
To conclude Sections 4.7.3.1 and 4.7.3.2, we present some numerical examples to
visually exhibit how different number of equilibria arise. They are presented in Figure
10. The three figures in the first row represent the situation in which µ(q∗ = 0) > 0
and µ(q∗ = 1)< 0. The three figures in the second row represent the situation in which
µ(q∗ = 0) < 0. The three figures in the third row represent the situation in which
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µ(q∗ = 1) > 0. We can see that in any situation, the number of equilibria in each row
of numerical examples follows the 1-5-3 sequence as λ increases (see Figure 10).
4.7.3.3 The Explanation of Result (2) in Proposition 7
Logically, under any parameter specification, as λ increases from 0, the game may
exhibit a unique equilibrium, or not, for all λ ∈ (0,+∞). Result (1) in Proposition 7
belongs to the ‘or not’ part.
For some parameter specifications satisfying µ(q∗ = 0) < 0 or µ(q∗ = 1) > 0, the
game contains a unique equilibrium for all λ ∈ (0,+∞). We can find numerical exam-
ples to support this fact:
1. µ(q∗ = 0)< 0: p = 0.2, M = 5, D = 3, u =−2 and d =−10;
2. µ(q∗ = 1)> 0: p = 0.8, M = 2, D = 1, u = 1 and d =−2.01.
Therefore, if µ(q∗ = 0) < 0 or µ(q∗ = 1) > 0, it is possible that there is only one
way for both players with scarcity of attention to play the Bayesian game shown in
Table 2. In this situation, both players will acquire information to make decisions.
However, if parameters satisfying µ(q∗ = 0) > 0 and µ(q∗ = 1) < 0, multiple
equilibria will surely happen when λ is large enough. For all q∗ ∈ [M+pu+(1−p)dM−D ,1],
µ(q∗) < 0, and
∂λ̄q∗
∂q∗ < 0. Therefore, as λ increases, q
∗ = 1 is the first point at which
the player chooses action 0 deterministically. Then, along the direction from q∗ = 1
to q∗ = M+pu+(1−p)dM−D , as λ increases, the player’s best responses gradually turn into 0.
At the same time, ∀q∗ ∈ [0, M+pu+(1−p)dM−D ), µ(q
∗) > 0 and
∂λ̄q∗
∂q∗ > 0. Therefore, as λ
increases, q∗ = 0 is the first point at which the player chooses action 1 deterministi-
cally, and then along the direction from q∗ = 0 to q∗ = M+pu+(1−p)dM−D , the player’s best
responses gradually turn into 1.
Hence, in the case of µ(q∗ = 0) > 0 and µ(q∗ = 1) < 0, as λ increases from 0,
a player’s best response q(q∗) will rise to 1 ∀q∗ ∈ [0, M+pu+(1−p)dM−D ), and at the same
time, the player’s best response will fall to 0 ∀q∗ ∈ [M+pu+(1−p)dM−D ,1]. Therefore, when
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λ = 0.5 (1 equilibrium)



















λ = 0.8 (5 equilibria)



















λ = 1.2 (3 equilibria)
Numerical examples corresponding to 1) of Theorem 1: M=5, D=3, u=-2, d=-5.1 and
p = 0.2.



















λ = 1 (1 equilibrium)



















λ = 2.1 (5 equilibria)



















λ = 3 (3 equilibria)
Numerical examples corresponding to 2) of Theorem 1: M=5, D=3, u=-2, d=-5.9 and
p = 0.2.



















λ = 1 (1 equilibrium)



















λ = 1.4 (5 equilibria)



















λ = 3 (3 equilibria)
Numerical examples corresponding to 3) of Theorem 1: M=5, D=3, u=-2, d=-5.1 and
p = 0.7.
Figure 10: Numerical examples of this game. The solid curves represent a player’s
best response function q(q∗), and the dashed curves represent the opponent’s best
response function q∗(q). The horizontal axis indicates q∗ (or q∗(q)) and the vertical
axis indicates q(q∗) (or q).
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q(q∗) = 0 at q∗ = 1 and q(q∗) = 1 at q∗ = 0, equilibria (1, 0) and (0, 1) arise. Thus, in
this situation, asymmetric equilibria are inevitable.
4.8 Impact of Information Cost on Equilibrium Strategy
In the symmetric strategic substitutes game, the symmetric equilibrium always exists
and is unique. When multiple equilibria arise, there are two types of asymmetric equi-
libria. In one type, there is at least one player choosing action 0 or 1 by comparing
ex ante expected payoff of each action. This type of asymmetric equilibria is usually
located at the outer part of a player’s best response function, hence named outer asym-
metric equilibria. In the other type, both players make their best response by acquiring
information. This type of asymmetric equilibria is usually located at the inner part of
a player’s best response function, hence named inner asymmetric equilibria.
For outer asymmetric equilibria, according to the payoff specification, there are
three specific results:
1) If µ(q∗ = 0)> 0 and µ(q∗ = 1)< 0, they are (1, 0) and (0, 1);
2) If µ(q∗ = 0)< 0, they are (t,0) and (0, t), where t ∈ (0,1);
3) If µ(q∗ = 1)> 0, they are ( j,1) and (1, j), where j ∈ (0,1).
In an equilibrium, if a player always chooses 0 or 1 deterministically, the corre-
sponding comparative statics results with respect to any parameter are always equal to
0. Only the equilibrium strategy that is made by acquiring information, i.e. q ∈ (0,1),
will be further analysed.
For inner asymmetric equilibria, there are no conclusive comparative statics results.
It depends on particular parameter specifications.
∂q
∂τ




represents the comparative statics of best response q(q∗) given q∗ with
respect to parameter τ. For the symmetric equilibrium and outer asymmetric equilibria
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in which equilibrium strategy q ∈ (0,1), the comparative statics results are given by
the following two propositions:
Proposition 8: For a symmetric equilibrium strategy or an outer asymmetric equi-
librium strategy q ∈ (0,1), ∂q
∂τ
≥ 0, where τ ∈ {M,D,u,d, p}. The equality is taken for
the outer asymmetric equilibria in which τ = D when µ(q∗ = 0) < 0 or τ = M when
µ(q∗ = 1)> 0.
Proof: see Appendix. 
The intuition of Proposition 8 is that increasing τ ∈ {M,D,u,d, p} can increase the
expected payoff of entry; therefore, a player is more willing to choose entry. If q∗ = 0
and µ(q∗ = 0) = M + pu+(1− p)d < 0, duopoly cannot happen, and hence, ∂q
∂D = 0.
If q∗ = 1 and µ(q∗ = 1) = D+ pu+(1− p)d > 0, from an ex ante perspective, entry is
more profitable than being inactive, and hence ∂q
∂M = 0.
Proposition 9: Given that λ = λ∗, for a symmetric equilibrium strategy or an outer
asymmetric equilibrium strategy q ∈ (0,1), if and only if p≥ (or <) p̄(q∗), then ∂q
∂λ
≥
(or <) 0, where the equality is taken when p = p̄(q∗). Here, q∗ = s for symmetric
equilibrium (s,s), q∗ = 0 for an outer asymmetric equilibrium in which µ(q∗ = 0)< 0,
and q∗ = 1 for an outer asymmetric equilibrium in which µ(q∗ = 1)> 0.
Proof: see Appendix. 
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librium (s,s) or (q,q∗). According to Proposition 3, it can be deduced that the sign of
∂q
∂λ











Finally, for any type of equilibrium, what is the effect of the situation where only
one player’s information cost changes given the other parameters? The answer is that
the impact of changing one player’s information cost on both players’ equilibrium
strategy cannot be determined without particular parameter specification in any equi-





























































The signs of 1−HK and ∂q(q
∗)
∂λ






) because H < 0. Therefore, the impact
of varying only one player’s information cost on each player’s equilibrium strategy,
in any equilibrium, cannot be determined, but its impact on one player’s equilibrium
strategy is always opposite to its impact on its opponent’s equilibrium strategy.
4.9 Impact of Information Cost on Players’ Expected
Payoffs of Entry
In this chapter, we have two types of expected payoff of entry: the ex ante expected
payoff of entry, i.e. (1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d, and the typical expected payoff
of entry, i.e. (1−q∗)M+q∗D+ ε ,where ε ∈ {u,d}. For both types, λ or λ∗ can only
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p=0.2, M=5, D=3, u=-2,
d=-5.9, q=0.6














p=0.2, M=5, D=3, u=-2,
d=-5.1, q=0.1














p=0.2, M=5, D=3, u=-2,
d=-5.1, q=0.3
Figure 11: Three numerical examples of EΠ(λ∗)
affect (1−q∗)M+q∗D. We define EΠ = (1−q∗)M+q∗D = M− (M−D)q∗. There-














Because if and only if pR p̄(q) given q ∈ [0,1], ∂q
∗(q)
∂λ∗ R 0. Therefore, if and only
if p Q p̄(q), ∂EΠ
∂λ∗ R 0. It is found that the sign of
∂ p̄(q)
∂λ∗ could be positive or negative.
Therefore, without particular parameter specification, it is hard to know the critical λ∗
that makes EΠ reach its highest value. For example, suppose ∂p̄(q)
∂λ∗ > 0. It can be found
that in this situation, the maximum value of EΠ is reached at either λ∗ = 0 or λ∗ = λ̄∗q
(see Appendix). We also exhibit three numerical examples here to show the flexibility
of the shape of EΠ with respect to λ∗ (see Figure 11).
4.10 (Bayesian) Quantal Response Equilibrium and Ra-
tional Inattention Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Consider the following entry game:













The players make their decisions after observing their respective private payoff
shocks ε and ε∗. However, the observation is always affected by an additive error η (or
η∗). Therefore, what they actually observe is ε+η and ε∗+η∗, assuming that η is in-
dependent from η∗. Assumption 1 in Section 4.3 is still held in this game. Therefore,
if player i observes u+η or d +η, in this game, the player’s choice is probabilistic
because D+u > 0 > M+d. The solution concept of this game is therefore (Bayesian)
Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995).
It is assumed that η follows Type I extreme value distribution, i.e. F(η) = e−e
−αη−β
.
Suppose that players in this game adopt a cutoff strategy. The conditional choice prob-
ability qεQRE(q






Let us recall the conditional choice probability in the rational inattention Bayesian























Since (4.11) and (4.12) look similar, it is natural to ask under what parameter spec-
ifications (4.11) and (4.12) are identical. If they are identical, there will be a clear
economic and psychological justification of why the disturbances η should be extreme
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value distributed in the Bayesian QRE game.











where λ < λ̄q∗ , (4.11) and (4.12) are identical. However, because α and λ are con-
stant, (4.13) is held if and only if 1(1−q∗)M+q∗D+ε ln
q
1−q is a constant with respect to ε





given that λ < λ̄q∗ .








Given q∗ ∈ [0,1], qQRE ∈ (0,1). As α→ +∞, the Bayesian QRE game converges
to the benchmark Bayesian game, which is also the limit of the rational inattention
Bayesian game as λ→ 0. In this situation, qQRE = p. As α→ 0, in the Bayesian QRE
game, actions consist of all observational errors such that all actions become indiffer-
ent ex ante. Hence, qQRE = 12 in this situation. It does not coincide with the rational
inattention Bayesian game of λ→+∞, in which players choose a deterministic action
(0 or 1) by comparing ex ante expected payoffs. According to equation (4.14) and
equation (4.8), it is further found that (12 ,q
∗) is an equilibrium for both types of games
under the same parameter specification and α = 1
λ
if and only if q∗ = 12 . The reason is
that because both games are symmetric, if (12 ,q
∗) is an equilibrium, (q∗, 12) should be
an equilibrium as well. According to the analysis in the previous paragraph, in (q∗, 12),
unless q∗ = 12 , (q
∗, 12) will not simultaneously satisfy (4.8) and (4.14).
Therefore, in conclusion, if there is a set of parameters satisfying α = 1
λ
and pro-
ducing equilibrium (12 ,
1
2) in the rational inattention Bayesian game, then the same set
of parameters will produce the same equilibrium (12 ,
1
2) in the Bayesian QRE game, and
vice versa. With the help of equation (4.14), we can express this result in an analytical
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form. We define a vector of parameters by W := (M,D, p,u,d,α,λ). If and only if











andλ < λ̄ 1
2
}, both the
rational inattention Bayesian game and the Bayesian QRE game can have a common
equilibrium (12 ,
1
2). This is the only coincidence situation of the two types of games.
4.11 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied how scarcity of attention affects economic agents’
strategic choice behaviour in an incomplete information environment. We use the ra-
tional inattention approach to model scarcity of attention. Given the opponent’s strat-
egy, as the information cost changes from 0 to +∞, a player’s behaviour of making best
responses will switch from by acquiring information to by comparing ex ante expected
payoff of each action. The latter behaviour solely relies on the player’s prior knowl-
edge. This behaviour transition is the behavioural manifestation of the mathematical
property that the continuity of the best response function with respect to the opponent’s
strategy is always ensured no matter how λ changes. Hence, the best response function
indeed contains two distinct choice behaviours.
It is particularly interesting to determine the impact of attention scarcity on forming
equilibria and affecting players’ strategic behaviour. By studying symmetric games,
we find that scarcity of attention can bring multiple equilibria and it is the high infor-
mation cost that generates multiple equilibria. The number of equilibria differs with
respect to different ranges of information cost. In any multiplicity situation in sym-
metric games, there always exists one pair of asymmetric equilibria in which at least
one player plays the game without acquiring information.
In a symmetric equilibrium or an outer asymmetric equilibrium (q,q∗), the effect
of attention scarcity on a player’s information-acquisition choice behaviour depends
on whether p is greater than p̄(q∗). We also find that in any equilibrium the impact
of a player’s information cost on their strategy is always opposite to its impact on the
opponent’s strategy.
Finally, we have compared the rational inattention Bayesian entry game with a
Bayesian QRE entry game. It is found that there exists a set of parameters satisfying
150 Chapter 4. Bayesian Games with Rationally Inattentive Players
α = 1
λ
and λ < λ̄ 1
2
. Specified by this set of parameters, both Bayesian QRE game and
rational inattention Bayesian game have a common equilibrium (12 ,
1
2). Except this sit-
uation, the two games cannot be coincided.
For future research, we will study the situation that players pay full attention to
their own information but are inattentive to their opponents’ information. We are in-
terested in how players make their strategic choices in such a paradigm. In future
study, we will investigate this problem to see how players’ behaviour deviates from
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Appendix of Chapter 2
Preliminaries and Glossaries of
Notations
The standard Gaussian density function is denoted by φ(.), and the standard Gaus-
sian cumulative density function is denoted by Φ(.). Given a Gaussian distribution














The joint Gaussian distribution is denoted by (ε,ε∗)∼ N(0,0,ς2,ς∗2,ρ). The den-


















The conditional density function is











and the conditional cumulative density function is
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We denote a player’s belief function by σ(x∗,ε) = F(x∗|ε), where ε is a player’s
own private information, and x∗ is the expected opponent’s cutoff strategy. We get the
following results for σ(x∗,ε):





























































The expected payoff function EΠ(x∗,ε) is expressed as follows:
















The best response function is denoted by g(x∗). In the proof, we often regard
g(x∗) as an independent variable and take derivatives of relevant functions with re-
spect to g(x∗) or find an optimum value of relevant functions with respect to g(x∗).
For simplicity, we denote g−1
′




, and ming(x∗)(maxg(x∗))ρ′(x∗) =
min(max)ρ′(x∗), which is the derivative of a function with x∗ as dependent variable
and g(x∗) as independent variable, and ming(x∗)(maxg(x∗))ρ′′(x∗) = min(max)ρ′′(x∗).
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Appendix of Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 1
Lemma B1: There exists a ρ̃ ∈ (−1,1), if M > D, for all ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̃] and for all
x∗ ∈ R, ∂EΠ(x
∗,ε)
∂ε




, with ρ = ρ̃.

















































≥ 0. Apparently, that ρ(M−D) ≤ 0 is sufficient to make the nec-




































Therefore, under the condition ρ(M−D)> 0, ∂EΠ(x
∗,ε)
∂ε
≥ 0 is always held if and only













≤ 0, the necessary and
sufficient condition is always held, and thus ∂EΠ(x
∗,ε)
∂ε









= 1. Given M, D, ς and ς∗, and denot-
ing the solution by ρ̃, then we have ρ̃2 = 2πς
2
2πς2+(M−D)2 . Furthermore, as long as ρ
2 < ρ̃2,
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< 0. Therefore, if M > D, and 0 < ρ ≤ ρ̃, ∂EΠ(x
∗,ε)
∂ε
≥ 0 is al-
ways held, and ∂EΠ(x
∗,ε)
∂ε




. Therefore, combined with the
results for the ρ(M−D) ≤ 0 situation, it can be concluded that if M > D, for all
ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̃], ∂EΠ(x
∗,ε)
∂ε
≥ 0 is always held, and ∂EΠ(x
∗,ε)
∂ε















∗ for M > D. Hence, both players have an identical range to ensure
that their respective expected payoff function EΠ(x∗,ε) always increases with respect
to ε ∈ R. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof of Proposition 1 is based on the proof of
Lemma B1. We denote the set of ρ that makes EΠ(x∗,ε) always increase with re-
spect to ε given x∗ by Γ ≡ {ρ|ρ ≤ ρ̃ if M > D }. From Lemma B1, it has been




is ρ ∈ Γ. Therefore, it is certain that as long as ρ does not belong to Γ, EΠ(x∗,ε) is not










. Without loss of generality, Figure B1 geometri-










given x∗, M, D, ρ, ς and ς∗ for all ρ /∈ Γ .
According to the quadratic structure of y(ε), as long as ρ /∈ Γ, there should be
















































on these results, without loss of generality, Figure B2 geometrically presents a general
description of function EΠ(x∗,ε) with respect to ε given any value of x∗ ∈ R, for all
ρ /∈ Γ.
Because for all x∗ ∈ R, given all primitives, expected payoff function EΠ(x∗,ε) is
always located between the line M+ ε and D+ ε, and if M > D, increasing x∗ will lift
EΠ(x∗,ε) upward, it is possible that for some value of x∗, there are two or three solu-
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Figure B1: A geometric description of the relationship between function y(ε) and









There must be two intersection point which make f (ε) = g(ε), and in this figure, they
are denoted by ε1 and ε2, respectively. The function y(ε) reaches its global minimum





tions of ε satisfying EΠ(x∗,ε) = 0. In Appendix D, we will prove that it is certain that
for all ρ /∈ Γ, by using a cutoff strategy, the game always contains a unique symmetric
solution g(s) = s, such that given s, EΠ(s,ε) = 0 has three solutions, and the solution
ε = s is located at the middle where EΠ(s,ε) decreases with respect to ε (see Figure
B2). Apparently, the solution (s,s) self-contradicts the definition of the cutoff strategy
under which it is derived. Hence, we cannot solve the game using the cutoff strategy
concept for all ρ /∈ Γ. Therefore, the set Γ not only indicates that EΠ(x∗,ε) increases
with respect to ε for all x∗ ∈R but also characterizes the set of cutoff strategy Bayesian
Nash equilibria of the symmetric strategic substitutes games. Therefore, Proposition 1
is obtained. Q.E.D.
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Figure B2: A general description of expected payoff function EΠ(x∗,ε) with respect
to ε given any value of x, for all ρ /∈ Γ. The position of EΠ(x∗,ε) depends on x∗, and
EΠ(x∗,ε) is always located within [D+ ε,M+ ε] for all x∗ ∈ R. If M > D, increasing
x∗ will lift EΠ(x∗,ε) upward. In Appendix E, it is proven that as long as a cutoff
strategy is used to solve the game, for all ρ /∈ Γ, there always exists a solution (s,s)
satisfying g(s) = s such that given s, EΠ(s,ε) behaves non-monotonically and has
three intersections with the x-axis; this is indicated by the red curve.
Appendix C
Appendix of Chapter 2
Derivation of the (Inverse) Best
Response Function
The best response function, g(x∗), is defined to satisfy EΠ(x∗,g(x∗)) = 0. Therefore,

























. Finally, we obtain the inverse best response function















g(x∗) = 0, we differentiate this equation with respect to x∗ on both sides, and ob-





























0, and it is known that as long as ρ ∈ Γ, ∂EΠ(x
∗,g(x∗))
∂ε
≥ 0; hence, if M > D, g′(x∗)< 0.
Therefore, as long as the concept of cutoff strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria is applied




Appendix of Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 2
Lemma D1: For all x∗ ∈R, assume ς= ς∗ and M >D, there exists two functions ρ′(x∗)
and ρ′′(x∗). Given an x∗ ∈R and ρ∈ (−1,1), if ρ∈ (−1,ρ′′(x∗)), then−1< g′(x∗)< 0;
if ρ ∈ (ρ′′(x∗),ρ′(x∗)), g′(x∗) < −1 ; at ρ = ρ′′(x∗), g′(x∗) = −1; at ρ = ρ′(x∗),
g′(x∗) = ∞.




























2). Hence, given an x∗ ∈ R,
if ρ > 0 and M > D, the function g−1
′
(x∗) must increase with respect to ρ. Besides, if
ρ = 0, g−1
′
(x∗)< 0, and if ρ = 1, g−1
′
(x∗) = 1. Because g−1
′
(x∗) is a continuous func-
tion with respect to ρ, for all ρ ∈ [0,1], g−1′(x∗) increases from a negative value to 1 as
ρ increases from 0 to 1. Therefore, there must exist a ρ∈ [0,1], whose value depends on
x∗, and it makes g−1
′
(x∗) = 0. We denote this ρ by ρ′(x∗). Since g−1
′
(x∗)< 0 is equiv-
alent to g′(x∗) < 0 and g−1
′
(x∗) > 0 is equivalent to g′(x∗) > 0, we can conclude that
given an x∗ ∈R, for all ρ∈ [0,ρ′(x∗)), g′(x∗)< 0, and for all ρ∈ (ρ′(x∗),1], g′(x∗)> 0.








2). For M > D, A < 0. Hence, the equa-
tion g−1
′
(x∗) = 0 can be equivalently expressed by ρ+A
√
1−ρ2 = 0. The solution
ρ′(x∗) that solves ρ+A
√
1−ρ2 = 0 equals − A√
1+A2
> 0. Because ς = ς∗, both play-
ers’ ρ′(x∗) function should be identical.
Because g′(x∗) = g−1
′
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2)> 0 for M > D. Given M, D,











must depend on x∗. Thus, we denote the ρ that makes g′(x∗) = g−1
′
(x∗) = −1 as
ρ′′(x∗). For this incomplete information game, ρ′′(x∗) should not be equal to ±1.
g−1
′
(x∗) = −1 can be equivalently expressed by ρ+ 1 = −
√
1−ρ2A. Solving this
equation, we get two solutions: ρ′′(x∗) = −1 and ρ′′(x∗) = A2−1A2+1 ; the first solution is
excluded on the basis of the previous argument. Therefore, ρ′′(x∗) = A
2−1
A2+1 .
Because given an x∗ ∈R, ρ′′(x∗) is unique, for all ρ∈ (−1,ρ′′(x∗)) or ρ∈ (ρ′′(x∗),ρ′(x∗)),
g′(x∗) is either greater or smaller than -1. To judge in which interval g′(x∗) is smaller
or greater than -1, let us recall the derivative of g−1
′


























(x∗) increases with respect to ρ. Because at ρ = ρ′′(x∗), g−1
′
(x∗) =
−1, for all ρ∈ (ρ′′(x∗)−ε,ρ′′(x∗)), g−1′(x∗)<−1, and for all ρ∈ (ρ′′(x∗),ρ′′(x∗)+ε),
g−1
′
(x∗) > −1. In addition, because ρ′′(x∗) is unique, this result can be extended to
the whole interval ρ ∈ (−1,1). Thus, for all ρ ∈ (−1,ρ′′(x∗)), g−1′(x∗)<−1, and for
all ρ ∈ (ρ′′(x∗),1), g−1′(x∗)>−1.
The relationship between ρ′(x∗) and ρ′′(x∗): Recall that ρ′(x∗)> 0. If ρ′′(x∗)≤ 0,
then it is certain that ρ′(x∗)> ρ′′(x∗). If ρ′′(x∗) is positive, g−1
′
(x∗) increases with re-
spect to ρ when ρ > 0 and at ρ = ρ′(x∗), g−1
′
(x∗) = 0, and at ρ = ρ′′(x∗), g−1
′
(x∗) =
−1. Therefore, ρ′(x∗) > ρ′′(x∗) if ρ′′(x∗) > 0. In conclusion, if M > D, ρ′(x∗) is al-
ways strictly greater than ρ′′(x∗).
Because ς = ς∗, both players’ ρ′(x∗) and ρ′′(x∗) function are identical. Therefore,








D−M ) has the following property: given an x
∗ ∈ R and ρ ∈ (−1,1),
if ρ < ρ′′(x∗), g′(x∗) > −1; if ρ′′(x∗) < ρ < ρ′(x∗), g′(x∗) < −1; if ρ = ρ′′(x∗),
g′(x∗) =−1; if ρ = ρ′(x∗), g′(x∗) = ∞; and if ρ > ρ′(x∗), g′(x∗)> 0. Q.E.D.
Lemma D2: For M > D, for all ρ ∈ [0,ρ′(x∗)], g′(x∗) decreases from a negative
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value to −∞, and for all ρ ∈ (ρ′(x∗),1), g′(x∗) decreases from +∞ to 1.
Proof: From the proof of Lemma D1, it has been known that given an x∗ ∈ R,
g−1
′
(x∗) increases with respect to ρ for ρ∈ [0,1) and it is continuous with respect to ρ.
Therefore, g′(x∗) must perform decreasing property in the interval ρ∈ [0,1). At ρ = 0,
g−1
′
(x∗)< 0 and hence g′(x∗)< 0; at ρ = ρ′(x∗), g−1
′
(x∗) = 0 and hence g′(x∗) = ∞;
and at ρ = 1, g−1
′
(x∗) = 1 and hence g′(x∗) = 1. Therefore, for function g′(x∗), there
is a discontinuity point at ρ = ρ′(x∗). For ρ ∈ [0,ρ′(x∗)), g′(x∗) should decrease from
a negative value to −∞, and for ρ ∈ (ρ′(x∗),1), g′(x∗) should decrease from +∞ to 1.
Q.E.D.
Lemma D3: For M > D, given an x∗ ∈ R, g′(x∗) is concave for ρ ∈ (−1,0). It
reaches its maximum value at ρ =− 1√
1+A2
.




















0, and for ρ < 0, g−1
′




dρ2 < 0 for ρ ∈ (−1,0). Hence, g
′(x∗)
is concave for all ρ ∈ (−1,0). Further, by calculating the first-order condition, it is
found that g−1
′










2) reaches its maximum
value at ρ =− 1√
1+A2








2). We denote this ρ
by ρ′′′(x). Thus, given an x∗ ∈ R, the function g′(x∗) reaches its maximum value at
ρ′′′(x) =− 1√
1+A2




For M > D, according to Lemmas D1, D2 and D3, the shape of g′(x∗) with respect
to ρ given an x∗ ∈ R can be generally represented as shown in Figure D1.
Lemma D4: Given an x∗ ∈ R and assuming M > D, for g(x∗) ∈ (−M+D2 ,−D],
dρ′(x∗)
dg(x∗) > 0 and
dρ′′(x∗)
dg(x∗) > 0; for g(x
∗) ∈ [−M,−M+D2 ),
dρ′(x∗)
dg(x∗) < 0 and
dρ′′(x∗)
dg(x∗) < 0.
Proof: Let us recall that ρ′(x∗) = − A√
1+A2
and ρ′′(x∗) = A
2−1
































1− 2A2+1 , as A increases, ρ
′(x∗) decreases and ρ′′(x∗) decreases. Hence, dρ
′(x∗)
dA < 0
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Figure D1: A general geometric description of function g′(x∗) with respect to ρ for
M > D given an x∗ ∈ R.
and dρ
′′(x∗)
dA < 0. If g(x
∗)<−M+D2 ,
dA
dg(x∗) > 0 and if g(x
∗)>−M+D2 ,
dA
dg(x∗) < 0; there-
fore, if g(x∗) ∈ (−M+D2 ,−D],
dρ′(x∗)
dg(x∗) > 0 and
dρ′′(x∗)
dg(x∗) > 0, and if g(x
∗) ∈ [−M,−M+D2 ),
dρ′(x∗)
dg(x∗) < 0 and
dρ′′(x∗)
dg(x∗) < 0. Hence, at g(x
∗) = −M+D2 , both ρ
′(x∗) and ρ′′(x∗) reach
their global minimum value with respect to g(x∗). The minimum values of ρ′(x∗) and





2πς∗2+(M−D)2 , respectively. Q.E.D.
Based on Lemmas D1 and D4, Figure D2 generally depicts functions ρ′(x∗) and
ρ′′(x∗) with respect to g(x∗). According to Lemmas D1, D2 and D3, given an x∗ ∈ R
and hence g(x∗), as ρ increases from -1 to 1, for ρ ∈ (−1,ρ′′(x∗)), −1 < g′(x∗) < 0;
for ρ ∈ (ρ′′(x∗),ρ′(x∗)), g′(x∗)<−1; for ρ ∈ (ρ′(x∗),+∞), g′(x∗)> 0. At ρ = ρ′′(x∗),
g′(x∗) =−1 and at ρ = ρ′(x∗), g′(x∗) = ∞. According to these properties, the general
shape of g′(x∗) can be illustrated by Figure D2. We choose an arbitrary value of g(x∗)
between−M and−D, and at this chosen g(x∗), we draw a vertical line from -1 to 1 (the
red line in Figure D2). The curves ρ′′(x∗) and ρ′(x∗) dissect this line into three parts,
on which g′(x∗)>−1, g′(x∗)<−1 and g′(x∗)> 0 from bottom to top. Because g(x∗)
is arbitrarily chosen, this result applies for all g(x∗) ∈ [−M,−D]. Therefore, it can be
concluded that given M, D, ς and ς∗, for all g(x∗) ∈ [−M,−D], if ρ ∈ (−1,ρ′′(x∗)),
g′(x∗)>−1 and correspondingly it is the area below the curve ρ′′(x∗) in Figure D2; for
all g(x∗)∈ [−M,−D], if ρ∈ (ρ′′(x∗),ρ′(x∗)), g′(x∗)<−1 and correspondingly it is the
area between the curve ρ′′(x∗) and the curve ρ′(x∗); finally, for all g(x∗) ∈ [−M,−D],
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if ρ ∈ (ρ′(x∗),1), g′(x∗)> 0 and correspondingly it is the area above the curve ρ′(x∗).
Figure D2: A general geometric description of functions ρ′(x∗) and ρ′′(x∗) with
respect to g(x∗) for M > D.
Lemma D5: For M > D, given a ρ ∈ [minρ′′(x∗),1), there are one or two values





Proof: Given M, D, ς and ς∗, if there are g(x∗)s whose derivative g′(x∗) =−1, then
























2πς∗2 ≥ 1, where the latter equality
is held if and only if ρ = minρ′′(x∗) = 2πς
∗2−(M−D)2







2πς∗2 , and Φ
−1(D+g(x
∗)















D. Note that g(x∗)1 ≤ g(x∗)2, where the equality is obtained as long as ρ = minρ′′(x∗).
Q.E.D.
Remark: Given all primitives, Lemma D5 must be held in the subinterval ρ ∈
[minρ′′(x∗),minρ′(x∗)] as well.
Lemma D6: Given a ρ ∈ (minρ′(x∗),1) if M > D, there are two values of g(x∗)
168 Appendix D. Appendix of Chapter 2 Proof of Proposition 2







ρ = minρ′(x∗) for M > D, at g(x∗) =−M+D2 , g
′(x∗) = ∞.
Proof: Given M, D, ς and ς∗, if there are g(x∗)s whose derivative g′(x∗) =∞, which
means 1g′(x∗) = 0, then the corresponding ρ ∈ (minρ
′(x∗),1) for M > D, and the g(x∗)
should simultaneously satisfy ρ = −A√
1+A2



























2πς∗2 ≥ 1, where the latter equality is held if and only if ρ = minρ
′(x∗) =√
2πς∗2
































2πς∗2 )−D. Note that for M > D, g(x
∗)1 ≤
g(x∗)2, where the equality is obtained as long as ρ = minρ′(x∗). If the equality is held,
g(x∗) = g(x∗)1 = g(x∗)2 =−M+D2 . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: According to Figure D2 and results from Lemmas D5 and
D6, we obtain the following conclusion about the shape of g(x∗) given M, D, ς and ς∗
for all ρ ∈ (−1,1):
1) for ρ ∈ (−1,minρ′′(x∗)), −1 < g′(x∗)< 0 globally;
2) for ρ ∈ [minρ′′(x∗),minρ′(x∗)],




2πς∗2 )−D), −1 < g
′(x∗)< 0;














2πς∗2 )−D,−D], −1 < g
′(x∗)< 0;






3) for ρ ∈ (minρ′(x∗),1),







































It is straightforward to find that the description of the shape of g(x∗) is still held
even if the payoff specification for both players is asymmetric, because from Lemmas
D1 to D6, we only focus on studying the properties of a single best response function.
In the following, we will prove that the shape of g(x∗) in 3), the non-monotonic
g(x∗), contradicts the definition of the cutoff strategy concept; hence, for the symmet-
ric strategic substitutes game, using the cutoff strategy concept to solve the game is
valid if and only if ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̃].




∗|ε)dε∗. These formulations are exeactly following the defini-
tion of the cutoff strategy concept in the paper. The definition of the cutoff strategy just
states that a player’s action choice should monotonically non-decrease with respect to
the player type. It does not explicitly state that at the equilibrium, given one player’s
cutoff strategy x∗, another player’s best response g(x∗) should be unique. However,
if given an opponent’s strategy, there are more than one best responses, this situation
naturally fails the definition of the cutoff strategy. For example, given an opponent’s
strategy ε∗, there are two cutoff strategies (best responses) towards ε∗, ε1 and ε2, where
ε1 < ε2, such that EΠ(ε∗,ε) = 0 and ε ∈ {ε1,ε2}. Then, for a payoff shock ε ∈ (ε1,ε2),
according to the definition of the cutoff strategy, because ε > ε1, the player should
choose being active, but because ε < ε2, the player chooses being inactive, leading to
a contradiction. Therefore, the definition of the cutoff strategy has implicitly dictated
that if a cutoff strategy is adopted, given one player’s cutoff strategy, the other player’s
best response should be unique. This conclusion is held irrespective of the specifica-
tion of payoffs.
As long as ρ /∈ Γ, in the proof of Proposition 1 (Appendix B), we have proven
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that given x∗ ∈ R, as ε increases from −∞ to +∞, EΠ(x∗,ε) first increases, then de-
creases, and finally increases. In addition, we showed that in the strategic substitutes
game, for all ρ > ρ̃, as g(x∗) decreases from−D to−M, function g(x∗) first decreases,
then increases, and finally decreases. In fact, the change of monotonicity of EΠ(x∗,ε)












g′(x∗)≶ 0 for M > D, and vice versa.
Solving the symmetric game for all ρ > ρ̃, there still exists a symmetric solution
that satisfies x∗ = g(x∗). However, at this symmetric solution, g′(x∗)> 0, because for













In addition, because ρ2 > 2πς
2















get g′(x∗)|g(x∗)=0 > 0. For M > D, if we regard g′(x∗) as a function with respect to
variable g2(x∗), ∂g
′(x∗)
∂g2(x∗) > 0, then for any symmetric solution (s,s), g
′(x∗)|g(x∗)=s ≥
g′(x∗)|g(x∗)=0 > 0. Therefore, for the symmetric strategic substitutes game, as long as
ρ > ρ̃, at the symmetric solution (s,s), the derivative g′(s) > 0, and correspondingly,
∂EΠ(s,ε)
∂ε
|ε=s < 0. So as long as ρ > ρ̃, given a symmetric solution (s,s) such that the
equation EΠ(s,ε) = 0 has a solution ε = s, according to the proof of Proposition 1 in
Appendix B, without loss of generality, function EΠ(s,ε) is simply the red curve in
Figure B2, and ε = s is the middle intersection point where the expected payoff func-
tion decreases. Therefore, if we still use a cutoff strategy to solve the game for ρ > ρ̃,
we will always get a symmetric solution (s,s), for which function EΠ(s,ε) = 0 has
three values of ε, including ε = s, that make the equation hold; more importantly, the
symmetric solution (s,s) itself contradicts the cutoff strategy definition under which it
is derived. Therefore, we cannot use the cutoff strategy concept to solve the symmetric
strategic substitutes game for ρ > ρ̃ given M > D and ς = ς∗. This supplements the
existing proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix B, and the proof of Proposition 1 is now
complete.
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As long as the strategic substitutes game is symmetric, the conclusions 1) and 2)
constitute Proposition 2. However, if the payoff specification is asymmetric, these
results are still held for describing a single player’s g(x∗) function as these results are
derived by studying only a single g(x∗) function. Hence, Proposition 2 is held in asym-
metric payoff settings also. Q.E.D.

Appendix E
Appendix of Chapter 2
Uniqueness/Multiplicity and Stability
of Equilibrium
Lemma E1 (Correspondence between the Position of Symmetric Equilibrium and
the Sign of M+D ): We denote the symmetric equilibrium of the strategic substitutes
game by (s,s). There is a one-to-one correspondence relationship between the position
of the symmetric equilibrium and the sign of M +D, which is M +D R 0 if and only
if 0R sR−M+D2 .
Proof: Let us recall the (inverse) best response function g(x∗) that is expressed




D−M ). We denote symmetric equilibria by (s,s).
It should satisfy g(s) = s. Hence, we get s = ρg(s) + ς∗
√
1−ρ2Φ−1(D+g(s)D−M ). Af-
ter a series of transformation of the previous equation, we get the following results









D−M . Apparently, the symmetric equilibrium (s,s) can be equivalently re-















Note that the function y= DD−M +
s
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Hence, the relative position between y = DD−M +
s





ς∗ ) depends on
the sign of M+D, and therefore, the position of the symmetric equilibrium should have
some relationship with the sign of M +D as well. Figures E1, E2 and E3 illurstrate
all possibilities of the positions of symmetric equilibrium (s,s) in terms of M+D > 0,
M+D = 0 and M+D < 0, respectively (see Figures E1, E2 and E3).
According to the analysis from Figures E1–E3, it can be concluded that 1) in the
symmetric strategic substitutes game, there always exists a unique symmetric equilib-
rium; and 2) the position of symmetric equilibrium (s,s) and the sign of M +D have
the following correspondence relationship: M+DR 0⇐⇒ 0R sR−M+D2 . Q.E.D.
Remark: The proof and result of Lemma E1 also apply to the case where ρ > ρ̃
for M > D. Hence, we can extend the results in Lemma E1 to the region where it is
illegitimate to use the cutoff strategy concept to solve the game and correspondingly
the ‘symmetric equilibrium’ should be called ‘symmetric solution’ instead.
Lemma E2: Assume M > D and ς = ς∗. Define function g(x∗;C), which is ex-




D−M ), where C is








decreases with respect to x∗ ∈ R. For the equation system












there always exists a unique solution which satisfies g(x∗;C) = x∗. We call it the
symmetric solution. If there exists other solutions, for which g(x∗;C) 6= x∗, they must
appear in even number. We call these solutions the asymmetric solution.






is the function that satsifies F(x∗;g(x∗;C)) = 0. Analogous to the proof of Proposition
1, it is easy to show that as long as ρ ≤ ρ̃, F(x∗,ε) globally increases with respect to
ε ∈ R and g(x∗;C) globally decreases with respect to x∗ ∈ R. Here, we do not go into
details about these results, and interested readers could refer the proof of Proposition
1 to verify these results.
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Figure E1: Given M > D, ς = ς∗, ρ and M +D > 0, there always exists a unique









D−M , which indicates that
the symmetric equilibrium always exists and it is unique under the given conditions,
and symmetric equilibrium (s,s) must satisfy −M+D2 < s < 0.
Figure E2: Given M > D, ς = ς∗, ρ and M +D = 0, there always exists a unique










indicates that the symmetric equilibrium always exists and it is unique under the given
conditions. Moreover, symmetric equilibrium (s,s) must satisfy −M+D2 = s = 0.
The two equations in equation group E2 can be regarded as the two players’ best
response functions. They are symmetrically located around the 45◦ line. By referring
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Figure E3: Given M > D, ς = ς∗, ρ and M +D < 0, there always exists a unique









D−M , which indicates that
the symmetric equilibrium always exists and it is unique under the given conditions,
and symmetric equilibrium (s,s) must satisfy 0 < s <−M+D2 .
to the proof of Lemma E1, it is known that the symmetric solution g(x∗;C) = x∗ always
exists and it is unique for all ρ≤ ρ̃.
If there exist solutions other than the symmetric solution, it is certain that for these
solutions, g(x∗;C) 6= x∗. If we get one asymmetric solution, then we can get another
one correponding to it by simply switching players’ identities. Therefore, if there exist
asymmetric solutions, they must appear in pairs, and hence the number of asymmetric
solutions must be in even number.
If C = DD−M , then g(x
∗;C) becomes the best response function g(x∗) of the game
we are analysing. Therefore, it can also be concluded that if there exist asymmetric
equilibria, they must appear in even number. Q.E.D.
Lemma E3: In the symmetric strategic substitutes game, if there exist asymmet-
ric equilibria, their number is two. Given all primitives, the necessary and sufficient
condition that the symmetric equilibrium is not unstable is that the game only contains
a unique equilibrium, which is the symmetric equilibrium. Given all primitives, the
necessary and sufficient condition that the symmetric equilibrium is unstable is that
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the game exhibits multiple (three) equilibria.












transform g(x∗) into polar coordinate representation. We define x∗= r cosθ and g(x∗)=
r sinθ, where r ≥ 0 is the radius and θ is the radian. Hence, the best response function





































Therefore, the best response function can be equivalently represented by p(θ,r) =
D
D−M . Because a player’s and the opponent’s best response functions should be sym-
metric around the line g(x∗) = x∗ (i.e. the 45◦ line) in Cartesian coordinates, denoting





r), the opponent’s best response function can be repre-
sented by q(θ,r) = DD−M . Hence, the equilibria of the game (θ,r) are simultaneously
determined by functions p(θ,r) = DD−M and q(θ,r) =
D
D−M .
For the function g(x∗,C), if there exists a point (x∗,g(x∗,C)) that reaches (0,0)
with zero distance, i.e. r = 0, it must be unique according to the monotonicity of func-
tion g(x∗;C) for all ρ ≤ ρ̃. Therefore, according to Lemma E2, because asymmetric
solutions must appear in pairs, their radius does not equal zero. Therefore, in this
proof, we only need to consider the r > 0 situation.
In terms of all possible values of the radian of asymmetric equilibria (θ,r), the best
response function g(x∗) can be separated into the following two cases:
In Case I, the radian of the symmetric equilibrium is 54π, and in Case II, it is
π
4 .
The range of radians for possible asymmetric equilibrium is θ ∈ [34π,
7
4π] in Case I and
θ ∈ [−π4 ,
3
4π) in Case II. In addition, it is necessary that a pair of asymmetric equilibria
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Figure E4: Case I: The value of radian θ ranges in θ ∈ [34π,
7
4π].
Figure E5: Case II: The value of radian θ ranges in θ ∈ [−π4 ,
3
4π).
(θ1,r) and (θ2,r) must satisfy θ2− 54π =
5




4 − θ1 in
Case II.
Let us first study Case I. Since the asymmetric equilibria must be symmetrically
located around the 45◦ line (in Cartesian coordinates), we first focus on θ ∈ [π, 32π],




Given radius r > 0, we have p′
θ
































































Next, we prove that given an arbitrary value of r > 0, for θ ∈ [34π,
7
4π], p(θ,r) first
decreases with respect to θ until θ̄ ∈ (π, 32π), and then increases. For the first step, we

































r) < 0 and hence l′
θ
(θ,r) < 0 for all θ in this range. If






r)> 0, and hence l′
θ
(θ,r)> 0
for all θ in this range. Only when θ = π+arctan 1
ρ
, l(θ,r) reaches its global maximum









, sinθ =− 1√
1+ρ2
,
and cosθ = − ρ√
1+ρ2
. Hence, for θ = π+ arctan 1
ρ



























r). Because ρ > 0, l(32π,r) > l(π,r) > 0. Without loss of general-
ity, function l(θ,r) is geometrically represented by Figure E6.
We can equivalently express p′
θ


















T − cosθM−D ; In addition, as p
′
θ
(π,r) < 0 and p′
θ
(32π,r) > 0,






























M−D . Therefore, combining the above analysis,
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Figure E6: A general geometric representation of function l(θ,r) with respect to θ
given r > 0 in θ ∈ [π, 32π]. The monotonicity, the position of the optimum (i.e. the




2π) for all ρ ∈ (0,1)),
and the relationship l(π,r) < l(32π,r) are always maintained for any parameter
specification of l(θ,r).
there exist two possibilities about the relative positions between curves − cosθM−D and
l(θ,r) for all θ ∈ [π, 32π], and these two possibilities indicate two types of shapes of
function p(θ,r). They are, respectively, described by Figures E7 and E8.
Which shape of p(θ,r) is correct, the one in Case 1 or in Case 2?
In Case 1, if we draw an arbitrary horizontal line p(θ,r) = C, we can get at most
two intersection points between the line and function p(θ,r), which equivalently mean
that there are at most two points on function g(x∗;C) that reach the origin (0,0) (in
Cartesian coordinates) with distance r. However, in Case 2, it is possible that we get
three or four intersection points on p(θ,r) by drawing a horizontal line p(θ,r) = C,
which means that there may exist three or four points on g(x∗;C) that reaches the ori-
gin (0,0) with distance r. In fact, it is impossible that the shape of p(θ,r) is of the
one in Case 2, because as long as ρ ≤ ρ̃, g(x∗;C) globally decreases with respect to
x∗. Hence, the number of intersections between g(x∗;C) and any circle with center
(0,0) and radius r > 0 is always two (see Figure E9). Therefore, the shape of Case
2 is incorrect and the shape of Case 1 is correct. Hence, p(θ,r) has only one interior
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Figure E7: Case 1: One possibility of the relative position between func-
tion l(θ,r) and − cosθM−D for ρ > 0 and θ ∈ [π,
3
2π], and the corresponding shape
of function p(θ,r), where there just exists one interior optimum. The signs











r− (− r cosθM−D ). Note that by far, we do not know




optimum (exactly a minimum value) for all θ ∈ (π, 32π). We denote the θ where p(θ,r)
reaches its (interior) minimum value by θ̄. Hence, given r > 0, p(θ,r) decreases from
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Figure E8: Case 2: Another possibility of the relative position between
function l(θ,r) and − cosθM−D for ρ > 0 and θ ∈ [π,
3
2π], and the corresponding
shape of function p(θ,r), where there exist three interior optima. The signs











r− (− r cosθM−D ). Note that by far, we do not know




π to θ̄, and then increases from θ̄ to 32π. θ̄ could be either greater than or equal to
5
4π,
or smaller than 54π.
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Figure E9: The number of intersections between g(x∗;C) and any circle with center
(0,0) and radius r > 0 is always two. Therefore, it is impossible that equation
p(θ,r) = C has three or four solutions for all C ∈ R. This result is held for all
θ ∈ [−π4 ,
7
4π].
What is the shape of p(θ,r) if ρ ≤ 0? In the following we prove that the previous
conclusion that p(θ,r) performs a ‘U’ shape for ρ > 0 in θ ∈ [π, 32π] is still estab-
lished for ρ ≤ 0 in θ ∈ [π, 32π]. For all θ ∈ [π,
3





r) ≥ 0, and hence l′
θ
(θ,r) ≥ 0, where all of these equalities



















r). Since ρ ≤ 0, l(π,r) ≤ 0 < l(32π,r). Without loss
of generality, Figure E10 geometrically describes the relationship between l(θ,r) and
− cosθM−D for ρ ≤ 0. It can be observed that, as long as ρ ≤ 0, for all θ ∈ [π,
3
2π], l(θ,r)
and − cosθM−D always have a unique intersection point in θ ∈ (π,
3
2π). It is denoted by θ̄.
Therefore, if ρ ≤ 0, for all θ ∈ [π, θ̄], p(θ,r) decreases, and for all θ ∈ (θ̄, 32π], p(θ,r)
increases (see Figure E10).





It is already known that for r > 0, p′
θ










all θ ∈ (32π,
7
4π], 0 < cosθ <
√
2
2 , and −1 < sinθ <−
√
2
2 . Whether ρ is positive or not,
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Figure E10: The relative position between function l(θ,r) and − cosθM−D , and the
corresponding shape of function p(θ,r) for ρ ≤ 0 and θ ∈ [π, 32π]. The signs











r− (− r cosθM−D ). Note that by far, we do not know










For all θ ∈ [34π,π], 0 < sinθ <
√
2
2 and −1 < cosθ <−
√
2
2 . If ρ≤ 0, then −sinθ−
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ρcosθ < 0, which indicates p′
θ
(θ,r) < 0. If ρ > 0, then for all θ ∈ [34π,π− arctanρ),
−sinθ−ρcosθ < 0, and for all θ ∈ [π− arctanρ,π], −sinθ−ρcosθ≥ 0. Therefore,
for all θ ∈ [34π,π− arctanρ), p
′
θ




















dominates r cosθM−D , then p
′
θ
(θ,r)> 0. Based on these analysis, we get two possible shapes
of p(θ,r) given r > 0 as shown in Figures E11 and E12, respectively.
Again, for shapes like that of Case 2 (see Figure E12), where there are three optima,
it indicates that there could be more than two points on g(x∗;C) that reaches (0,0) with
distance r, and as what we have proven, it is impossible. Therefore, the ‘U’ shape is
the only correct shape of function p(θ,r) in θ ∈ [34π,
7





p(θ,r) decreases as θ increases from 34π to θ̄, and then increases from θ̄ to
7
4π, where
θ̄ ∈ (π, 32π).
Can there be more than one pair of asymmetric equilibria (θ1,r) and (θ2,r) if they
exist? To answer this question, first let us recall that a pair of asymmetric equilibria, if
























In addition, it is necessary that the radians of the pair of asymmetric equilibria θ1
and θ2 satisfy that θ2− 54π =
5
4π−θ1. Then, let us check whether given a pair of asym-
metric equilibria (θ1, r̃) and (θ2, r̃), there exists another pair of asymmetric equilibria
(θ′1, r̃
′) and (θ′2, r̃
′) that satisfies equation group E.3. If r is successively changed away
from r̃, the new solutions that satisfy p(θ,r) = DD−M (or q(θ,r) =
D







1, then it is certain that there exists only one pair of asymmetric equi-
libria, if they exist.
We first analyse the case when θ ∈ [π, 32π]. Since the functions p(θ,r) and q(θ,r)





mirror image to the part of q(θ,r) for θ ∈ [π, 54π), i.e. p(θ,r) = q(
5
2π−θ,r). Then, if
we restrict θ within the range θ ∈ [π, 54π), we can analyze the change of p(θ,r) for all
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θ ∈ [54π,
3
2π] via the corresponding change of q(θ,r) for all θ ∈ [π,
5
4π).

































Given an arbitrary value of r > 0, functions ∂p(θ,r)
∂r and
∂q(θ,r)
∂r with respect to θ inter-








M−D > 0. Therefore, if and




∂r , otherwise, the two functions do not intersect. There-












∂r < 0, for all r > 0.
Suppose at r = r̃, we get asymmetric equilibria (θ1, r̃) and (θ2, r̃), where θ1 < θ2.
Then, θ2− 54π =
5
4π− θ1. Hence, for all θ ∈ [π,
5
4π), given any value of θ, if r suc-
cessively increases, q(θ,r) decreases more than p(θ,r), which equivalently means that
p(52π− θ,r) decreases more than p(θ,r) for all θ ∈ [π,
5
4π) given the same amount
of change of r. Therefore, as r is increased away from r̃ successively, for any new
intersection points (θ′1,r) and (θ
′











conversely, if we decrease r away from r̃ successively, p(θ,r) increases less than
p(52π−θ,r) for all θ∈ [π,
5
4π]; hence, for any new pair of intersection points (θ
′′
1,r) and










1 (see Figure E13). Therefore, given
primitives M, D, ς, ς∗ and ρ, if we have found a pair of asymmetric equilibria (θ1,r)
and (θ2,r), we cannot find another pair of asymmetric equilibria for all θ ∈ [π, 32π].
How about case when given r̃, one asymmetric equilibrium θ1 ∈ [34π,π), and an-
other asymmetric equilibrium θ2 ∈ [32π,
7
4π]? Again, if the present asymmetric equi-
libria are (θ1, r̃) and (θ2, r̃), can there exist another pair of asymmetric equilibria by
changing the radius r given the same primitives M, D, ς, ς∗ and ρ? In the following,
we prove that in this case, we still obtain only one pair of asymmetric equilibria if they
exist.
As before, it is known that p(θ,r) = q(52π− θ,r). Hence, we can still study the
187
properties and the movement of p(θ,r) in θ ∈ [32π,
7
4π] through its mirror image q(θ,r)




























































































∂r . Therefore, based on these results, we can conclude that 1) given
r > 0, function ∂p(θ,r)
∂r decreases more rapidly than
∂q(θ,r)






∂r > 0 >
∂q( 34 π,r)






∂r . Figure E14 gives
a general description of functions ∂p(θ,r)
∂r and
∂q(θ,r)
∂r for all θ ∈ [
3
4π,π] given r > 0.
Given primitives M, D, ς, ς∗ and ρ, suppose we already get one pair of asymmetric




4π]. According to the
above analysis, if r is increased away from r̃ successively, the new intersection point θ′2
is obtained as θ2 increases, while another intersection point θ′1 is obtained from θ1 but
θ1 may increase or decrease and hence θ′1 ≷ θ1. No matter how θ1 changes, θ2 always
moves faster than θ1 and along a fixed direction. Therefore, as r increases, the new
intersection points θ′1 and θ
′









(see Figure E15). The same conclusion can still be obtained by decreasing r away
from r̃. Hence, if there exists a pair of asymmetric equilibria (θ1, r̃) and (θ2, r̃), where




4π], there would never exist any other asymmetric equilibria
for all θ ∈ [34π,
7
4π].
In conclusion, for all θ ∈ [34π,
7
4π], given all primitives (M, D, ς, ς
∗ and ρ), if asym-
metric equilibria exist, the number of asymmetric equilibria is two.
Next, it is natural to ask, under what conditions asymmetric equilibria exist. The







188Appendix E. Appendix of Chapter 2Uniqueness/Multiplicity and Stability of Equilibrium
Then, geometrically, asymmetric equilibria should be the intersections of the fol-
lowing three curves: y = p(θ,r), y = q(θ,r) and y = DD−M . According to the possible





discuss how asymmetric equilibria arise in the following two distinctive conjectures.





In this case, if the symmetric equilibrium is stable, then there must exist asymmet-
















0 decreases to 0. If at r = r̂, l(54π, r̂)<−
cos 54 π




as r increases away from r̂, the relationship l(54π,r)<−
cos 54 π
M−D is held for all r > r̂, and
therefore, p′
θ
(54π,r) < 0 for all r > r̂; and 2) because p
′
θ
(54π,r) < 0, the asymmetric
equilibrium candidates always exist. The asymmetric equilibrium candidates are the
two extreme intersection points between p(θ,r) and q(θ,r), and correspondingly the
middle intersection point is the symmetric equilibrium candidate. Since ∂p(θ,r)
∂r < 0
for all θ ∈ [54π,τ2] and
∂q(θ,r)
∂r < 0 for all θ ∈ [τ1,
5
4π], the entire function of p(θ,r)
in θ ∈ [54π,τ2] and q(θ,r) in θ ∈ [τ1,
5
4π] decreases as r increases. Therefore, sup-
pose the symmetric equilibrium is obtained at r = r̄, i.e. it is (54π, r̄), and it satisfies
p′
θ
(54π, r̄) < 0. Then, as r increases away from r̄, the asymmetric equilibrium can-
didates fall from positions above the line y = DD−M to the positions below the line
y = DD−M . Therefore, there must exist a moment such that the asymmetric equilibrium
candidates pass the line y = DD−M . At that moment, which is recorded by the relevant
value of r, the asymmetric equilibrium candidates formally become the asymmetric
equilibria that satisfy equation group E.3 (see Figure E16); 3) We denote the symmet-
ric equilibrium (candidate) by (s,s), and equivalently it is denoted by (54π,r) in polar
coordinate representation. According to the following equivalence relationship at the




















(54π, r̄)< 0 means that the symmetric equilibrium is stable. In conclusion,
as long as p(τ1,r) < p(τ2,r), if the symmetric equilibrium is stable, then there must
exist asymmetric equilibria.
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However, this conjecture is in fact not correct. Because a fact we have already
established is that as long as the best response function is a contraction, there always
exists a unique equilibrium. It is symmetric and must be stable. Therefore, for the con-
traction case, the symmetric equilibrium is stable and no other equilibria exist. Hence,
the conjecture 1 that p(τ1,r)< p(τ2,r) is incorrect.





Since conjecture 1 is incorrect, conjecture 2 must be the correct property of p(θ,r).
In this case, if there is no asymmetric equilibrium candidate, p′
θ
(54π,r)≤ 0 must hold,
and if there exist asymmetric equilibria candidates, p′
θ
(54π,r) > 0 must hold (see Fig-
ures E17 and E18, respectively).
Remember that as r increases, l(54π,r) decreases. Therefore, supposing at r = r̂,
l(54π, r̂) > −
cos 54 π
M−D , i.e. p
′
θ




decrease gradually from p′
θ
(54π, r̂) > 0 to p
′
θ
(54π, r̂) = 0, and finally to p
′
θ
(54π, r̂) < 0.
If there is no asymmetric equilibrium, it is because at r = 0, l(54π,0) ≤ −
cos 54 π
M−D , and
hence no asymmetric equilibrium candidate exists. Therefore, in this case, as r in-
creases, no asymmetric equilibrium candidates will appear certainly. Alternatively,
it is because as r increases from 0, at the beginning, there were asymmetric equilib-
rium candidates, but before the symmetric equilibrium candidates (54π,r) passes the
line y = DD−M , p
′
θ
(54π,r) changes from a positive value to a non-positive value, and
thereafter, asymmetric equilibrium candidates vanish; consequently, only a symmet-
ric equilibrium candidate exists, and hence the game will have only one equilibrium,
which is symmetric. For both possibilities, the corresponding symmetric equilibrium
(54π, r̄) must satisfy p
′
θ
(54π, r̄) ≤ 0. Let us recall that for the symmetric equilibrium
(candidate) (s,s), g′(s)T−1 ⇐⇒ p′
θ
(54π,r)S 0. Therefore, it can be concluded that
if there is no asymmetric equilibrium, the relevant symmetric equilibrium must be not
unstable, which means it is either stable or stability is not determined.
Conversely, if the symmetric equilibrium is not unstable, there are no asymmet-
ric equilibria, because 1) as long as the symmetric equilibrium is not unstable, i.e.
g′(s) ≥ −1, p′
θ
(54π, r̄) ≤ 0, and therefore, no asymmetric equilibrium candidate exists
when r = r̄; and 2) since the symmetric equilibrium is not unstable, i.e. p′
θ
(54π, r̄)≤ 0,
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if r increases away from r̄, based on the previous analysis, p′
θ
(54π,r)< 0 must be held;
hence, asymmetric equilibrium candidates would never appear. Therefore, an asym-
metric equilibrium is impossible to exist and only a symmetric equilibrium survives if
p′
θ
(54π, r̄)≤ 0, i.e. the symmetric equilibrium is not unstable.
In conclusion, given all primitives and for all θ ∈ [34π,
7
4π], the symmetric strategic
substitutes game contains only a unique equilibrium that must be symmetric if and only
if the symmetric equilibrium is not unstable, and equivalently, asymmetric equilibria
exist if and only if the relevant symmetric equilibrium is unstable.
Then, we study Case II, where θ ∈ [−π4 ,
3
4π]. Since the asymmetric equilibria are
symmetrically located around the 45◦ line (in Cartesian coordinates), we first study the










































ς∗2(1−ρ2)) > 0. Therefore, for all ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̃],
p′
θ




























































We then prove that given any r > 0, for all θ ∈ [−π4 ,
3
4π], p(θ,r) first increases until
θ̄ ∈ (0, π2 ), and then decreases. In the first step, we restrict our focus within θ ∈ (0,
π
2 ).












r)> 0 and hence l′
θ
(θ,r)> 0 in θ ∈ (arctan 1
ρ
, π2 ). If cosθ−ρsinθ >






r) < 0, and hence l′
θ
(θ,r) < 0. Therefore, only




2 ), l(θ,r) reaches its global minimum value for all θ ∈ [0,
π
2 ].








, sinθ = 1√
1+ρ2





1+ρ2 at θ = arctan 1
ρ
. Therefore, l(arctan 1
ρ


















r). As ρ > 0, l(π2 ,r) <
l(0,r) < 0. Based on these properties, Figure E19 generally describes the function






















T− cosθM−D given r > 0, p
′
θ
(0,r)> 0 and p′
θ






























M−D . Given these properties, we find that for ρ > 0, there are two possibilities about
the relative positions between functions y = − cosθM−D and y = l(θ,r) for all θ ∈ [0,
π
2 ],
which give two possible shapes of p(θ,r). The two possible cases are described in
Figures E20 and E21, respectively.
Then, which shape of p(θ,r) is correct, Case 1 or Case 2?
As we have proven, if ρ≤ ρ̃, g(x∗;C) globally decreases with respect to x∗ ∈R and
there are at most two points on g(x∗;C) that reaches (0,0) with r > 0, which equiva-
lently means that p(θ,r) =C has two solutions at most. This result is applicable for the
case where θ ∈ [−π4 ,
3
4π) as well. Hence, the correct shape of p(θ,r) should be Case
1. In Case 2, it is possible that p(θ,r) = C contains three or four solutions because
y = p(θ,r) and y = C could have three or four intersection points, which contradicts
the fact that p(θ,r) =C at most has two solutions.





r)≤ 0, and so l′
θ


















r)< 0. Hence, if ρ≤ 0, y = l(θ,r) and y =− cosθM−D
will have only a unique intersection point. Based on these analysis, the top graph in
Figure E22 generally describes how y = l(θ,r) and y = − cosθM−D behave and intersect











(− r cosθM−D ), from the top graph, we can also obtain the results about the monotonicity
of p(θ,r) if ρ≤ 0, which is described by the bottom graph in Figure E22, where only
a unique interior optimum exists (see Figure E22). Therefore, in conclusion, for all
ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̃], p(θ,r) increases from 0 to θ̄, and then decreases from θ̄ to π2 .




4π]? It is already known
that p′
θ


















2 ≤ sinθ≤ 1. Moreover, irrespective of whether ρ is positive, sinθ+ρcosθ > 0.
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For θ∈ [−π4 ,0],−
√
2
2 ≤ sinθ≤ 0 and
√
2
2 ≤ cosθ≤ 1. If ρ≤ 0, then sinθ+ρcosθ<
0, which indicates that p′
θ
(θ,r)> 0. If ρ > 0, then for all θ ∈ [−π4 ,−arctanρ), sinθ+
ρcosθ < 0, and for all θ ∈ (−arctanρ,0], sinθ+ ρcosθ > 0, and at θ = −arctanρ,
sinθ + ρcosθ = 0. Therefore, for all θ ∈ [−π4 ,−arctanρ), p
′
θ
(θ,r) > 0. For all
























Again, according to these analyses, we get two possible shapes of p(θ,r) given r > 0,
which are shown in Figures E23 and E24.
Again, the shape in Case 2 is not established because there could be three or four
intersection points between y = p(θ,r) and y = C, where C is a constant, and thus,
equation p(θ,r) =C could contain three or four solutions, which indicates that corre-
spondingly in Cartesian coordinates, there could be three or four points on g(x∗;C) that
reaches (0,0) with distance r. This is impossible as long as ρ≤ ρ̃, as we have proven.
Therefore, in conclusion, for all θ ∈ [−π4 ,
3
4π], p(θ,r) increases with respect to θ from
−π4 to θ̄, and then decreases with respect to θ from θ̄ to
3
4π, where θ̄ ∈ (0,
π
2 ).
Is there more than one pair of asymmetric equilibria (θ1,r) and (θ2,r) if they ex-
























It is necessary that the radians θ1 and θ2 satisfy θ2− π4 =
π
4 −θ1. Then, the above
question becomes that given a pair of asymmetric equilibria (θ1, r̃) and (θ2, r̃), whether
there exists another pair of asymmetric equilibria (θ′1, r̃
′) and (θ′2, r̃
′) that satisfy the
same equation group. If r is successively changed away from r̃, and the new solutions
that satisfy p(θ,r) = DD−M (or q(θ,r) =
D









there certainly exists only one pair of asymmetric equilibria, and hence, the number of
asymmetric equilibria is two if asymmetric equilibria exist.
We first analyze the case of θ ∈ [0, π2 ]. Since the functions p(θ,r) and q(θ,r) are
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2 ] is the mirror image to the part of
q(θ,r) in θ ∈ [0, π4 ), i.e. p(θ,r) = q(
π
2 −θ,r). Then, methodologically, we can analyze
the change of p(θ,r) for all θ ∈ [π4 ,
π
2 ] via the corresponding change of q(θ,r) for all
θ ∈ [0, π4 ).

































For all r > 0, ∂p(θ,r)
∂r and
∂q(θ,r)































Suppose at r = r̃, we get symmetric equilibria (θ1, r̃) and (θ2, r̃), where θ1 < θ2.
Then, the two radians must satisfy θ2− π4 =
π
4 − θ1. Hence, for each θ ∈ [0,
π
4 ), if r
increases (or decreases), q(θ,r) increases (or decreases) more than p(θ,r). If we in-
crease (or decrease) r away from r̃ successively, since p(θ,r) increases (or decreases)




2 ], for any new pair of intersection points (θ
′
1,r)






















4 if r is decreased). Therefore, if we find a pair of
asymmetric equilibria, say (θ1,r) and (θ2,r), then given the same primitives M, D, ς,
ς∗ and ρ, we cannot find another pair of asymmetric equilibria for all θ ∈ [0, π2 ] (see
Figure E25).
Let us now look at the case when given all primitives and a pair of asymmetric
equilibria (θ1, r̃) and (θ2, r̃), where one asymmetric equilibrium’s radian θ1 ∈ [−π4 ,0]
and another asymmetric equilibrium’s radian θ2 ∈ [π2 ,
3
4π]. Can we find another pair of
asymmetric equilibria by changing r away from r̃? In the following, we prove that in
this case, we still get only one pair of asymmetric equilibria if they exist.
As before, it is known that by symmetry, p(θ,r) = q(π2−θ,r). Hence, we can study
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function p(θ,r) in θ∈ [π2 ,
3
4π] through its mirror image q(θ,r) in θ∈ [−
π
4 ,0). In the fol-




















































































M−D . Hence, by continuity, given
r > 0, ∂q(0,r)
∂r >
∂p(0,r)




∂r . Therefore, given r > 0, function
∂p(θ,r)
∂r increases more rapidly than
∂q(θ,r)
∂r as θ increases from −
π




∂r > 0 >
∂p(− π4 ,r)








Given primitives M, D, ς, ς∗ and ρ, suppose we already get one pair of asymmetric




4π]. According to Figure
E27, if r is increased away from r̃ successively, θ2 increases and the new intersection
point θ′2 > θ2, while θ1 could increase or decrease and the new intersection point θ
′
1
may be greater or smaller than θ1. No matter how θ1 changes, θ2 always moves faster
than θ1 and along a fixed direction. Therefore, as r increases, the new intersection
points θ′1 and θ
′








1 (see Figure E27).
The same conclusion can still be obtained by decreasing r away from r̃. Hence, if
there exists a pair of asymmetric equilibria (θ1, r̃) and (θ2, r̃), where θ1 ∈ [−π4 ,0) and
θ2 ∈ [π2 ,
3
4π], there would never exist any other asymmetric equilibria.
Therefore, in conclusion, for all θ ∈ [−π4 ,
3
4π], given all primitives M, D, ς, ς
∗ and
ρ, if asymmetric equilibria exist, the number of asymmetric equilibria is two.
Next, under what conditions asymmetric equilibria exist? Recall that the asymmet-








Hence, these solutions of the equation group E.4 can be interpreted as the inter-
sections of the three curves y = p(θ,r), y = q(θ,r) and y = DD−M , simultaneously.
According to the relationship between p(τ1,r) and p(τ2,r), where (τ1,τ2) is (0, π2 ) or
(−π4 ,
3
4π), we will discuss how asymmetric equilibria arise in the following two distinct
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conjectures:





In this case, if the symmetric equilibrium is stable, there must exist asymmetric
















creases to 0. If at r = r̂, l(π4 , r̂) > −
cos π4
M−D , which implies that p
′
θ
(π4 , r̂) > 0, then as
r increases away from r̂, it keeps the relationship l(π4 ,r) > −
cos π4
M−D for all r > r̂, and
therefore, p′
θ
(π4 ,r) > 0 for all r > r̂; 2) Because p
′
θ
(π4 ,r) > 0, then the asymmetric
equilibrium candidates always exist. Still, the asymmetric equilibrium candidates are
the two extreme intersection points between p(θ,r) and q(θ,r), and correspondingly
the middle intersection point is the symmetric equilibrium candidate. Since ∂p(θ,r)
∂r > 0
for all θ ∈ [π4 ,τ2], and
∂q(θ,r)
∂r > 0 for all θ ∈ [τ1,
π
4 ], the entire function of p(θ,r) in
θ ∈ [π4 ,τ2] and q(θ,r) in θ ∈ [τ1,
π
4 ] increases as r increases. Therefore, supposing the
symmetric equilibrium is obained at r = r̄, i.e. it is (π4 , r̄), and it satisfies p
′
θ
(π4 , r̄)> 0,
as r increases away from r̄, the asymmetric equilibrium candidates rise from positions
below the line y = DD−M to the positions above the line y =
D
D−M . Therefore, there
must exist a moment such that the asymmetric equilibrium candidates pass the line
y = DD−M . At that moment which is recorded by the relevant value of r, the asymmetric
equilibrium candidates formally become the asymmetric equilibria (see Figure E28);
3) According to the following equivalence relationship at the symmetric equilibrium




















(π4 , r̄)> 0 indicates that the symmetric equilibrium is stable. Therefore, in con-
clusion, as long as p(τ1,r)> p(τ2,r), if the symmetric equilibrium is stable, then there
must exist asymmetric equilibria.
However, this conjecture is not true because of the contradiction with the facts
we have obtained. If the best response function is a contraction, there always ex-
ists a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric and stable. Hence, the conjecture that





196Appendix E. Appendix of Chapter 2Uniqueness/Multiplicity and Stability of Equilibrium





Since conjecture 1 is incorrect, conjecture 2 must be the correct one to reflect the
true property of p(θ,r). Given that p(τ1,r)< p(τ2,r), if there is no asymmetric equi-
librium candidate, p′
θ
(π4 ,r) ≥ 0 must hold, and if there are asymmetric equilibrium
candidates, then for the symmetric equilibrium candidate (π4 ,r), p
′
θ
(π4 ,r) < 0 must
hold (see Figures E29 and E30, respectively).
Remember that as r increases, l(π4 ,r) increases. Therefore, if at r = r̂, l(
π




M−D , and hence p
′
θ
(π4 , r̂) < 0, then as r increases away from r̂, p
′
θ
(π4 ,r) will in-
crease gradually from p′
θ
(π4 ,r) < 0 to p
′
θ
(π4 ,r) = 0, and then to p
′
θ
(π4 ,r) > 0. If there
is no asymmetric equilibrium, it is either because for all r > 0, even for r → 0+,
limr→0+ l(π4 ,r) > −
cos π4
M−D , and thus no asymmetric equilibrium candidates exist for all
r > 0, or because as r increases, at the beginning, there were asymmetric equilib-
rium candidates, but before the symmetric equilibrium candidate (π4 ,r) passes the line
y = DD−M , p
′
θ
(π4 ,r) changes from a negative value to a non-negative value, and there-
after, asymmetric equilibrium candidates vanish; consequently, the game has only one
equilibrium, which is symmetric. For both possiblities, the corresponding symmet-
ric equilibrium (π4 , r̄) must satisfy p
′
θ
(π4 , r̄) ≥ 0. Let us recall that for the symmetric
equilibrium candidate (s,s), g′(s) T −1 ⇐⇒ p′
θ
(π4 ,r) T 0. Therefore, it can be con-
cluded that given all primitives, in the symmetric strategic-substitutes game, if there is
no asymmetric equilibrium, the relevant symmetric equilibrium must be not unstable.
Conversely, if the symmetric equilibrium, which is denoted by (π4 , r̄), is not unsta-
ble, there are no asymmetric equilibria, because 1) as long as symmetric equilibrium
(s,s) is not unstable, i.e. g′(s) ≥ −1, p′
θ
(π4 , r̄) ≥ 0, and therefore, there do not exist
asymmetric equilibrium candidates at r = r̄; 2) since the symmetric equilibrium is not
unstable, i.e. p′
θ
(π4 , r̄) ≥ 0, if r increases away from r̄, p
′
θ
(π4 ,r) ≥ 0 must be held for
all r > r̄ because p′
θ
(π4 ,r) increases as r increases; therefore, the asymmetric equilib-
rium candidates would never appear for all r ∈ [r̄,+∞). Hence, it is impossible for
the asymmetric equilibria to exist, and only the symmetric equilibrium survives if the
symmetric equilibrium is not unstable.
In conclusion, given all primitives and for all θ ∈ [−π4 ,
3
4π], the symmetric strategic
substitutes game contains only a unique equilibrium if and only if the symmetric equi-
197
librium is not unstable, and equivalently, asymmetric equilibria exist in the symmetric
strategic substitutes game if and only if the relevant symmetric equilibrium is unstable.
Therefore, for the entire symmetric strategic substitutes game (i.e., θ ∈ [−π4 ,
7
4π]),
given all primitives (M, D, ς, ς∗ and ρ), the necessary and sufficient condition for
unique equilibrium is that the symmetric equilibrium, which always exists, is not un-
stable. Equivalently, the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of asym-
metric equilibria is that the relevant symmetric equilibrium is unstable. Finally, if there
exist asymmetric equilibria, the number is two. Q.E.D.












































































































































dρ < 0, as long as M > D and ς = ς












































dρ ]< 0. In conclusion, given that M > D and ς = ς
∗,
f (ρ) decreases with respect to ρ. Q.E.D.
Lemma E5: In the symmetric strategic substitutes game (M > D) and ς = ς∗, there
always exists a unique boundary ρ̄ ≥ ρ̂ = 2πς
∗−(M−D)2
2πς∗+(M−D)2 . Given M > D and ς = ς
∗, the
game always contains a unique equilibrium for all ρ∈ (−1, ρ̃] if and only if ρ̄≥ ρ̃. It is
symmetric and not unstable. Given M > D and ς = ς∗, the game can contain asymmet-
ric equilibria for some value of ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̃] if and only if ρ̄ < ρ̃. In this case, only the
symmetric equilibrium exists if and only if ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̄]. The symmetric equilibrium
is not unstable. Multiplicity arises if and only if ρ ∈ (ρ̄, ρ̃]. There is one symmetric
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equilibrium, which is unstable, and two asymmetric equilibria.

























where s is an unkonwn variable that is uniquely contained in the first equation of
equation group E.5.
Proof: Without loss of generality, for all ρ∈ (−1, ρ̂], g(x∗) is a contraction. There-
fore, a unique equilibrium always exists. It is symmetric and stable.
For all ρ ∈ (ρ̂, ρ̃], g(x∗) is not a contraction. In this case, there could be either one
equilibrium or multiple equilibria given all primitives. According to Lemma E3, the
criterion to judge whether there exist multiple equilibria is the stability of the sym-
metric equilibrium. If and only if the symmetric equilibrium is not unstable, i.e. at
this equilibrium g′(x∗)≥−1, there exists a unique equilibrium, which is only the sym-
metric equilibrium. If and only if the symmetric equilibrium is unstable, i.e. at this
equilibrium g′(x∗)<−1, then asymmetric equilibria exist.
We denote the symmetric equilibrium by (s,s). It should satisfy g(s) = s, and at
the symmetric equilibrium, each player’s best response function’s first-order derivative















For all ρ ∈ [ρ̂, ρ̃], according to Lemma E3, there exists only a unique (symmetric)
equilibrium if and only if the symmetric equilibrium is not unstable, i.e. the first-order
199





























(M−D). In addition, let us recall that the symmetric equilibrium should satisfy






s) = D+sD−M . Therefore, given M > D, ς = ς
∗ and ρ ∈ [ρ̂, ρ̃],
according to Lemma E3, if there exists only a unique equilibrium, it is necessary and



















































E.9 with equation E.7 and inequality E.8, the three conditions together indicate that
given M > D, ς = ς∗ and ρ ∈ [ρ̂, ρ̃], the symmetric equilibrium is unstable; hence, ac-
cording to Lemma E3, asymmetric equilibira exist as well.
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We denote the LHS of above inequality by f (ρ). Then, f (ρ) ≥ 1 indicates that
g′(s) ≥ −1, while f (ρ) < 1 indicates that g′(s) < −1. According to Lemma E4, if







































2 )≥ 1, where s satisfies equation E.7. Because f (1)=
0, as ρ increases from ρ̂ to 1, f (ρ) decreases from a value greater than or equal to 1 to
0. Therefore, there must exist a unique ρ = ρ̄ ∈ [ρ̂,1) such that at ρ = ρ̄, f (ρ̄) = 1.
Suppose ρ̄ < ρ̃ =
√
2πς∗2
2πς∗2+(M−D)2 . Because f
′(ρ) < 0, for all ρ ∈ [ρ̂, ρ̄], f (ρ) >
1 ⇐⇒ g′(s) ≥ −1, while for ρ ∈ (ρ̄, ρ̃], f ′(ρ) < 1 ⇐⇒ g′(s) < −1. Therefore, in
this case, according to Lemma E3, given M > D and ς = ς∗, the game only has a
unique equilibrium if and only if ρ ∈ [ρ̂, ρ̄], while multiple equilibria exist if and only
if ρ ∈ (ρ̄, ρ̃].
Suppose ρ̄ ≥ ρ̃ =
√
2πς∗2
2πς∗2+(M−D)2 . Because f
′(ρ) < 0, for all ρ ∈ [ρ̂, ρ̃], the first-
order derivative of each player’s best response function at symmetric equilibrium (s,s)
is g′(s) ≥ −1, where the equality is obtained as long as ρ = ρ̃ = ρ̂. Therefore, in this
case, based on Lemma E3, it can be concluded that given M > D and ς = ς∗, there
always exists a unique equilibrium for all ρ ∈ [ρ̂, ρ̃].
From the above analysis, it can be observed that given M > D and ς = ς∗, the rela-
tionship between ρ̄ and ρ̃ equivalently reflects whether asymmetric equilibria can exist.
Suppose that given M > D and ς = ς∗, the game can contain asymmetric equilibria for
some value of ρ, then at least at ρ = ρ̃, the symmetric equilibrium should be unstable,
while if at ρ = ρ̃, the symmetric equilibrium is unstable, then the game certainly has
asymmetric equilibria. Therefore, we get the following necessary and sufficient condi-
tion to guarantee that the game can contain asymmetric equilibria for some value of ρ
given M > D and ς = ς∗: ρ̄ < ρ̃ ⇐⇒ at ρ = ρ̃, the symmetric equilibrium is unstable
⇐⇒ given M > D and ς = ς∗, asymmetric equilibria must exist in the game for some
value of ρ. Next, we turn to find the algebraic representation of the necessary and suf-
ficient condition. At ρ = ρ̃ =
√
2πς∗2
2πς∗2+(M−D)2 , the symmetric equilibrium is unstable if









































































Combining the previous analysis, it can be concluded that the above two conditions
are the necessary and sufficient conditions to guarantee ρ̄ < ρ̃, and hence, given M > D
and ς = ς∗, the game can contain asymmetric equilibria for some value of ρ, and which
is exactly ρ ∈ (ρ̄, ρ̃].
Next, we derive the analytical expression of ρ̄. At ρ = ρ̄, there exists a unique
equilibrium/solution; this equilibrium’s/solution’s stability is not determined. Accord-

































First, consider the case where M+D = 0. According to the Lemma E1, it is known
that as long as M+D= 0, symmetric equilibrium (s,s) = (0,0). According to equation
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E.10, given ς= ς∗ and (s,s) = (0,0), equation E.10 indicates that ρ̄= 2πς
∗−(M−D)2
2πς∗+(M−D)2 = ρ̂.
Hence, if M+D = 0, ρ̄ = ρ̂.
Inequality E.12 can be equivalently transformed into (M−D)
2(ς+ς∗ρ̄)2
2πς∗2ς2(1−ρ̄2) ≥ 1, where the
equality is held as long as ρ̄ = 2πς
∗−(M−D)2





2πς∗2ς2(1−ρ̄2) . If ρ̄ = ρ̂, then
(M−D)2(ς+ς∗ρ̄)2
2πς∗2ς2(1−ρ̄2) = 1, and hence s = 0.
According to Lemma E1, M +D = 0, which is therefore necessary and sufficient for
ρ̄ = ρ̂.
Now consider the case where M + D 6= 0. Then ρ̄ > 2πς
∗−(M−D)2
2πς∗+(M−D)2 , and hence
(M−D)2(ς+ς∗ρ̄)2





2πς∗2ς2(1−ρ̄2) . According to Lemma












According to Lemma E4, function f (ρ) strictly decreases with respect to ρ. It im-
plies that ρ̄ must be unique if and only if it simultaneously satisfies E.10, E.11 and
E.12, which constitute ρ̄’s definition. If there exists multiple ρ̄s, it indicates that equa-
tion groups of E.10, E.11 and E.12 represent more than one equilibrium/solution of
which stability is not determined, which contradicts the fact that there is only one such
kind of equilibrium/solution in this symmetric strategic substitutes game. Therefore,
given the expressions of s and equation E.11, for M + D > 0, ρ̄ is the unique so-

























D−M . For M+D 6= 0, ρ̄≷ ρ̃.
Finally, according to the previous proofs, we can use the stability of the symmetric
equilibrium at ρ = ρ̃ to judge whether the game can contain asymmetric equilibria, or
equivalently ρ̄ > ρ̃ or ρ̄ < ρ̃. Here, we give the algebraic representation of the stability



























which indicates that ρ̄ < ρ̃, and vice versa.














which indicates that ρ̄≥ ρ̃, and vice versa.Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1: The proof of Theorem 1 completely comprises all proofs in
Appendix E, which are the proofs of Lemmas E1 to E5. All of these proofs and their
conclusions constitute Theorem 1. Q.E.D.
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(θ,r) > 0 for all ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̃]. For all
θ∈ [34π,π], if ρ≤ 0, p
′
θ
(θ,r)< 0; therefore, p(θ,r) gets the ‘U’ shape in θ∈ [34π,
7
4π] if
ρ≤ 0. If ρ > 0, for all θ ∈ [34π,π−arctanρ), p
′
θ
(θ,r)< 0. For all θ ∈ [π−arctanρ,π],











(θ,r) < 0, and therefore
in this case, p(θ,r) gets the ‘U’ shape in θ ∈ [34π,
7
4π] if ρ > 0. Note that by far,
we do not know the relationship between p(34π,r) and p(
7













(θ,r) > 0 for all ρ ∈ (−1,1). If
ρ > 0, for all θ ∈ [34π,π− arctanρ), p
′
θ









r dominates r cosθM−D , then p
′
θ
(θ,r)> 0; therefore, in this case,
p(θ,r) gets the shape where there are three optima in θ ∈ [34π,
7
4π]. Note that by
far, we do not know the relationship between p(34π,r) and p(
7









Figure E13: Since p(θ,r) always have a larger movement in θ ∈ [54π,
3
2π] than in





(θ1,θ2) are intersection points between p(θ,r) and DD−M given the value of r > 0, the
position of the new intersection points will not be balanced, i.e. the new intersection










4π−θ1. This conclusion is
held for either p(π,r)> p(32π,r) or p(π,r)< p(
3
2π,r)
Figure E14: A geometric description of ∂p(θ,r)
∂r and
∂q(θ,r)
∂r for all θ∈ [
3
4π,π] given r > 0
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Figure E15: Given a pair of asymmetric equilibria (θ1, r̃) and (θ2, r̃), where




4π]. If r is increased away from r̃ successively, the new





be greater or smaller than θ1. No matter how θ1 changes, θ2 always moves faster
than θ1 and along a fixed direction. Therefore, as r increases, the new intersection

























equilibrium candidates always exist. They are the two extreme intersection points.
Suppose there is a symmetric equilibrium (54π, r̄). If r is increased away from r̄, there
must exist a moment that the asymmetric equilibrium candidates fall onto y = DD−M
so that they formally become the asymmetric equilibria. From previous analysis and
results, it is known that if asymmetric equilibria exist, there will be only two. Hence,
the moment, or essentially the coresponding radius r, that asymmetric equilibrium
candidates pass the line y = DD−M is unique.
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(54π,r) ≤ 0, there exists only one symmetric equilibrium candidate and no asym-
metric equilibrium candidate. The top figure describes the p′
θ
(54π,r) < 0 case, while
the bottom figure describes the p′
θ
(54π,r) = 0 case.
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(54π,r) > 0, both the symmetric equilibrium candidate (the middle intersection
point) and asymmetric equilibrium candidates (the two extreme intersection points)
exist.
Figure E19: A general geometric representation of function l(θ,r) with respect to
θ given r > 0 in θ ∈ [0, π2 ]. The monotonicity, the position of the optimum (i.e., the




2 ) for all ρ ∈ (0,1)), and the
relationship l(0,r)> l(π2 ,r) are always maintained for any parameter specification of
l(θ,r).
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Figure E20: Case 1: One possibility of the relative position between func-
tion l(θ,r) and − cosθM−D , and the corresponding shape of function p(θ,r), where
there exists only one interior optimum for ρ > 0 and θ ∈ [0, π2 ]. The signs











r− (− r cosθM−D ). Note that by far, we do not know
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Figure E21: Case 2: Another possibility of the relative position between
function l(θ,r) and − cosθM−D , and the corresponding shape of function p(θ,r),
where there exist three interior optima for ρ > 0 and θ ∈ [0, π2 ]. The signs











r− (− r cosθM−D ). Note that by far, we do not know





Figure E22: The relative position between function l(θ,r) and − cosθM−D , and
the corresponding shape of function p(θ,r) for ρ ≤ 0 in θ ∈ [0, π2 ]. The signs











r− (− r cosθM−D ). Note that by far, we do not know
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Figure E23: Case 1: For all θ ∈ [π2 ,
3
4π], irrespective of whether ρ is positive,
p′
θ
(θ,r)< 0. For all θ ∈ [−π4 ,0], if ρ≤ 0, p
′
θ
(θ,r)> 0; therefore, p(θ,r) gets the ‘cap’
shape in θ ∈ [−π4 ,
3


















(θ,r) > 0; therefore, in this case also, p(θ,r) gets the ‘cap’ shape in θ ∈ [−π4 ,
3
4π]
if ρ > 0. Note that by far, we do not know the relationship between p(−π4 ,r) and














(θ,r) < 0 for all ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̃]. If
ρ > 0, for all θ ∈ [−π4 ,−arctanρ), p
′
θ









r dominates r cosθM−D , then p
′
θ
(θ,r)< 0; therefore, in this case,




Figure E25: Since p(θ,r) always have a larger movement in θ ∈ [π4 ,
π
2 ] than




4 − θ1, where
(θ1,θ2) are intersection points between p(θ,r) and DD−M given r > 0, the position













4 −θ1. This conclusion is held for
either p(0,r)> p(π2 ,r) or p(0,r)< p(
π
2 ,r).
Figure E26: A geometric illurstration of function ∂p(θ,r)
∂r and
∂q(θ,r)
∂r for all θ∈ [−
π
4 ,0)
given r > 0.
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Figure E27: Given a pair of asymmetric equilibria (θ1, r̃) and (θ2, r̃), where




4π]. If r is increased away from r̃ successively, the new





be greater or smaller than θ1. No matter how θ1 changes, θ2 always moves faster
than θ1 and along a fixed direction. Therefore, as r increases, the new intersection




















Figure E28: If p(τ1,r) > p(τ2,r), the asymmetric equilibrium candidates always
exist. They are the two extreme intersection points. Suppose there is a symmetric
equilibrium (π4 , r̄). If r is increased away from r̄, there must exist a moment that
the asymmetric equilibrium candidates rise and pass the line y = DD−M so that they
formally become the asymmetric equilibria. From previous analysis and results, it is
known that if there are asymmetric equilibria, there are only two. Hence, the moment,
or essentially the coresponding radius r, that asymmetric equilibrium candidates pass
the line y = DD−M is unique.
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p′(π4 ,r)≥ 0, there exists only one symmetric equilibrium candidate and no asymmetric
equilibrium candidate. The top figure describes the p′
θ
(π4 ,r) > 0 case, while the
bottom figure describes the p′
θ
(π4 ,r) = 0 case.
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(π4 ,r)< 0, both the symmetric equilibrium candidate (the middle intersection point)
and asymmetric equilibrium candidates (the two extreme intersection points) exist.
Appendix F
Appendix of Chapter 2
Derivation of the Best Response
Function at ρ→ 1











) = 12 . Therefore,
1
2(M−D)+
D+g(x∗) = 0, and hence g(x∗) =−M+D2 . Thus, at x
∗ =−M+D2 , g(x
∗) =−M+D2 .





) = Φ(+∞) = 1, g(x∗) = −M. In the equation
EΠ(x∗,g(x∗)) = 0, if and only if x∗ = −M+D2 , g(x
∗) = x∗; therefore, if x∗ > −M+D2 ,
g(x∗) =−M.





) = Φ(−∞) = 0, g(x∗) = −D. In the equation
EΠ(x∗,g(x∗)) = 0, if and only if x∗ = −M+D2 , g(x





Appendix of Chapter 2
Comparative Statics of the Symmetric
Equilibrium
In this section, we first derive the comparative statics of the best response function at
the symmetric equilibrium; next, we derive the comparative statics of the symmetric
equilibrium. Both types of comparative statics have been qualitatively discussed in the
intuition of comparative statics analysis.
G.1 Proof of Comparative Statics of the Best Response
Function






















∂M : Differentiating both sides of equation (G.1) with respect to M and rear-
ranging terms on both sides, we obtain
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The condition ρ≤ ρ̃ =
√
2πς2




























































0. Because g(x∗) ∈ [−M,−D], where −M and −D are reached at the asymptote, with-





∂D : Differentiating both sides of equation (G.1) with respect to D and rear-
















Because g(x∗)∈ [−M,−D], where−M and−D are reached at the asymptote, with-






: Differentiating both sides of equation (G.1) with respect to ρ and rear-




























At symmetric equilibrium (s,s), where g(s) = s and s ∈ [−M,−D] in which −M










∂ς∗ : First, differentiating both sides of equation (G.1) with respect to























Second, differentiating both sides of equation (G.1) with respect to ς∗ and rear-


















































At symmetric equilibrium (s,s), where g(s) = s and s ∈ [−M,−D] in which −M






G.2 Proof of Comparative Statics of the Symmetric Equi-
librium (Proof of Proposition 3)



















Then, differentiating both sides of equation (G.2) with respect to M, D, ρ, ς and ς∗,
and rearranging the terms on both sides of relevant equations, we obtain the following
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Appendix of Chapter 2
Contraction and Non-contraction Best
Response Functions
Contraction is a very useful property of the best response functions. According to Zim-
per (2004), if the best response functions of a lattice game are contraction, the game
is dominance solvable, and therefore, a unique equilibrium exists. In this thesis, the
best response functions are real-valued and one-dimensional. In this specific context,
we prove that, if and only if the abosulte value of the first-order derivative of a best
response function is smaller than one, given any strategy of the opponent, the best re-
sponse function is a contraction. This result applies to all chapters in this thesis.
Proposition H1: A first-order differentiable best response function x = g(x∗),
where x ∈ R and x∗ ∈ R, is a contraction if and only if for all x∗ ∈ R, |g′(x∗)|< 1.
Proof: In an arbitrary interval [a,b] ⊆ R, g(x∗) as defined is first-order differen-
tiable. Therefore, according to the Lagrange intermdeidate value theorem, there exists
a η ∈ (a,b) such that
g(b)−g(a) = g′(η)(b−a)
Therefore, we have |g(b)−g(a)|= |g′(η)|(b−a)≤maxx∗∈(a,b) |g′(x∗)|.|b−a|.
If x = g(x∗) is a contraction, according to the formal definition of contraction (see
223
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de la Fuente, 2000), we have maxx∗∈(a,b) |g′(x∗)| < 1. Because a and b (b > a) are
arbitrarily valued, for all x∗ ∈ R, |g′(x∗)|< 1.
If for all x∗ ∈R |g′(x∗)|< 1, then at any interval (a,b)⊆R, maxx∗∈(a,b) |g′(x∗)|< 1,
and therefore, x = g(x∗) is a contraction for all x∗ ∈ R. Q.E.D.
In this thesis, we will meet two types of best response functions: contraction and
non-contraction. Given a best response function x = g(x∗), where x∗ ∈ R, the condi-
tion of contraction is that |g′(x∗)| < 1 for all x∗ ∈ R. In some situations, |g′(x∗)| = 1
at some isolated points on the real line indicating the value of x∗ and at the remaining
real numbers, |g′(x∗)| < 1. For these situations, x = g(x∗) is still a contraction. The
proof of Proposition 1 adapts to such situations. The situation of the non-contraction
best response functions is that at some interval(s) of x∗ ∈ R, |g′(x∗)|> 1.
Reference: de la Fuente, A. (2000), Mathematical Methods and Models for Economists,
Cambridge University Press.
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Appendix of Chapter 3
Preliminaries and Glossaries of
Notations
The standard Gaussian density function is denoted by φ(.), and the standard Gaus-
sian cumulative density function is denoted by Φ(.). Given a Gaussian distribution














The joint Gaussian distribution is denoted by (ε,ε∗)∼ N(0,0,ς2,ς∗2,ρ). The den-


















The conditional density function is











and the conditional cumulative density function is
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We denote a player’s belief function by σ(x∗,ε) = F(x∗|ε), where ε is a player’s
own private information, and x∗ is the opponent’s expected cutoff strategy. We obtain
the following results of σ(x∗,ε):





























































The expected payoff function EΠ(x∗,ε) is expressed as
















The best response function is denoted by g(x∗). In the proof, g(x∗) is often re-
garded as an independent variable and the derivatives of relevant functions with respect
to g(x∗) are taken or the optimum value of relevant functions with respect to g(x∗) is







min(max)ρ′(x∗), which is the derivative of a function with x∗ as a dependent variable
and g(x∗) as an independent variable, and ming(x∗)(maxg(x∗))ρ′′(x∗)=min(max)ρ′′(x∗).
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Proof of Proposition 1








with ρ = ρ̃.

















































≥ 0. Apparently, that ρ(D−M) ≥ 0 is sufficient to make the nec-




































Therefore, under the condition ρ(D−M) < 0, ∂EΠ(x
∗,ε)
∂ε
≥ 0 always holds if and only













≤ 0, the necessary and suf-
ficient condition always holds, and thus ∂EΠ(x
∗,ε)
∂ε









= 1, given D, M, ς and ς∗, and denoting
the solution by ρ̃, we have ρ̃2 = 2πς
2
2πς2+(M−D)2 . Furthermore, as long as ρ
2 < ρ̃2,
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ways holds, and ∂EΠ(x
∗,ε)
∂ε




. Therefore, combined with the




always holds, and ∂EΠ(x
∗,ε)
∂ε
















∗ for D > M. Hence, both players have an identical range to en-
sure that their respective expected payoff function EΠ(x∗,ε) always increases with
respect to ε ∈ R. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof of Proposition 1 is based on the proof of
Lemma B1. We denote the set of ρ that makes EΠ(x∗,ε) always increase with re-
spect to ε given x∗ by Γ ≡ {ρ| ρ ≥ ρ̃ if D > M }. From Lemma B1, it has been




ρ ∈ Γ. Therefore, it is certain that as long as ρ does not belong to Γ, EΠ(x∗,ε) is not










for ρ /∈ Γ. Without loss of generality, Figure B1










given x, M, D, ρ, ς and ς∗ for all ρ /∈ Γ (see Figure B1).
According to the quadratic structure of y(ε), as long as ρ /∈ Γ, there should be
















































on these results, without loss of generality, Figure B2 geometrically gives a general de-
scription of function EΠ(x∗,ε) with respect to ε given any value of x, for all ρ /∈ Γ (see
Figure B2).
Because for all x∗ ∈R, given all primitives, the expected payoff function EΠ(x∗,ε)
is always located between the line D+ ε and M + ε, and if D > M, increasing x∗ will
bring EΠ(x∗,ε) downward, it is possible that for some value of x∗, there are two or
three solutions of ε satisfying EΠ(x∗,ε) = 0. In Appendix D, we will prove that it is
231
Figure B1: A geometric description of the relation between function y(ε) and z(ε)









must be two intersection points which make f (ε) = g(ε), and in this figure, they are






certain that for all ρ /∈ Γ by using cutoff strategy, the game always contains a unique
symmetric solution g(e) = e, such that given e, EΠ(e,ε) = 0 has three solutions, and
the solution ε = e is located in the middle where EΠ(e,ε) decreases with respect to
ε (see Figure B2). Apparently, the solution (e,e) self-contradicts the definition of the
cutoff strategy under which it is derived. Hence, it is impossible to solve the game
using the cutoff strategy concept for all ρ /∈ Γ. Therefore, the set Γ not only indicate
that EΠ(x∗,ε) increases with respect to ε for all x∗ ∈ R but also characterizes the set
of cutoff strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria of the symmetric strategic complements
games. Therefore, Proposition 1 is obtained. Q.E.D.
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Figure B2: A general description of expected payoff function EΠ(x∗,ε) with respect
to ε given any value of x∗, for all ρ /∈ Γ. The position of EΠ(x∗,ε) depends on x∗, and
EΠ(x∗,ε) is always located within [M+ε,D+ε] for all x ∈R. If D > M, increasing x∗
will bring EΠ(x∗,ε) downward. In Appendix D, it is proven that as long as the cutoff
strategy concept is used to solve the game, for all ρ /∈ Γ, there always exists a solution
(s,s) satisfying g(s) = s, such that given s, EΠ(s,ε) behaves non-monotonically and
has three intersections with the x-axis, which is demonstrated by the red curve.
Appendix C
Appendix of Chapter 3
Derivation of the (Inverse) Best
Response Function
The best response function, g(x∗), is defined to satisfy EΠ(x∗,g(x∗)) = 0. Therefore,
















). Since the cumulative density function of normal distribution is invert-








. Finally, we obtain the inverse best response















g(x∗) = 0, we differentiate this equation with respect to x∗ on both sides, and ob-





























0, and it is known that as long as ρ ∈ Γ, ∂EΠ(x
∗,g(x∗))
∂ε
≥ 0 ∀x∗ ∈ R; hence, if D > M,
g′(x∗) > 0. Therefore, as long as the concept of cutoff strategy Bayesian Nash equi-





Appendix of Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 2
Lemma D1: Assume ς = ς∗ and D > M. There exist two functions ρ′(x∗) and ρ′′(x∗).
Given any x∗ ∈ R and for all ρ ∈ (−1,1), if ρ ∈ (ρ′(x∗),ρ′′(x∗)), g′(x∗) > 1; if ρ ∈
(ρ′′(x∗),1), 0 < g′(x∗)< 1; at ρ = ρ′′(x∗), g′(x∗) = 1; at ρ = ρ′(x∗), g′(x∗) = ∞.




























2). Hence, given an x∗ ∈ R,
if ρ < 0 and D > M, then the function g−1
′
(x∗) must increase with respect to ρ. In
addition, if ρ =−1, g−1′(x∗) =−1, and if ρ = 0, g−1′(x∗)> 0. Because g−1′(x∗) is a
continuous function with respect to ρ, for all ρ ∈ (−1,0], g−1′(x∗) increases from -1 to
a positive value as ρ increases from -1 to 0. Therefore, there must exist a ρ ∈ (−1,0],
whose value depends on x∗, and it makes g−1
′
(x∗) = 0. We denote this ρ by ρ′(x∗).
Because g−1
′
(x∗) < 0 is equivalent to g′(x∗) < 0, and g−1
′
(x∗) > 0 is equivalent to
g′(x∗)> 0, we can conclude that given an x∗ ∈ R, for all ρ ∈ (−1,ρ′(x∗)), g′(x∗)< 0,
and for all ρ ∈ (ρ′(x∗),0), g′(x∗)> 0.








2). For D > M, A > 0. Hence, the equa-
tion g−1
′
(x∗) = 0 can be equivalently expressed by ρ+A
√
1−ρ2 = 0. The solution
ρ′(x∗) that solves ρ+A
√
1−ρ2 = 0 equals − A√
1+A2
< 0. Because ς = ς∗, both play-
ers’ ρ′(x∗) function should be identical.
Because g′(x∗) = g−1
′










2) = 1, and
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2)> 0 for D > M. Given D, M, ς and











must depend on x∗. Thus, we denote the ρ that makes g′(x∗) = g−1
′
(x∗) = 1 by ρ′′(x∗).
For this incomplete information game, ρ′′(x∗) should not be equal to ±1. g−1′(x∗) = 1
can be equivalently represented by 1−ρ = A
√
1−ρ2. Solving this equation, we get
two solutions: ρ′′(x∗) = 1 and ρ′′(x∗) = 1−A
2
1+A2 . The first solution is excluded according
to the previous argument. Therefore, ρ′′(x∗) = 1−A
2
1+A2 .
Because given an x∗ ∈ R, ρ′′(x∗) is unique, for all ρ ∈ (ρ′(x∗),ρ′′(x∗)) or ρ ∈
(ρ′′(x∗),1), g′(x∗) is either greater or smaller than 1. To judge in which interval g′(x∗)
is smaller or greater than 1, let us recall the derivative of g−1
′


















)]2) = 1− ρ√
1−ρ2
A








(x∗) increases with respect to ρ. Because at ρ = ρ′′(x∗), g−1
′
(x∗) = 1,
∀ρ ∈ (ρ′′(x∗)− ε,ρ′′(x∗)), g−1′(x∗) < 1, and ∀ρ ∈ (ρ′′(x∗),ρ′′(x∗)+ ε), g−1′(x∗) > 1.
Moreover, because ρ′′(x∗) is unique, this result can be extended to the whole interval
ρ∈ (−1,1). Thus, ∀ρ∈ (−1,ρ′′(x∗)), g−1′(x∗)< 1, and ∀ρ∈ (ρ′′(x∗),1), g−1′(x∗)> 1.
The relationship between ρ′(x∗) and ρ′′(x∗): Let us recall that ρ′(x∗) < 0. If
ρ′′(x∗)> 0, then certainly ρ′(x∗)< ρ′′(x∗). Now, consider the case that ρ′′(x∗) is neg-
ative. Recall that g−1
′
(x∗) increases with respect to ρ if ρ is negative. At ρ = ρ′(x∗),
g−1
′
(x∗) = 0 and hence g′(x∗) = ∞, and at ρ = ρ′′(x∗), g−1
′
(x∗) = 1 and hence g′(x∗) =
1. Therefore, ρ′(x∗)< ρ′′(x∗) if ρ′′(x∗)< 0. In conclusion, if D > M, ρ′′(x∗) is always
strictly greater than ρ′(x∗).
Because ς = ς∗, both players’ ρ′(x∗) and ρ′′(x∗) functions are identical. Therefore,








D−M ) has the following property: given x
∗ ∈ R and ρ ∈ (−1,1),
if ρ′(x∗) < ρ < ρ′′(x∗), g′(x∗) > 1; if ρ ∈ (ρ′′(x∗),1), 0 < g′(x∗) < 1; if ρ = ρ′′(x∗),
g′(x∗) = 1; if ρ = ρ′(x∗), g′(x∗) = ∞; and if ρ < ρ′(x∗), g′(x∗)< 0. Q.E.D.
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Lemma D2: For D > M, for all ρ ∈ [ρ′(x∗),0], g′(x∗) decreases from +∞ to a
positive value, and for all ρ ∈ (−1,ρ′(x∗)], g′(x∗) decreases from -1 to −∞.
Proof: From the proof of Lemma D1, it has been known that given an x∗ ∈ R,
g−1
′
(x∗) increases with respect to ρ for ρ ∈ (−1,0] and it is continuous. Therefore,
g′(x∗) must have a decreasing property in the interval ρ ∈ (−1,0]. We have at ρ = 0,
g−1
′
(x∗)> 0, and hence g′(x∗)> 0; at ρ = ρ′(x∗), g−1
′
(x∗) = 0 and hence g′(x∗) = ∞;
and at ρ = −1, g−1′(x∗) = 1, and hence g′(x∗) = 1. Therefore, for function g′(x∗),
there is a discontinuity point at ρ = ρ′(x∗). For ρ ∈ (−1,ρ′(x∗)], g′(x∗) should de-
crease from -1 to −∞, and for ρ ∈ (ρ′(x∗),0], g′(x∗) should decrease from +∞ to some
positive value. Q.E.D.
Lemma D3: For D > M, given an x∗ ∈R, g′(x∗) is convex for ρ∈ [0,1). It reaches
its minimum value at ρ = 1√
1+A2
.


























dρ2 > 0 for ρ ∈ (0,1). Hence, g
′(x∗) is convex for all ρ ∈ (0,1). Fur-
thermore, by calculating the first-order derivative, it is found that g−1
′





















2). We denote this ρ by ρ′′′(x). Therefore, given an
x∗ ∈ R, the function g′(x∗) reaches its minimum value at ρ′′′(x) = 1√
1+A2
∀ρ ∈ (0,1),
and the minimum value of g′(x∗) is just 1√
1+A2
. Q.E.D.
For D > M, according to Lemmas D1, D2 and D3, the shape of g′(x∗) with respect
to ρ given an x∗ ∈ R can be generally represented by Figure D1.
Lemma D4: Given an x∗ ∈ R and assuming D > M, for g(x∗) ∈ (−M+D2 ,−M],
dρ′(x∗)
dg(x∗) < 0 and
dρ′′(x∗)
dg(x∗) < 0; for g(x
∗) ∈ [−D,−M+D2 ),
dρ′(x∗)
dg(x∗) > 0 and
dρ′′(x∗)
dg(x∗) > 0.
Proof: Let us recall that ρ′(x∗) = − A√
1+A2
and ρ′′(x∗) = 1−A
2
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Figure D1: A general geometric description of function g′(x∗) with respect to ρ for


















1+A2 − 1, as A increases, ρ





dA < 0. If g(x
∗) < −D+M2 ,
dA
dg(x∗) < 0 and if g(x
∗) > −D+M2 ,
dA
dg(x∗) > 0;
therefore, in conclusion, if g(x∗) ∈ [−D,−D+M2 ),
dρ′(x∗)
dg(x∗) > 0 and
dρ′′(x∗)
dg(x∗) > 0, and if
g(x∗) ∈ [−D+M2 ,−M],
dρ′(x∗)
dg(x∗) < 0 and
dρ′′(x∗)
dg(x∗) < 0. Hence, at g(x
∗) = −D+M2 , both
ρ′(x∗) and ρ′′(x∗) reach their global maximum value with respect to g(x∗). The max-





(D−M)2+2πς∗2 , respectively. Q.E.D.
Based on Lemmas D1 and D4, Figure D2 generally depicts functions ρ′(x∗) and
ρ′′(x∗) with respect to g(x∗). According to Lemmas D1, D2 and D3, given an x∗ ∈ R
and hence g(x∗), as ρ increases from -1 to 1, for ρ ∈ (−1,ρ′(x∗)), g′(x∗) < −1; for
ρ ∈ (ρ′(x∗),ρ′′(x∗)), g′(x∗) > 1; for ρ ∈ (ρ′′(x∗),1), 0 < g′(x∗) < 1. At ρ = ρ′′(x∗),
g′(x∗) = 1 and at ρ = ρ′(x∗), g′(x∗) = ∞. This change of g′(x∗) can be illustrated
by Figure D2. We choose an arbitrary value of g(x∗) between −D and −M, and at
this chosen g(x∗), we draw a vertical line from -1 to 1 (the red line in Figure D2).
The curves ρ′(x∗) and ρ′′(x∗) dissect this line into three parts, g′(x∗) < 0, g′(x∗) > 1
and g′(x∗) < 1 from bottom to top. Because g(x∗) is arbitrarily chosen, this result
applies for all g(x∗) ∈ [−D,−M]. Therefore, it can be concluded that given D, M, ς
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and ς∗, for all g(x∗) ∈ [−D,−M], if ρ ∈ (ρ′′(x∗),1), 0 < g′(x∗) < 1 and correspond-
ingly it is the area above the curve ρ′′(x∗) in Figure D2; for all g(x∗) ∈ [−D,−M], if
ρ ∈ (ρ′(x∗),ρ′′(x∗)), g′(x∗) > 1 and correspondingly it is the area between the curves
ρ′(x∗) and ρ′′(x∗); finally, for all g(x∗) ∈ [−D,−M], if ρ < ρ′(x∗), g′(x∗)< 0 and cor-
respondingly it is the area below the curve ρ′(x∗).
Figure D2: A general geometric description of functions ρ′(x∗) and ρ′′(x∗) with
respect to g(x∗) for D > M.
Lemma D5: For D>M, given an ρ∈ (−1,maxρ′′(x∗)], there are one or two values





Proof: Given D, M, ς and ς∗, if there are g(x∗)s whose derivative g′(x∗) = 1, then
























2πς∗2 ≥ 1, where the latter equality
is held if and only if ρ = maxρ′′(x∗) = (D−M)
2−2πς∗2







2πς∗2 , and Φ
−1(D+g(x
∗)















D. Note that g(x∗)1≤ g(x∗)2, where the equality is obtained as long as ρ=maxρ′′(x∗).
Q.E.D.
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Lemma D6: Given a ρ ∈ (−1,maxρ′(x∗)), if D > M, there are two values of g(x∗)







ρ = maxρ′(x∗) for D > M, at g(x∗) =−D+M2 , g
′(x∗) = ∞.
Proof: Given D, M, ς and ς∗, if there are g(x∗)s whose derivative g′(x∗) =∞, which
means 1g′(x∗) = 0, then the corresponding ρ∈ (−1,maxρ
′(x∗)) for D>M, and the g(x∗)
should simultaneously satisfy ρ = −A√
1+A2
































































2πς∗2 )−D. Note that for D > M, g(x
∗)1 ≥
g(x∗)2, where the equality is obtained as long as ρ = maxρ′(x∗). If the equality is held,
g(x∗) = g(x∗)1 = g(x∗)2 =−M+D2 . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: According to Figure D2 and results from Lemmas D5 and
D6, we get the following result for the shape of g(x∗) given D, M, ς and ς∗ for all
ρ ∈ (−1,1):
1) for ρ ∈ (−1,maxρ′(x∗)),






































2) for ρ ∈ [maxρ′(x∗),maxρ′′(x∗)],




2πς∗2 )−D), 0 < g
′(x∗)< 1;
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2πς∗2 )−D,−M], 0 < g
′(x∗)< 1;






3) for ρ ∈ (maxρ′′(x∗),1), 0 < g′(x∗)< 1 globally.
It is straightforward to find that the description of the shape of g(x∗) is still held
even if the payoff specification for both players is asymmetric, because in Lemmas
D1–D5 and Lemma D6, we only focus on studying a single g(x∗) function.
In the following, we prove that the shape of g(x∗) in 1), the non-monotonic g(x∗),
contradicts the definition of the cutoff strategy concept; therefore, for the symmetric
strategic complements game, using the cutoff strategy concept to solve the game is
valid if and only if ρ ∈ [ρ̃,1). In addition, the definition of the cutoff strategy implic-
itly dictates that, given the opponent’s cutoff strategy, a player’s best response towards
it should be unique, and it is held irrespective of the specification of payoffs.
As long as ρ /∈ Γ, in the proof of Proposition 1 (Appendix B), we have proven that
given an x∗ ∈ R, as ε increases from −∞ to +∞, EΠ(x∗,ε) first increases, then de-
creases, and finally increases. We just saw that in the strategic complements game, for
all ρ < ρ̃, as g(x∗) decreases from −M to −D, function g(x∗) first increases, then de-
creases, and finally increases with respect to the corresponding x∗. In fact, the changes
of EΠ(x∗,ε) monotonicity (with respect to ε) and g(x∗) (with respect to x∗) are syn-







∂x∗ < 0 for D > M, for
any point (x∗,g(x∗)) from the function g(x∗), if ∂EΠ(x
∗,ε)
∂ε
|ε=g(x∗) ≷ 0, g′(x∗) ≷ 0 for
D > M, and vice versa.
For the symmetric strategic complements game, all solutions are symmetric, i.e.
they satisfy x∗ = g(x∗). However, we find that if ρ ∈ (−1, ρ̃), at any (symmetric) solu-
tion, g(x∗) must have a negative derivative, i.e. g′(x∗) < 0. It is because for solutions
that satisfy x∗ = g(x∗), its derivative g′(x∗) can be expressed as













Furthermore, because at this situation ρ2 > 2πς
2















g′(x∗)|g(x∗)=0 < 0. For D > M, if we regard g′(x∗) as a function with respect to
variable g2(x∗), ∂g
′(x∗)
∂g2(x∗) < 0,. Then, for any symmetric solution (e,e), we must have
g′(x∗)|g(x∗)=e≤ g′(x∗)|g(x∗)=0 < 0. Therefore, for the symmetric strategic complements
game, as long as ρ < ρ̃, at any (symmetric) solution (e,e), the derivative g′(e)< 0, and
correspondingly, ∂EΠ(e,ε)
∂ε
|ε=e < 0. Thus, as long as ρ < ρ̃, given any symmetric solu-
tion (e,e), the equation EΠ(e,ε) = 0 must always have a solution ε = e, and at this
point, ∂EΠ(e,ε)
∂ε
< 0. Therefore, according to the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix
B, without loss of generality, the function EΠ(e,ε) with respect to ε is the red curve
shown in Figure B2, and the ε = e is the middle intersection point around which ex-
pected the payoff function decreases. Therefore, if we still use a cutoff strategy to solve
the game for ρ < ρ̃, all (symmetric) solutions contradict the cutoff strategy definition
under which these solutions are derived. Therefore, we cannot use the cutoff strategy
concept to solve the symmetric strategic complements game for ρ < ρ̃ given D > M
and ς = ς∗. This supplements the existing proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix B, and
the proof of Proposition 1 is now complete.








fore, if g(x∗) globally increases, ρ ≥ ρ̃ must hold, i.e. the cutoff strategy concept is
legitimately used to solve the game, and vice versa. Therefore, combining the previ-
ous result in the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix B, we find that a necessary and
sufficient condition for using the cutoff strategy concept to solve the symmetric strate-
gic complements game, or equivalently ρ≥ ρ̃, is that the best response function g(x∗)
globally increases.
As long as the strategic complements game is symmetric, the conclusions 2) and
3) obtained at the beginning of the proof form the content of Proposition 2. However,
if the payoff specification is asymmetric, these results are still held for describing a
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single player’s g(x∗) function as these results are derived by studying a single g(x∗)
function. Hence, Proposition 2 is still held for asymmetric payoff settings. Q.E.D.

Appendix E
Appendix of Chapter 3
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1: The main content of Section 3.4 is essentially about the proof of
Theorem 1. Hence, in the Appendix, we supplement Section 3.4 with proofs around ρ̄.
The proof below, together with Section 3.4, completes the proof of Theorem 1. In the
following, we assume that ρ̄ exists in the mathematical sense, i.e. M < 0 if D+M > 0




1+ρx) can be tangent with y =
D+x
D−M
at ρ = ρ̄. If ρ̄ cannot exist in the mathematical sense, then the game always contains a
unique equilibrium, because it is impossible to make the tangent point arise, let alone
the multiple intersection-point situation, as ρ increases from ρ̃ to 1 (recall that as ρ




1+ρx) “stretches”). Therefore, if ρ̄ cannot exist in mathematical
sense, ∀ρ ∈ [ρ̃,1), the game always contains a unique equilibrium.
From Section 3.4, it is known that at the boundary case ρ = ρ̄, there must exist a






x) and y = D+xD−M . Hence, ρ̄ and (e,e) must
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Reasonably, ρ̄≤ ρ̂ = (D−M)
2−2πς∗2
(D−M)2+2πς∗2 . Because ς = ς
∗, the previous inequality equiv-






≥ 1, where the equality is obtained if and only if









From Figures 2–4, it can be concluded that for the sign of the tangent point (e,e),
it has the following one-to-one correspondence relationship with respect to the sign of
D+M: D+M R 0 ⇐⇒ e R 0. From this equivalence relationship, it is certain that
as long as D+M = 0, e = 0 and ρ̄ = ρ̂. Otherwise, if D+M 6= 0, then ρ̄ 6= ρ̂, and vice
versa. Therefore, if D+M > 0, by substituting the expression of e into E.2, we obtain






























If D+M < 0, by substituting the analytical expression of e into E.2, we get the






























and if D+M = 0, then ρ̄ = ρ̂.
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Next, we will prove that equations E.3 and E.4 have a unique solution of ρ̄ by con-
tradiction. Suppose there is a second solution ρ̄′ that is the solution of either equation
E.3 or equation E.4. Given this ρ̄′, we can obtain another solution from the equation





y= D+xD−M ). It is impossible. From Figures 2–4, it can be seen that in any situation, given




1+ρx) and y =
D+x
D−M can be tangent with each
other at most only once, and hence, the tangent point is unique if it exists. Therefore, a
contradiction arises, and thus equations E.3 and E.4 always contain a unique solution
of ρ̄ if ρ̄ exists. Finally, according to Figures 2–4, it is known that, for the strategic
complements game, if there exist multiple equilibria (three or two) for ρ ∈ [ρ̃,1), the
boundary correlation coefficient ρ̄ must be greater than or equal to ρ̃, and vice versa.
Therefore, equations E.3 and E.4 are the correct implicit expressions about ρ̄ for the
symmetric strategic complements games for D+M 6= 0 and ρ̄ is the unique solution of
equations E.3 and E.4. Q.E.D.
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Appendix of Chapter 3
Derivation of the Best Response
Function at ρ→−1











) = 12 .
Therefore, 12(M−D)+D+g(x
∗) = 0, and hence g(x∗) =−D+M2 . Thus, at x
∗ = D+M2 ,
g(x∗) =−D+M2 .





) = Φ(+∞) = 1, g(x∗) = −M. In the equation
EΠ(x∗,g(x∗)) = 0, if and only if x∗ = D+M2 , g(x
∗) = −x∗; therefore, if x∗ > D+M2 ,
g(x∗) =−M.





) = Φ(−∞) = 0, g(x∗) = −D. In the equation
EΠ(x∗,g(x∗)) = 0, if and only if x∗ = D+M2 , g(x





Appendix of Chapter 3
Comparative Statics of Equilibria
(Proof of Proposition 3)
Proof of Proposition 3: In this symmetric strategic complements game, all equilibria
are symmetric. Particularly, recall that ς = ς∗ always holds. We denote one by (e,e).



















Remember that in the strategic-complements game, D > M. Therefore, −D < e <
−M.
For ρ > ρ̄, there exists a unique equilibrium. According to the slope relationship
expressed in Figures 2–4, such equilibrium should satisfy
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As stated in the main context of this paper, this inequality also indicates that the
equilibrium is stable.


















































and therefore, it is stable. For the equilibrium expressed as the tangent point in
















and its stability cannot be determined.
Then, differentiating both sides of equation (G.1) with respect to D, M, ρ, ς and ς∗
(the relation ς = ς∗ is always maintained), and rearranging the terms on both sides of

























Because e∈ [−D,−M] and−D and−M are reached at the asymptote, without loss
of generality, ∂e
∂M < 0 for stable equilibria and
∂e























Because e∈ [−D,−M] and−D and−M are reached at the asymptote, without loss
of generality, ∂e
∂D < 0 for stable equilibria and
∂e































Therefore, at the symmetric equilibrium, if eR 0, then ∂e
∂ρ
Q 0 for stable equilibria
and ∂e
∂ρ
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Therefore, at the symmetric equilibrium, if eR 0, then ∂e
∂ς
+ ∂e




∂ς∗ R 0 for unstable equilibria .
For the equilibrium whose stability cannot be determined, any comparative statics
result equals ∞. Q.E.D.
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Appendix of Chapter 3
Proof of Corollary 1
































The latter equality is obtained by the relation ς = ς∗. Differentiating F(ρ;ς2) with
respect to ρ and ς2, respectively, we obtain
∂F(ρ;ς2)
∂ς2






























2πς2(1+ρ) − 1]. Therefore,
∂F(ρ;ς2)
∂ς2
> 0 ⇐⇒ A× (− 12ς2 )− B×
1+ρ
1−ρ > 0 and
∂F(ρ;ς2)
∂ρ
> 0 ⇐⇒ A×(− 11−ρ2 )−B×
2ς2




1−ρ > 0 ⇐⇒
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mathematically the inequalities ∂F(ρ;ς
2)
∂ρ




We define ς̄2 such that F(ρ; ς̄2) = 0. According to the proof of Theorem 1, it

















is monotonic with respect to ς2). Therefore, the reasons of the existence of ς̄2 and ρ̄
are the same. In the same way, if ρ̄ is the unique solution of equation E.3, then ς̄2 is
the unique solution of the following function, derived from F(ρ; ς̄2) = 0, and it can be
















According to the expression of H.1, it can be found that equation H.1 corresponds
to equation E.3. In addition, to ensure that F(ρ;ς2) is valid, the ς̄2 should satisfy
(D−M)2(1−ρ)
2πς̄2(1+ρ)




for D+M 6= 0. If and only if D+M = 0, then
(D−M)2(1−ρ)
2πς̄2(1+ρ)
= 1 ⇐⇒ ς̄2 = ς̂2
By putting ς̃2 into H.1 to replace ς̄2, it is found that ς̄2 could be greater or smaller






could be greater or smaller than 0. Therefore, in the following, we discuss the
two situations separately. It is found that both situations lead to the same result.
1) For ρ > ρ̄, if ∂F(ρ;ς
2)
∂ρ
> 0, then F(ρ;ς2) > F(ρ̄;ς2), i.e. F(ρ;ς2) > 0. Because
∂F(ρ;ς2)
∂ρ
> 0 is equivalent to ∂F(ρ;ς
2)
∂ς2
> 0, F(ρ;ς2) > F(ρ; ς̄2). Hence, for such ς2,
ς2 > ς̄2 can be obtained.
2) For ρ > ρ̄, if ∂F(ρ;ς
2)
∂ρ
< 0, then F(ρ;ς2) < F(ρ̄;ς2), i.e. F(ρ;ς2) < 0. Because
∂F(ρ;ς2)
∂ρ
< 0 is equivalent to ∂F(ρ;ς
2)
∂ς2
< 0, F(ρ;ς2) < F(ρ; ς̄2). Hence, for such ς2,
257
ς2 > ς̄2 can be obtained.
Therefore, for the strategic complements game with ς2 > max{ς̄2, ς̃2} if ρ < 0
or with ς2 > ς̄2 if ρ ≥ 0, the situation is equivalent to the game with ρ > max{ρ̄, ρ̃}.
Hence, the game contains a unique equilibrium for ς2 >max{ς̄2, ς̃2} if ρ< 0 or ς2 > ς̄2
if ρ≥ 0.
Moreover, from the proof, supposing ς̄2 > ς̃2, we can find that for games with
ς2 ∈ [ς̃2, ς̄2) for ρ < 0 or with ς2 ∈ (0, ς̃2) for ρ ≥ 0, this situation mathematically
corresponds to the game with ρ∈ [ρ̃, ρ̄) given ς2. Hence, the game contains three equi-
libria. In addition, at ς2 = ς̄2, supposing ς̄2 ≥ ς̃2 if ρ < 0, because D+M > 0, the game
contains two equilibria.
Applying the same approach, we can derive ς̄2’s (implicit) analytical expression for
D+M < 0. Still, the condition D > 0 > M ensures the existence of ς̄2 for D+M < 0,















and for D+M = 0, ς̄2 = ς̂2. Still, in these two situations (D+M ≤ 0), for ς2 ∈
(max{ς̄2, ς̃2},+∞) if ρ < 0 or ς2 ∈ (ς̄2,+∞) if ρ≥ 0, there exists a unique equilibrium,
and for ς2 ∈ (ς̃2, ς̄2) if ς̄2 > ς̃2 and ρ < 0 or ς2 ∈ (0, ς̄2) if ρ≥ 0, there exist three equi-
libria. At ς2 = ς̄2, where ς̄2 ≥ ς̃2 if ρ < 0, there are two equilibria for D+M < 0. One
equilibrium is stable, and the other equilibrium’s stability cannot be determined. For
D+M = 0, there exists a unique equilibrium, which is stable. Q.E.D.
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Appendix of Chapter 3
Derivation of the Best Response
Function for ς and ς∗→ 0





where x∗ ∈ [−ρD,−ρM]. Let us recall the definition equation of the cutoff best re-











) = Φ(+∞) = 1 and hence g(x∗) = −M. Therefore, if x∗ > −ρM,
g(x∗) =−M.





) = Φ(−∞) = 0 and hence g(x∗) =−D. There-
fore, if x∗ <−ρD, g(x∗) =−D.






x∗ −ρD≤ x∗ ≤−ρM
−M x∗ >−ρM
Suppose M > D and ρ < 0. As shown in Section 3.7, as ς and ς∗→ 0,
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) = Φ(+∞) = 1 and hence
g(x∗) =−M. Hence, if x∗ >−ρM, g(x∗) =−M.





) = Φ(−∞) = 0 and hence g(x∗) =−D. There-
fore, if x∗ <−ρD, g(x∗) =−D.






x∗ −ρD≤ x∗ ≤−ρM
−M x∗ >−ρM.
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Notations











































1 if P is true0 otherwise
7. For a bivariate function y = f (x,v), its inverse function with respect to x is ex-
pressed by x = f−1(y;v).
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GDP(λ) := T (λ,0)
4.
µDP := e(0)
Definitions in the rational inattention Bayesian game:
1.
f (q∗,λ) := w((1−q∗)M+q∗D,λ)
If there exists a λ̃ given q∗ such that f ′q∗(q
∗, λ̃) =−1, then λ̃ = f ′−1q∗ (−1;q∗).
2.
F(λ,q∗) := S(λ,(1−q∗)M+q∗D)
If there exists a λ̄q∗ given q∗ such that F(λ̄q∗,q∗) = 1, then λ̄q∗ = F−1(1;q∗).
3.
G(λ,q∗) := T (λ,(1−q∗)M+q∗D)






Appendix of Chapter 4
Proofs of Proposition 1 and
Proposition 2
Proof of Proposition 1: Proposition 1 is a particular case of Proposition 2 if M =
D = 0. Therefore, the proof of Proposition 1 is essentially the proof of Proposition 2.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Define qε = Pr(a = 1|ε), where ε ∈ {u,d}. Player i’s





Moreover, the information processing capacity can be written as
I(qε) = H(q)−Eε[H(qε)]
=−(1−q) ln(1−q)−q lnq+ p[(1−qu) ln(1−qu)+qu lnqu]+(1− p)[(1−qd) ln(1−qd)+qd lnqd]
(B.2)
where H(.) is the entropy measure of relevant probability distribution and q =
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Next, we solve player i’s utility maximization problem to obtain the best response
function. Given the opponent’s strategy q∗ ∈ [0,1], player i’s utility maximization





−λ{−(1−q) ln(1−q)−q lnq+ p[(1−qu) ln(1−qu)+qu lnqu]+(1− p)[(1−qd) ln(1−qd)+qd lnqd]}
s.t. 0≤ qu ≤ 1, 0≤ qd ≤ 1.
Solving G-1, we obtain the conditional choice probabilities qε, where ε ∈ {u,d},











where ε ∈ {u,d}.
Substituting equation (B.4) back to i’s objective function in G-1, we obtain the fol-











s.t. 0≤ q≤ 1.
If the interior solution in G-2 exists, i.e. the function q with respect to q∗ obtained
from G-2 is between 0 and 1 (q ∈ [0,1]), then the solution, which is also player i’s best






















)−1]< 0 ∀q∗ ∈ [0,1]. Therefore, given the opponent’s strategy
q∗, equation (B.5) is the unique maximizer of player i’s utility.
Conditions ensuring the existence of (B.5) : Given q∗ ∈ [0,1], for (B.5), that





























The inequality group (B.6) is the necessary and sufficient condition to ensure that
i’s information-acquisition best response (B.5) exists given the opponent’s strategy. We
are interested in the value of λ that ensures (B.5) exists given the other primitives. In
the following, we will derive the set of λ that ensures (B.5) exists from (B.6).
Define F(λ) = pexp( (1−q
∗)M+q∗D+u
λ
) + (1− p)exp( (1−q
∗)M+q∗D+d
λ







). It can be obtained that limλ→0+ F(λ)=
limλ→0+ G(λ) =+∞ and limλ→+∞ F(λ) = limλ→+∞ G(λ) = 1. The derivatives of F(λ)





























In the following, we will analyse the range of λ that ensures the existence of the
interior solution (B.5) in three different cases: (1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d Q 0.
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Therefore, LHS(λ) strictly decreases with respect to λ.
Because limλ→0+ LHS(λ) = +∞ and limλ→+∞ LHS(λ) = (1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+
(1− p)d, equation F ′(λ) = 0 or LHS′(λ) = 0 has a solution if and only if (1−q∗)M+
q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d ≤ 0, and the solution must be unique.
Here, we only consider the strict inequality case. Thus, if
(1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d < 0 (B.7)
then there exists a unique λ̂ such that F ′(λ̂)= 0. In addition, for λ< λ̂, LHS(λ)> 0,
which equivalently indicates that F ′(λ)< 0; for λ> λ̂, LHS(λ)< 0, which equivalently
indicates that F ′(λ) > 0. Therefore, if (B.7) is held, F(λ) decreases with respect to λ
for λ < λ̂, and F(λ) increases with respect to λ for λ > λ̂.





























Therefore, G′(λ)< 0 ∀λ ∈ (0,+∞). Thus, when (B.7) is held, there exists a unique
λ = λ̂ such that F ′(λ̂) = 0. For λ < λ̂, F(λ) decreases, and for λ > λ̂, F(λ) increases.
According to the above analysis, it is known that F(λ̂) < 1, and ∀λ ∈ (0,+∞), G(λ)
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decreases.
Therefore, in this case, there exists a unique λ̄ <+∞ such that F(λ̄) = 1. ∀λ < λ̄,
F(λ) > 1, and ∀λ ≤ λ̄, G(λ) > 1. Hence, in conclusion, given a q∗ ∈ [0,1], as long
as (B.7) is held, ∀λ ∈ (0, λ̄], (B.6) is held, and so the information-acquisition best re-
sponse (B.5) exists (see Figure B.1).
Figure B.1: Given a q∗ ∈ [0,1], if (1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d < 0, there exists a
λ̄ such that F(λ̄) = 1. In this case, ∀λ ∈ (0, λ̄], player i’s information-acquisition best
response exists.
In this case, for λ> λ̄, the interior solution does not exist. Instead, there is a bound-
ary solution. Given a q∗ ∈ [0,1], since (1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d < 0, q = 0 in
this situation.1 The behavioural implication is that for λ > λ̄, player i’s best response
towards q∗ is obtained by comparing the ex ante (i.e. before nature draws payoff shocks
for each player) expected payoff of being active and inactive. Note that at λ = λ̄, the
interior solution q= 0 as well, and in this situation, the amount of information acquired
at the optimum is zero. Therefore, the coincidence of the solution at λ = λ̄ with the
solution at λ > λ̄ supports that the prior-reliance choice behaviour is the limit of the
information-acquisition choice behaviour as λ increases, given a q∗ ∈ [0,1]. In the fol-
lowing, we will frequently use the term ’prior-reliance choice behaviour’ to represent
the choice behaviour by comparing the ex ante expected payoff of each action.
1If the constraint 0≤ q≤ 1 is ignored, the interior solution q obtained from solving G-2 is negative.
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Therefore, LHS(λ) strictly increases with respect to λ.
Because limλ→0+ LHS(λ) =−∞ and limλ→+∞ LHS(λ) = (1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+
(1− p)d, equation F ′(λ) = 0 or LHS′(λ) = 0 has a solution if and only if (1−q∗)M+
q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d ≥ 0, and the solution must be unique.
Here, we only consider the strict inequality case. Thus, if
(1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d > 0 (B.8)
then there exists a unique λ̂ such that G′(λ̂) = 0. In addition, for λ < λ̂, G′(λ)< 0
and for λ > λ̂, G′(λ)> 0. Therefore, if (B.8) is held, G(λ) decreases with respect to λ
for λ < λ̂, and G(λ) increases with respect to λ for λ > λ̂.
According to (B.8) and the convexity property of function xexp(x), we get




























Therefore, F ′(λ)< 0 ∀λ ∈ (0,+∞). Thus, when (B.8) is held, there exists a unique
λ = λ̂ such that G′(λ̂) = 0. For λ < λ̂, G(λ) decreases, and for λ > λ̂, G(λ) increases.
According to the above analysis, it is known that G(λ̂) < 1, and ∀λ ∈ (0,+∞), F(λ)
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decreases.
Therefore, in this case, there exists a unique λ̄ <+∞ such that G(λ̄) = 1. ∀λ < λ̄,
G(λ) > 1, and ∀λ ≤ λ̄, F(λ) > 1. Hence, in conclusion, given a q∗ ∈ [0,1], as long
as (B.8) is held, ∀λ ∈ (0, λ̄], (B.6) is held, and so the information-acquisition best re-
sponse (B.5) exists (see Figure B.2).
Figure B.2: Given a q∗ ∈ [0,1], if (1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d > 0, there exists a
λ̄ such that G(λ̄) = 1. In this case, ∀λ ∈ (0, λ̄], player i’s information-acquisition best
response exists.
In this case, for λ> λ̄, the interior solution does not exist. Instead, there is a bound-
ary solution. Given a q∗ ∈ [0,1], since (1− q∗)M + q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d > 0, q = 1
in this situation.2 Its behavioural implication and its consistence with the information-
acquisition choice behaviour are the same as in the analysis of Case 1.
Case 3 ((1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d = 0) : If (1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1−
p)d = 0, then limλ→0+ F ′(λ) =−∞ and limλ→+∞ F ′(λ) = 0; limλ→0+ G′(λ) =−∞ and
limλ→+∞ G′(λ) = 0. Furthermore, the condition that (1− q∗)M + q∗D+ pu+ (1−




2If the constraint 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 is ignored, the interior solution q obtained from solving G-2 is greater
than 1.
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Therefore, according to above results, ∀λ < +∞, both F(λ) and G(λ) decrease
from +∞ to 1 as λ increases from 0 to +∞, and hence in this case, only at +∞ can
F(λ) and G(λ) be equal to 1. Therefore, in this case, all λ ∈ (0,+∞) are applicable to
ensure the existence of the interior solution (B.5) (see Figure B.3).
Figure B.3: Given a q∗ ∈ [0,1], if (1 − q∗)M + q∗D + pu + (1 − p)d = 0, it
is at λ = +∞, F(λ) = G(λ) = 1, and hence in this case, λ̄ = +∞. Therefore,
∀λ ∈ (0,+∞), the interior solution (B.5) always exists. According to Assumption 1,
(1−q∗)M+q∗D+u > 0. Therefore F(λ)> G(λ).
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Summary of proof results for all three cases: In conclusion, under Assumption
1, given i∗’s strategy q∗ ∈ [0,1], i’s information-acquisition best response (B.5) exists
if and only if:
1) if (1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d < 0, there exists a unique λ̄ <+∞ such that
F(λ̄) = 1, and ∀λ ∈ (0, λ̄], i’s information-acquisition best response, given by (B.5),
exists and is unique.
∀λ ∈ (λ̄,+∞), q = 0 given any q∗ ∈ [0,1].
2) if (1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d > 0, there exists a unique λ̄ <+∞ such that
G(λ̄) = 1, and ∀λ ∈ (0, λ̄], i’s information-acquisition best response, given by (B.5),
exists and is unique.
∀λ ∈ (λ̄,+∞), q = 1 given any q∗ ∈ [0,1].
3) if (1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d = 0, ∀λ∈ (0,+∞), i’s information-acquisition
best response (B.5) always exists and it is unique. In this case, λ̄ =+∞. Q.E.D.

Appendix C
Appendix of Chapter 4
Proofs of Proposition 4, 5, 7 and
Corollary 1
Proof of Proposition 4: The choice probabilities q and q∗ are contained in the unit
interval. The function (q(q∗),q∗(q)), which is represented by the equation system
q = 1×1{ f (q∗,λ)> 1}+ f (q∗,λ)×1{0≤ f (q∗,λ)≤ 1}+0×1{ f (q∗,λ)< 0}q∗ = 1×1{ f (q,λ∗)> 1}+ f (q,λ∗)×1{0≤ f (q,λ∗)≤ 1}+0×1{ f (q,λ∗)< 0}
where f (q∗,λ) is equation (6), is continuous with respect to (q∗,q). Therefore,
according to Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, there exists a fixed point of the function
(q(q∗),q∗(q)). The fixed point corresponds to an equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 5: In this proof, we omit the “*” notation for denoting oppo-
nent’s strategy for simplicity. It will not affect the understanding of this proof because
the opponent’s strategy only plays the role as an independent variable.
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Disregarding the constraint 0≤ q≤ 1, f (q) generically has two discontinuity points:
q = M+uM−D and q =
M+d
M−D . According to Assumption 1, M+d < 0 and D+u > 0; there-
fore, M+uM−D > 1 and
M+d
M−D < 0. Hence, under Assumption 1, f (q) is continuous with
respect to q ∈ [0,1] (see Figure C.1).
Figure C.1: A geometric representation of function f (q∗). Note that f (0) and f (1)
could be greater than or equal to 1, or less than 1, depending on specific parameter
specification.
Derivation of ∂ f
′(q)
∂λ
: Define φ(x) = 1+x

















< 0 ∀λ ∈ (0,+∞)














































































































We have limλ→0−Φ′(λ) = 0, and from the previous analysis, it has been known
that −Φ(λ)> 0, −Φ′(λ)> 0, limλ→0−Φ(λ) = 0 and limλ→0−Φ′(λ) = 0. Therefore,
there should exist an ε > 0 such that given q∗ ∈ [0,1], ∀λ ∈ (0,ε), −Φ′(λ)< 1M−D , and
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Figure C.2: A geometric illustration of the proof. For λ ∈ (0,ε), −Φ(λ) < λM−D ,
and hence f ′(q) > −1. From the proof by far, at least it can be known that the λ that
makes f ′(q)>−1 must begin from 0.
Therefore, we obtain a preliminary result that given the opponent’s strategy q∗ ∈
[0,1], there exists an ε such that ∀λ ∈ (0,ε), | f ′(q)|< 1, or equivalently, f ′(q)>−1.














































































































We can obtain T (exp(M
λ
))> 0 and T (exp(D
λ































































































Note that L(s) < 0 equivalently indicates that T ′(A) < 0, and we find that the fol-
lowing:














, then f ′′(q)> 0.
Therefore, in Case 1, f ′(q) increases with respect to q ∈ [0,1] (see Figure C.3).


























































Recall the definition of A≡ exp(M−(M−D)q
λ
). Therefore, Ā corresponds to a unique
value of q and we denote it by q̄. According to the above analysis, if A < Ā, i.e. q > q̄,
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Figure C.3: A geometric illustration of the shape of f ′(q) in Case 1. This figure
can only express the monotonicity of f ′(q), but that is enough for the remaining proofs.
then f ′′(q)< 0, and if A > Ā, i.e. q < q̄, then f ′′(q)> 0. Therefore, for q ∈ [0, q̄], f ′(q)
increases, and for q ∈ [q̄,1], f ′(q) decreases (see Figure C.4).
Figure C.4: A geometric illustration of the shape of f ′(q) in Case 2. Similar to
Figure C.3, this figure can only express the monotonicity of f ′(q), but that is enough
for the remaining proofs.














, then f ′′(q)< 0
for all q ∈ [0,1]. Therefore, in Case 3, f ′(q) decreases with respect to q ∈ [0,1] (see
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Figure C.5).
Figure C.5: A geometric illustration of the shape of f ′(q) in Case 3. Similar to
Figures C.3 and C.4, this figure can only express the monotonicity of f ′(q), but that is
enough for the remaining proofs.
The sign of ∂ f
′(q)
∂λ



















































Specifically, for Φ′(λ)− Φ(λ)
λ
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+1. In the following,
we first prove that (A)< 0 ∀λ ∈ (0,+∞), and then prove that (B)< 0 ∀λ ∈ (0,+∞).
1) Define t = c(d)
λ
. For all λ ∈ (0,+∞), t ∈ (−∞,0). Define equation A(t) =
(t−1)exp(t)+1+ t. Hence, A′(t) = t exp(t)+1.
Define equation ξ(t) = t exp(t). Hence, ξ′(t) = (1+ t)exp(t). According to the
first-order derivative, it can be known that the minimum value of ξ(t) is taken at t =−1.
It is ξ(−1) =−exp(−1)>−1.
For all t ∈ (−∞,0), t exp(t)>−1 and hence A′(t)> 0 for all t ∈ (−∞,0). Therefore,
the maximum value of A(t) is taken at t = 0, which is A(0) = 0. Hence, A(c(d)
λ
) < 0
for all λ ∈ (0,+∞).
By re-arranging A(c(d)
λ








+ 1 < 0 for
all λ ∈ (0,+∞).
2) Define t = c(u)
λ
. For all λ ∈ (0,+∞), t ∈ (0,+∞). Define equation B(t) =
(t−1)exp(t)+1+ t. Hence, B′(t) = t exp(t)+1.
For all t ∈ (0,+∞), B′(t) > 0; therefore, the minimum value of B(t) is taken at













+1 < 0 for all
λ ∈ (0,+∞).
Therefore, in conclusion, ∀λ ∈ (0,+∞), (A) < 0 and (B) < 0, which implies that
Φ′(λ)− Φ(λ)
λ




From the previous proof of the range of λ that ensures | f ′(q)| < 1, we have ob-
tained a preliminary result that given the opponent’s strategy q∈ [0,1], where λ∈ (0,ε),
f ′(q) > −1. Moreover, from the proof of the shape of f ′(q), we found that f ′(q), in
terms of monotonicity, has three kinds of shapes. Based on the analysis by far, it can
be learnt that irrespective of the shape of f ′(q), given a q ∈ [0,1], when λ increases
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from 0, f ′(q) will decrease from a value that is greater than −1.
Therefore, according to the proof of shapes of f ′(q), combining the above analysis,
we obtain the necessary and sufficient condition to ensure f (q) is a contraction func-
tion. As a first step, we determine the necessary and sufficient condition to make f (q)
a contraction if as λ increases, f ′(q) always exhibits a single type of shape (remember
there are three possibilities). This condition is still expressed in three cases, consistent
with the three possible shapes of f ′(q). They are given in terms of the value of λ that
ensures f (q) is a contraction:
Case 1: 0 < λ≤ λ̃, where λ̃ is the unique solution of f ′(0) =−1;
Case 2: 0 < λ ≤ λ̃, where λ̃ is the minimum value between the λ̃ which is the
unique solution of f ′(0) =−1 and the λ̃ which is the unique solution of f ′(1) =−1;
Case 3: 0 < λ≤ λ̃, where λ̃ is the unique solution f ′(1) =−1.
As λ increases from 0, we could meet either Case 1, Case 2 or Case 3. The shape
of f ′(q) may not be confined within a single type for every value of λ. However, no
matter what situation it is, the necessary and sufficient condition to ensure f (q) as a
contraction is always that, given other primitives,
λ ∈ (0, λ̃]
where λ̃ is the minimum value between the λ̃ which is the unique solution of
f ′(0) =−1 (λ̃ = f ′−1q∗ (−1;q∗ = 0) in this chapter) and the λ̃ which is the unique solu-
tion of f ′(1) =−1 (λ̃ = f ′−1q∗ (−1;q∗ = 1) in the chapter) . In one word, it is the value
of f ′(q) at q = 0 or 1 that decides whether f (q) is a contraction.
If λ∈ (0, λ̃] and λ∗ ∈ (0, λ̃∗], where λ may not be equal to λ∗, then the game is dom-
inance solvable. In this situation, both players’ best response functions are contraction
and the best response could be q = f (q∗)× 1{0 ≤ f (q∗) ≤ 1}, i.e. the information-
acquisition best response, or q = 0 or 1 that is obtained by comparing the ex ante
expected payoff given the opponent’s strategy. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1: (1) For M + pu+(1− p)d > 0 and D+ pu+(1− p)d <
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0, if the game turns into a complete information game, then at q∗ = M+pu+(1−p)dM−D ,
f ′q∗(q
∗,λ) = +∞.
If (1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d = 0, λ̄q∗ =+∞. Therefore, at q∗= M+pu+(1−p)dM−D ,
λ̄q∗ = +∞. For the other value of q∗, the corresponding λ̄q∗ < +∞. Therefore, in this
situation, λc =+∞.




(2) If (1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d > 0, λ̄q∗ is determined by G(λ̄q∗,q∗) = 1. It
is known that ∂G(λ,q
∗)





< 0. Therefore, according to the implicit











If for all q∗ ∈ [0,1], (1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d > 0, thus D+ pu+(1− p)d >






At λ = λc, G(λ,q∗ = 1) = 1 is invertible. Therefore, λc = G−1(1;q∗ = 1).
(3) If (1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d < 0, λ̄q∗ is determined by F(λ̄q∗,q∗) = 1. It
is known that ∂F(λ,q
∗)





< 0. Therefore, according to the implicit











If for all q∗ ∈ [0,1], (1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d < 0, then M+ pu+(1− p)d <








At λ = λc, F(λ,q∗ = 0) = 1 is invertible. Therefore, λc = F−1(1;q∗ = 0). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: In this proof, we still omit the notation “*” for simplicity.
It will not affect our understanding of the proof because this notation only appears at
the opponent’s strategy q∗, and q∗ only plays the role as an independent variable of a















and hence the best response function, equation (8) in the paper, can be written as
q∗(q) = 0×1{ f (q)< 0}+ f (q)×1{0≤ f (q)≤ 1}+1×1{ f (q)> 1}















and thus the 2nd iteration of best response functions is given by
g(q∗(q))= 0×1{A(q∗(q))< 0}+A(q∗(q))×1{0≤A(q∗(q))≤ 1}+1×1{A(q∗(q))> 1}
The equilibria of this game should be the solutions of the following equation:
q = g(q∗(q))
where q ∈ [0,1] and in particular, we denote the symmetric equilibrium by (s,s). It
should satisfy
s = q∗(s) = g(q∗(s))
where s ∈ [0,1].
The first- and second-order derivatives of g(q∗(q)) are given by






× d f (q)
dq





























Rearranging the RHS of equation dg(q
∗(q))






×1{0≤ A(q∗(q))≤ 1}× d f (q)
dq
×1{0≤ f (q)≤ 1}
Define set h := {q|0 ≤ f (q) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ A(q∗(q)) ≤ 1}. The function A(q∗(q))
where q ∈ h, or equivalently g(q∗(q)) where q ∈ h, represents the situation in which
both players play the game by acquiring information.
The shape of g(q∗(q)): There should be four types of best response functions
according to whether a player makes the best response at q∗ = 0 or 1 by acquiring
information. Then, based on these four types of best response functions, we can ob-
tain four possible shapes of g(q∗(q)) in the symmetric games. As we will present
below, these four possible types only reflect monotonicity and information acquisition
behaviour, but these properties are enough for the proof. Irrespective of the changes
in λ, a particular shape of q∗(q), and hence g(q∗(q)), will always belong to one of the
four possibilities.
Scenario 1: In this scenario, there are some q in q∗(q) such that f (q)< 0, and some
q in q∗(q) such that f (q)> 1. According to the decreasing property of f (q), f (q)< 0
and f (q)> 1 must happen at the two extreme parts of f (q). We denote the interval of
q that makes f (q) ∈ (0,1) by α = (a,b) ⊂ (0,1). This scenario is depicted by Figure
C.6-1.
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Figure C.6-1: The first possible type of q∗(q). The red curve represents the generic
f (q) function.
For q ∈ (a,b), the player makes the best response by acquiring information and
hence q∗(q) = f (q) ∈ (0,1). According to the construction of the 2nd iteration algo-
rithm, in order to obtain A(q∗(q)) where q ∈ h, rotate q∗(q) ∀q ∈ (a,b) around q = s
by 180◦ and stretch as well as compress relevant parts to make the rotated parts fit
the interval [q∗−1(b),q∗−1(a)]. According to the continuity and increasing property
of A(q∗(q)), it can be expected that for q ∈ (0,q∗−1(b)), A(q∗(q)) < 0 and for q ∈
(q∗−1(a),1), A(q∗(q)) > 1. Therefore, for g(q∗(q)), ∀q ∈ (0,q∗−1(b)), A(q∗(q)) = 0,
and ∀q ∈ (q∗−1(a),1), g(q∗(q)) = 1. Figure C.6-2 exhibits the shape of g(q∗(q)) geo-
metrically.
For q∈ (q∗−1(b),q∗−1(a)), g(q∗(q)) that is obtained by rotating q∗(q) for q∈ (a,b)
should inherit the following property: that d f
′(q)
dλ decreases as λ increases, given any









dq ) begins going above 1 at either q = 0 or 1. The detailed derivation
and analysis of dg(q
∗(q))
dq will be discussed later.
Scenario 2: In this scenario, there are some q of q∗(q) such that f (q) < 0, and
for the remaining q, q∗(q) = f (q) ∈ (0,1), i.e. the player’s best response is made by
acquiring information. According to the decreasing property of q∗(q), we denote this
interval supporting information acquisition by β = [0,a) ∈ [0,1]. This scenario is de-
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Figure C.6-2: The first possible type of g(q∗(q)). It reflects monotonicity and
information acquisition behaviour. ∀q ∈ (0,q∗−1(b)) and ∀q ∈ (q∗−1(a),1), there is
at least one player playing the game without acquiring information, indicated by the
horizontal line.
picted by Figure C.7-1.
Figure C.7-1: The second possible type of q∗(q). The red lines indicate two possible
parts of q∗(q) that are used to obtain the shape of g(q∗(q)). Which part will be used
depends on the relative magnitude of a and q∗(0).
In this scenario, for q ∈ [0,a), the player makes the best response by acquiring
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(a) q∗−1(a)> 0 (b) q∗−1(a)< 0
Figure C.7-2: The second possible type of g(q∗(q)). It has two possible shapes
which depends on the relative magnitude of q∗−1(a) and 0. These figures reflects
monotonicity of g(q∗(q)) and players’ information acquisition behaviour.
information. According to the construction of the 2nd iteration algorithm, in order to
obtain A(q∗(q)) where q∈ h, rotate q∗(q) ∀q∈ [0,min{a,q∗(0)}] around q= s by 180◦,
and compress as well as stretch relevant parts to fit the interval [max{q∗−1(a),0},a].
Therefore, we obtain the A(q∗(q)) where q∈ h. For q∈ [0,max{q∗−1(a),0}), g(q∗(q))=
0 if q∗−1(a) > 0 and g(q∗(q)) = q(q∗(0)) if q∗−1(a) < 0. For q ∈ [a,1], g(q∗(q)) =
q∗(0). This result implies that in Scenario 2, for q ∈ [0,max{q∗−1(a),0}) or q ∈ [a,1],
there is at least one player not acquiring information when playing the game. There-
fore, we obtain the shape of function g(q∗(q)) which reflects monotonicity and infor-
mation acquisition behaviour. It is given by Figure C.7-2.





herits the property of d f (q)dq (and hence
dq∗(q)
dq ) since the former is in principle a rotated
image of the latter. In particular, by inheriting the property of d f
′(q)
dλ < 0, correspond-
ingly, as λ increases, dA(q
∗(q))
dq increases ∀q ∈ [0,1] and it is at q = 0 or 1 that
dA(q∗(q))
dq




Scenario 3: In this scenario, there are some q of q∗(q) such that f (q)> 1, and for
the remaining q, q∗(q) = f (q) ∈ (0,1), i.e. the player’s best response is made by ac-
quiring information. We denote the interval about information-acquisition behaviour
by r = [b,1]⊂ [0,1]. This scenario is depicted by Figure C.8-1.
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Figure C.8-1: The third possible type of q∗(q). The red lines denote two possible
parts that are used to obtain the shape of g(q∗(q)). Which part will be used depends
on the relative magnitude of b and q∗(1).
For q ∈ [b,1], the player makes the best response by acquiring information. In or-
der to obtain A(q∗(q)) where q ∈ h, rotate q∗(q) for all q ∈ [max{b,q∗(1)},1] around
q = s by 180◦, and compress as well as stretch relevant parts to fit [b,min{1,q∗−1(b)}].
Therefore, we obtain the shape of A(q∗(q)) where q ∈ h, which is the part of g(q∗(q))
in which both players play the game by acquiring information. For all q ∈ [0,b],
g(q∗(q)) = q∗(1) and for all q ∈ (q∗−1(b),1), g(q∗(q)) = 1 if q∗(1) < b. This re-
sult implies that in Scenario 3, for q∈ [0,b] or q∈ [min{q∗−1(b),1},1], there is at least
one player not acquiring information when playing the game. Therefore, we obtain the
shape (geometric expression) of g(q∗(q)) which reflects monotonicity and information
acquisition behaviour. They are given by Figure C.8-2.
Scenario 4: In this scenario, for all q ∈ [0,1], q∗(q) = f (q) ∈ [0,1], i.e. in the
symmetric game, both players always play the game by acquiring information. This
scenario is depicted by Figure C.9-1.
In order to obtain A(q∗(q)) where q ∈ h, rotate the part of q∗(q) corresponding to
[q∗(1),q∗(0)] around q = s by 180◦, and compress as well as stretch relevant parts in
order to fit the interval [0,1]. Without loss of generality, we obtain the shape of func-
tion A(q∗(q)) where q ∈ h and hence g(q∗(q)). It is given by Figure C.9-2.
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(a) q∗−1(b)< 1 (b) q∗−1(b)> 1
Figure C.8-2: The third possible type of g(q∗(q)). It has two possible shapes which
depends on the relative magnitude between q∗−1(b) and 1. These figures reflect
monotonicity of g(q∗(q)) and players’ information acquisition behaviour
Figure C.9-1: The fourth possible type of q∗(q)









dq ) since the former is in principle a rotated image of the latter. In partic-
ular, it inherits the following property: that as λ increases, dA(q
∗(q))
dq increases for all
q ∈ [0,1] and it is at q = 0 or q = 1 that dA(q
∗(q))
dq first begins increasing above 1. The
detailed derivation and analysis of dg(q
∗(q))
dq will be discussed later.
dg(q∗(q))
dq and equilibria of the game: As we have derived, for λ ∈ (0, λ̃), the best
response functions should be contraction. Therefore, the 2nd iteration of the best re-
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Figure C.9-2: The fourth possible type of g(q∗(q)). As in previous cases, this
figure can only reflect monotonicity of g(q∗(q)) and players’ information acquisition
behaviour.
sponse functions should be contraction as well (recall the equation of dg(q
∗(q))
dq ). The
contraction 2nd iteration can be categorized into the following three situations in terms
of whether players acquire information at the symmetric equilibrium when the best
response functions are contraction functions (see Figure C.10).1
However, (2) and (3) are impossible to happen. When λ = 0, the equilibrium is
(p, p), while p is the prior probability and it is assumed that p ∈ (0,1). For λ ∈ (0,ε),
where ε is a small enough positive number, the information cost is small; hence, the
new solution (p′, p′) should be close to (p, p) and p′ ∈ (0,1). Hence, for the 2nd iter-
ation algorithm we start with, it must be in the form of sub-figure (1) of Figure C.10,
where the intersection point between g(q∗(q)) and 45◦ line is between 0 and 1. More-
over, the intersection point is realized by the A(q∗(q)) function, not horizontal lines,
which implies that both players acquire information at the symmetric equilibrium.
Sub-figure (1) in Figure C.10 represents a situation where for all q ∈ [0,1], both
players play the game by acquiring information. According to previous analysis, in re-
1These figures can generally represent monotonity and information acquisition behaviour of players
in such games, but as in most previous figures, by far these figures do not necessarily reflect other more
precise properties such as curvature of q∗(q) and g(q∗(q)). However, we do not need these properties
yet. The monotonicity and information-acquisition behaviour shown by these figures have been enough
for us in the current proof.
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(1) (2) (3)
Figure C.10: The three possible cases of the 2nd iteration algorithm g(q∗(q)) for
λ ∈ (0, λ̃) such that the best response function q∗(q) and hence g(q∗(q)) are
contraction. In (1), in the symmetric equilibrium, both players acquire information.
In (2), both players do not acquire information when making decisions and the
equilibrium is (1, 1). In (3), both players do not acquire information when making
decisions as well and the equilibrium is (0, 0). In (1), (2) and (3), the figures reflect
the monotonicity, information-acquisition behaviour of players (at the symmetric
equilibrium), and the contraction property of g(q∗(q)).
ality, we have additional two possibilities describing the shape of contraction g(q∗(q)).
First, for qs close to 0, there is at least one player playing the game without acquiring
information; this part is represented by a horizontal line in sub-figure (1)-1 of Figure
C.11. Second, for qs close to 1, there is at least one player playing the game without
acquiring information; this part is represented by a horizontal line in sub-figure (1)-2
of Figure C.11.
Now, we consider the situation that multiple equilibria begin to arise. As we may
start from situation (1) (in Figure C.10), (1)-1 or (1)-2 (in Figure C.11), and each sit-
uation has three possibilities in terms of the three possible cases of f ′(q), we have
to consider 9 possible first-time occurrences of multiple equilibria as λ increases to a
level λ1.2 These 9 possible situations are described in Figure C.12.
It can be easily proven that in this game, when multiple equilibria arise, it is impos-
sible that at the symmetric equilibrium, both players do not acquire information (a fact
indicated by no horizontal line intersection at the symmetric equilibrium). Interested
readers can prove this result by themselves.
2λ1 is defined to describe the situation of the first-time occurrences of multiple equilibria.
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(1)-1 (1)-2
Figure C.11: Two possible shapes of contraction g(q∗(q)). (1)-1 is the case that for
qs close to 0, at least one player does not acquire information. (1)-2 is the case that
for qs close to 1, at least one player does not acquire information.
In all nine possibilities, the shapes that match with Cases 1 and 3 of f ′(q) are im-
possible to happen, since there are only two intersection points. The game exhibits
strategic substitutes and the best response function is decreasing and continuous with
respect to the opponent’s strategies, and therefore, if multiple equilibria can arise, the
number of equilibria must be odd. Therefore, in all nine possible situations, only
cases corresponding to Case 2 can happen when multiple equilibria first appear as λ
increases. Therefore, we only get three cases, corresponding to (1), (1)-1 and (1)-2,
to describe the first-time appearance of multiple equilibria and the corresponding λ is
the λ1 as indicated from above. In a particular situation, irrespective of whether the
multiplicity evolves from (1), (1)-1 or (1)-2, there are always three equilibria, and in
the two asymmetric equilibria which are the outer intersection points between g(q∗(q))
and the 45◦ line, there is always one player not acquiring information.
Another result we can derive from the above analysis is that for λ∈ (λ1−ε,λ1+ε),
where ε is an arbitrarily small positive number, the shape of q∗(q) is always in line with
Case 2. It is because of the continuity of q∗(q) and hence g(q∗(q)) with respect to λ
for all q ∈ [0,1]. In Case 2, the g(q∗(q)) where q ∈ h first exhibits concavity and then
exhibits convexity as q increases. We call this property the concavity–convexity prop-
erty of g(q∗(q)).
Therefore, as λ increase away from λ1, for λ ∈ (λ1,λ1 + ε), at each q ∈ [0,1],
dg(q∗(q))
dq increases, and therefore, we get five equilibria in either situation evolving
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Case 2 Case 1 Case 3
The first multiple equilibria situation happens at λ1 and it evolves from (1)
Case 2 Case 1 Case 3
The first multiple equilibria situation happens at λ1 and it evolves from (1)-1
Case 2 Case 1 Case 3
The first multiple equilibria situation happens at λ1 and it evolves from (1)-2
Figure C.12: Nine possible situations describing the first multiple equilibria
situations if multiple equilibria can happen in this symmetric game.
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(1) (1)-1 (1)-2
Figure C.13: The three possible cases of 5 equilibria corresponds to (1), (1)-1 and
(1)-2. Based on the previous analysis, it is known that in this situation, the derivative
of best response function q∗(q) must follow the shape of Case 2.
from (1), (1)-1 or (1)-2.3 Figure C.13 shows a geometric description of these three
5-equilibria situations.
As λ increases, for all q∈ [0,1], dg(q
∗(q))
dq continues increasing, and geometrically, it
indicates that the part of g(q∗(q)) in which both players acquire information will grow
steeper. This part is essentially A(q∗(q)) where q∈ h, not the horizontal lines. Besides,
it can be obtained that as λ increases away from λ1, before the symmetric equilibrium
becomes unstable, q∗(q)’s shape is always in line with Case 2, and Cases 1 and 3 are
impossible to happen. From the red curves in the following figures (see Figure C.14),
it can be found that if Case 1 or Case 3 happens, there are three equilibria and the sym-
metric equilibrium becomes unstable. More importantly, in one asymmetric equilib-
rium, both players acquire information (the intersection point of the red curve with the
45◦ line), and in the other asymmetric equilibrium, at least one player does not acquire
information. This contradicts with the symmetry property. Therefore, as λ increases
away from λ1, 5 equilibria will always be maintained and the symmetric equilibrium
is stable. Until the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable as λ increases, we can
consider whether the shape of q∗(q) may deviate from Case 2 to Case 1 or Case 3.
As λ increases, the next boundary situation that we need to consider is that at λ =
λ2, the stability of the symmetric equilibrium is not determined, i.e.
dq∗(q)
dq |q=s = −1;
hence, dg(q
∗(q))
dq |q=s = 1.
4 According to the continuity of dq
∗(q)
dq with respect to λ, it can
3In the following, for simplicity, we will indicate any situation originating from situation (1) (in
Figure C.10), (1)-1 or (1)-2 (in Figure C.11) by (1), (1)-1 or (1)-2. It does not affect the understanding
of the proof.
4λ2 is defined to describe this boundary situation.
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(1) (1)-1 (1)-2
Figure C.14: The three possible cases of g(q∗(q)) before the symmetric equilibrium
becomes unstable. The shapes of g(q∗(q)) function are consistent with Case 1 and
Case 3. Each curve is combined with a red part and a black part.
be known that at λ2, the shape of Case 2 is still maintained.
In addition, by proof of contradiction, it can be shown that at λ = λ2,
dg(q∗(q))
dq
reaches its lowest value at q = s, which is dg(q
∗(q))
dq = 1. For other values of q except
s, dg(q
∗(q))
dq > 1 based on its shape indicated by Case 2. Here is the proof. Suppose at
q = s, the dg(q
∗(q))
dq has not reached its lowest value, which without loss of generality
can be depicted by Figure C.15.
Around s, for q ∈ (s−ε,s), dg(q
∗(q))
dq > 1 and for q ∈ (s,s+ε),
dg(q∗(q))
dq < 1. There-
fore, (s, g(q∗(s))) turns to be a tangent point of g(q∗(q)) with 45◦ line (see Figure
C.16).
According to the above analysis and Figure C.16, apparently this situation con-
tradicts with the symmetry property of the strategic substitutes game. Therefore, at
λ = λ2, the value of
dq∗(q)
dq reaches its lowest value, which equals 1. Therefore, at
λ = λ2, for the value of q ∈ (s− ε,s+ ε), dq
∗(q)
dq should exhibit in the following shape
(see Figure C.17).
Hence, at λ = λ2, the situations following (1), (1)-1 and (1)-2 turn into the fol-
lowing situations, respectively (see Figure C.18). We can see that at λ = λ2, g(q∗(q))
where q∈ h still exhibits the concavity–convexity property. Together with the situation
of λ = λ1, it can be concluded that at any boundary where the number of equilibria will
change, g(q∗(q)) where q ∈ h always exhibit the concavity–convexity property.
296 Appendix C. Appendix of Chapter 4 Proofs of Proposition 4, 5, 7 and Corollary 1
Figure C.15: The red curve corresponds to the generic A(q∗(q)) function. As it is
known, the A(q∗(q)) function is part of the g(q∗(q)) function, to which the piecewise
function indicated in blue corresponds. The overlapped parts between the red curve
and blue curve correspond to the function A(q∗(q)) where q ∈ h and the symmetric
equilibrium s belongs to the set h.
Figure C.16: Following Figure C.15, in this situation, (s, g(q∗(s))) turns to be a
tangent point of g(q∗(q)) with 45◦ line, and according to value of dg(q
∗(q))
dq around s,
g(q∗(q)) must be located below the 45◦ line. In this symmetric strategic substitutes
game, the number of equilibria must be odd, thus a contradiction arises.
Therefore, at λ = λ2, at symmetric equilibrium (s, s),
dq∗(q)
dq = −1, and there are
297
Figure C.17: The correct shape of dq
∗(q)
dq at λ = λ2
(1) (1)-1 (1)-2
Figure C.18: At λ = λ2, dq
∗(q)
dq |q=s = 1, and the shape of g(q
∗(q)) has three
possibilities that evolve from (1), (1)-1 and (1)-2, respectively.
three equilibria.
As λ increases away from λ2, except the part that at least one player plays the game
without acquiring information, which exhibits a horizontal line and happens at the two
sides of g(q∗(q)), the derivative of g(q∗(q)) in which both players play the game by




dλ > 0 ∀q ∈ [0,1]. According to
continuity of g(q∗(q)) with respect to λ, at the new symmetric equilibrium, both play-
ers still play the game by acquiring information. By increasing λ away from λ2, the
shapes of g(q∗(q)) evolving from (1), (1)-1 and (1)-2 not only match with Case 2, but
the shapes of g(q∗(q)) may match with Case 1 or Case 3 as well. Therefore, for λ> λ2,
Cases 1 and 3 again become the candidate shapes of g(q∗(q)), and again, we have nine
possible shapes of g(q∗(q)), which are given by Figure C.19.
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It is found that, irrespective of the shape of g(q∗(q)), there are always three equi-
libria, and in either (1), (1)-1, or (1)-2, irrespective of the case (Case 1, Case 2 or
Case 3), the concerned properties of equilibria (i.e. the stability of the symmetic equi-
librium, players’ behaviour at the symmetic equilibrium and the types of asymmetric
equilibria) are the same. In all nine possible situations, the symmetric equilibrium is
unstable. In the situation of (1), according to symmetry of players’ behaviour in a pair
of corresponding asymmetric equilibria, the asymmetric equilibria in this situation is
(1, 0) and (0, 1). In the situation of (1)-1, again according to symmetry, the asymmet-
ric equilibria are (1,q) and (q,1), where q ∈ (0,1). And in the situation of (1)-2, the
asymmetric equilibria are (0,q) and (q,0), where q ∈ (0,1). These (outer) asymmetric
equilibria have already been there since asymmetric equilibria arise from λ = λ1.
Before we proceed, let us study some profound issues underlying (1), (1)-1 and (1)-
2. We begin from (1)-1. According to the symmetry property of players’ behaviour in
asymmetric equilibria, as long as asymmetric equilibria arise, as it has been shown, the
(1,q) and (q,1) asymmetric equilibria where q ∈ (0,1) always exist. This means that
given an opponent’s strategy q∗ ∈ (0,1), player i always chooses action 1 by comparing
ex ante expected payoff of each action. Therefore, player i in (1)-1 always has
(1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d > 0 ∀q∗ ∈ (0,1)
and equivalently it implies that the payoff specification always satisfies
D+ pu+(1− p)d > 0
For (1)-2, as long as asymmetric equilibria arise, the (0,q) and (q,0) equilibria
where q ∈ (0,1) always exist, which means that given opponent’s strategy q∗ ∈ (0,1),
player i always chooses action 0 when not acquiring information. Hence, in this situa-
tion, for player i, we get
(1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d < 0 ∀q∗ ∈ (0,1)
and equivalently it implies that the payoff specification always satisfies
M+ pu+(1− p)d < 0
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Case 2 Case 1 Case 3
The three-equilibria situation happens for λ > λ2 and it evolves from (1). The
symmetric equilibrium is unstable.
Case 2 Case 1 Case 3
The three-equilibria situation happens for λ > λ2 and it evolves from (1)-1. The
symmetric equilibrium is unstable.
Case 2 Case 1 Case 3
The three-equilibria situation happens for λ > λ2 and it evolves from (1)-2. The
symmetric equilibrium is unstable.
Figure C.19: Nine possible shapes of g(q∗(q)) for λ > λ2. There are three equilibria
in all nine situations, and the symmetric equilibrium is unstable.
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For (1), as long as asymmetric equilibria arise, the (1,0) and (0,1) asymmetric
equilibria always exist. It implies that when the player makes the decision without ac-
quiring information, (1−q∗)M+q∗D+ pu+(1− p)d is not necessarily always greater
than or smaller than 0 for all q∗ ∈ (0,1). Hence, given assumption 1, situation (1) im-
plies that the payoff specification satisfies
M+ pu+(1− p)d > 0
and
D+ pu+(1− p)d < 0
Now, we go back to the three-equilibria situation that we have just analysed. For
(1), as λ increases (λ> λ2), the g(q∗(q)) where q∈ h will grow steeper since its deriva-
tive with respect to q increases, and at the same time, the three equilibria always exist.





∞ at q = s. This limit indicates that if the opponent deviates from the symmetric
equilibrium s, a player will either choose action 0 or action 1. This is the reaction
style for a player in a complete information game. Under the payoff specification
M + pu+(1− p)d > 0 and D+ pu+(1− p)d < 0, the symmetric equilibrium at the
limit is just the mixed strategy in the corresponding complete information game which
is shown in Table 3, Section 4.4. Therefore, it can be said that when λ is so large that
at symmetric equilibrium q = s, dg(q
∗(q))
dq = +∞, no player will try to make the best
response by acquiring information given any strategy of the opponent q∗ ∈ [0,1] and
the game turns into the complete information game described in Table 3, Section 4.4.
Suppose at λ = λc,
dg(q∗(q))
dq equals +∞ at q = s. Then, for λ > λc, the shape of the best
response function is fixed because dg(q
∗(q))
dq ≥ 0 always holds; hence, from λ≥ λc, the
game is always the complete information game (see Figure C.20).





dλ > 0, and at the same time, the three equilibria always exist. It has been
known that when λ is greater than λc so that players make the best response without
acquiring information given any strategy of the opponent, the game becomes the com-
plete information game described in Table 3 and the equilibrium is (1,1). From the
three-equilibria situation to the complete information game limit, dg(q
∗(q))
dq continues to
increase and the three-equilibira situation will always be maintained, unless the ver-
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Figure C.20: The 2nd iteration algorithm g(q∗(q)) for λ ≥ λc given that
M + pu + (1− p)d > 0 and D + pu + (1− p)d < 0, i.e. situation (1). This algo-
rithm calculates the equilibria of the complete information game described in Table 3.
tical distance between the two horizontal lines at the two sides of g(q∗(q)) decreases
at the same time, the complete information limit that its equilibrium is unique and it
is (1, 1) would never be reached. Therefore, as λ increases from λ2,
dg(q∗(q))
dq where
q ∈ h continues to increase, and at the same time, the vertical distance between the
horizontal lines at the two sides of g(q∗(q)) decreases, until λ = λc, g(q∗(q)) becomes
a horizontal line, and the game becomes a complete information game. Because in
(1)-1, D+ pu+(1− p)d > 0, for λ ≥ λc, g(q∗(q)) = 1, and the unique intersection
point of g(q∗(q)) and the 45◦ line is just the equilibrium of the complete information
game (see Figure C.21).
For (1)-2, the analysis is the same as in (1)-1 and the results parallel with (1)-1.
(1)-2 is characterized by M + pu+ (1− p)d < 0. As λ increases until λc in which
both players play the game without acquiring information given any strategy of the
opponent and hence playing a complete information game, then g(q∗(q)) = 0 and so




dλ > 0, it is
known that g(q∗(q)) always equals 0 (see Figure C.22).
Therefore, in conclusion, as λ increases from 0, multiple equilibria will arise, and
then we get the following results:
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Figure C.21: The 2nd iteration algorithm g(q∗(q)) for λ ≥ λc given that
D + pu + (1− p)d > 0, i.e. situation (1)-1. It is g(q∗(q)) = 1. This algorithm
calculates the equilibria of the complete information game described in Table 3.
Figure C.22: The 2nd iteration algorithm g(q∗(q)) for λ ≥ λc given that
M + pu + (1− p)d < 0, i.e. situation (1)-2. It is g(q∗(q)) = 0. This algorithm
calculates the equilibria of the complete information game given in Table 3.
1) As λ increases from 0, if M+ pu+(1− p)d > 0 and D+ pu+(1− p)d < 0, for
λ < λc, it is always possible that a player makes the best response by acquiring infor-
mation for some strategies of the opponent. Then, the number of equilibria will change
in the following sequence: 1→ 3→ 5→ 3. During this process, at symmetric equilib-
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rium, both players play the game by acquiring information. Finally, when λ ≥ λc, no
player will make the best response by acquiring information given any strategy of the
opponent and the game becomes a complete information game shown in Table 3. The







M−D )}. The mixed strategy
is the limit of the symmetric equilibrium as λ increases from 0.
2) As λ increases from 0, if D+ pu+(1− p)d > 0, for λ < λc, it is always pos-
sible that a player will make the best response by acquiring information. Then, the
number of equilibria will change in the following sequence: 1→ 3→ 5→ 3. During
this process, at the symmetric equilibrium, both players play the game by acquiring
information. Finally, when λ≥ λc, no player will make the best response by acquiring
information given any strategy of the opponent and the game becomes a complete in-
formation game shown in Table 3. The limit complete information game has a unique
equilibrium (1,1).
3) As λ increases from 0, if M+ pu+(1− p)d < 0, for λ < λc, it is always possible
that a player will make the best response by acquiring information for some strategies
of the opponent. Then, the number of equilibria will change in the following sequence:
1→ 3→ 5→ 3. During this process, at the symmetric equilibrium, both players play
the game by acquiring information. Finally, when λ≥ λc, no player will make the best
response by acquiring information given any strategy of the opponent and the game
becomes a complete information game shown in Table 3. The limit complete informa-
tion game has a unique equilibrium (0,0).
Logically, there exists another possibility as λ increases from 0— during the pro-
cess, there always exists a unique equilibrium. From the previous analysis, we can
see that if at symmetric equilibrium q = s, dg(q
∗(q))
dq ≥ 1, i.e. the symmetric equilib-
rium is unstable, then irrespective of the shape of f (q) in Case 1, Case 2 or Case
3, multiple equilibria will definitely arise (which is the situation that λ ≥ λ2 in the
previous multiple-equilibria situation). Therefore, a necessary requirement for the
uniqueness situation happening is that as λ increases from 0 to +∞, the symmetric
equilibrium is always stable. For this situation, when players make the best response
by acquiring information at the symmetric equilibrium, dq
∗(q)
dq |q=s > −1, and hence,
dg(q∗(q))
dq |q=s < 1. Finally, when players no longer acquire information at the symmetric
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equilibrium, dq
∗(q)
dq |q=s = 0, and hence,
dg(q∗(q))
dq |q=s = 0. In this uniqueness situation,
before g(q∗(q)) becomes a horizontal line at the symmetric equilibrium, both play-
ers play the game by acquiring information at equilibrium and equilibrium strategy
s ∈ (0,1).
When g(q∗(q)) becomes a horizontal line at q = s, it is impossible that the hor-
izontal line around q = s is located between 0 and 1 because if there exists a unique
equilibrium in which no player plays the game by acquiring information, then this equi-
librium must be either (0,0) or (1,1) obtained by comparing ex ante expected payoff of
each action. Therefore, this fact indicates that this situation can only happen with pay-
off specifications of M+ pu+(1− p)d < 0 or D+ pu+(1− p)d > 0 (see Figure C.23).
Figure C.23: An illustration of the unqiueness situation of the game as λ increases
from 0 to +∞. Without loss of generality, the process can be described by the LHS
sub-figure and RHS sub-figure(s). This uniqueness situation can only happen for
M+ pu+(1− p)d < 0 or D+ pu+(1− p)d > 0
Therefore, if M+ pu+(1− p)d < 0 or D+ pu+(1− p)d > 0, as λ increases from
0 to +∞, the game is able to always perform a unique equilibrium under appropriate
parameter specification. The equilibrium is always stable.
Therefore, all the above proof constitutes the proof of Proposition 7, and Proposi-




Appendix of Chapter 4
Proof of Comparative Statics Analysis
(Proposition 3, 8 and 9)
Proof: At an equilibrium (q,q∗) where q and q∗ ∈ (0,1), we denote the compara-
tive statics of parameter τ on player i’s equilibrium strategy by ∂q
∂τ
, and the com-




τ ∈ {M,D,u,d, p,λ}. It is found that players’ equilibrium strategies are contained in
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The comparative statics of best response ∂q(q
∗)
∂τ








































































































































Next, we consider the comparative statics of parameter τ, where τ∈{M,D,u,d, p,λ},
on players’ equilibrium strategies:
1. Symmetric Equilibrium: For symmetric equilibrium q = q∗ = s ∈ (0,1), ac-


























} > 1. There-















2. Outer Asymmetric Equilibrium: At an extreme asymmetric equilibrium (q,q∗),
where q ∈ (0,1) and q∗ = 0 or 1, because ∂q
∗
∂τ
= 0, in such asymmetric equilibrium, ac-






3. Inner Asymmetric Equilibrium: At a middle asymmetric equilibrium (q,q∗),
where q ∈ (0,1) and q∗ ∈ (0,1), the comparative statics result in such equilibrium are
expressed simply by equation system (D.1). In such asymmetric equilibria, ∂q
∂τ
is linear














depend on not only the value of parameters but also both players’ equilibrium strategy
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the middle asymmetric equilibria cannot be determined. Q.E.D.
D.1 Proof of the Sensitivity Analysis that Only One Player’s
Information Cost Changes










for q ∈ (0,1). Now, we calculate the impact of varying one player’s information ac-



















is λ’s impact on player i’s best response. Solving the equa-


















Appendix of Chapter 4
Proof for Section 4.9
In this section, we calculate ∂p̄
∂λ∗ and explain why its sign is uncertain.









. Calculating its derivative with
















































312 Appendix E. Appendix of Chapter 4 Proof for Section 4.9
p̄∗ ≥ p p̄∗ < p (Case 1) p̄∗ < p (Case 2)
Figure E.1: Assuming ∂ p̄
∗
∂λ∗ > 0, three cases of EΠ(λ
∗) are possible. In the third figure








It can be concluded that the sign of the latter formula cannot be determined without












In the following, we assume that ∂ p̄
∗
∂λ∗ > 0, and study how λ
∗ affects a player’s ex-
pected payoff.
Given that ∂ p̄
∗
∂λ∗ > 0, suppose when λ
∗ is close to 0, p̄∗ ≥ p, where p has been given.
Then, as λ∗ increases, p̄∗ becomes higher, and therefore ∂EΠ
∂λ∗ > 0 as λ
∗ increases from
0 to +∞. In this case, we always have ∂q
∗(q)
∂λ∗ < 0 and when λ
∗ reaches λ̄∗q, as defined in
Proposition 2, q∗(q) = 0 and thus EΠ = M, which is the highest of value of EΠ (see
Figure E.1).
Next, suppose when λ∗ is close to 0, p̄∗ < p. As λ∗ increases, two possible scenar-
ios happen:
Case 1: As λ∗ increases, p̄∗ < p is always maintained. Therefore, ∂EΠ
∂λ∗ < 0. Until
λ∗ = λ̄∗q, which is defined in Proposition 1, q
∗(q) = 1 and EΠ = D, which is its lowest
value.
Case 2: As λ∗ increases, at λ∗ = λ0 < λ̄∗q, p̄∗ = p. For λ∗ Q λ0, ∂EΠ∂λ∗ Q 0. There-
fore, in Case 2, the highest value of EΠ is reached at λ∗ = λ̄∗q, and the highest value is
M. At λ∗ = λ0, EΠ reaches its lowest value.
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Therefore, if ∂ p̄
∗
∂λ∗ > 0, the highest value of EΠ is reached at either λ
∗= 0 or λ∗= λ̄∗q.
The λ̄∗q is defined in Proposition 2 (see Figure E.1).
